FINAL MORAL VALUES IN SOCIOLOGY

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FINAL MORAL VALUES IN SOCIOLOGY

BY

REV. THEODORE M. HEMELT, S.S., S.T.D.,

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Final Moral Values in Sociology

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PREFACE

This work is the fruit of a careful examination of a large number of representative and widely-circulated sociological works, especially those in use in the high schools, colleges, and universities of this country. This literature is immense, its circulation is great, and its influence is profound. Many of these books aim at shaping the practical outlook on life and the conduct of a large part of the youth of the country. The self-appointed mission of all of them is to stamp their views on the thought and the life of the present and the coming generations. The writer proposes to set forth the system underlying these works and to discuss their position in matters of morality.

Although sociologists consider their science as primarily a descriptive one, they are lead almost inevitably, it seems, to put interpretations upon the facts which they set out to discover, to describe, and to catalogue. They look for processes behind the facts, and then seek out laws, or principles, or elementary factors behind facts and processes. These elementary factors are in turn practically and finally evaluated, and this definite, final evaluation is stamped on the ensemble. Thus an entire system is built up, which undertakes to explain, not only society, but man and the universe.

The system turns out to be a comprehensive philosophy of life, cast in novel categories, expressed in a new terminology, but based on evolutionary and materialistic assumptions and plainly subversive of everything that the average Christian considers vital to morality both in theory and in practice. In this system there is no human freedom, no right or wrong, no responsibility to conscience, fellow-man, or God, no positive

sanction for conduct. According to it Society in evolution is the great reality. The individual is only a cell in the vast organism—society, which is developing under the influence of natural selection towards some higher type. Man is not consciously constructing this social process in evolution, but the social process is constructing man.

This "social process", the main-spring of the system, is an unwarranted assumption, not a demonstrable fact or principle. It is, indeed, an hypothesis utterly inconsistent with many elementary truths and facts that are irreducible to its scheme of things. The writer proposes to prove this point, to reveal the inadequacy of the analyses, the conceptions, and the conclusions of the system, and to show its irreconcilability with Christian truths and standards.

If these contentions are true, and the writer is convinced that they are and that he can prove it, no apology for this work is required. It is a duty to the public and to religion. Sociologists are undermining the basis of the morality which reason, experience, and religion show to be the mainstay of the individual and of society. For it they are confidently urging a frail substitute, conceived of a false outlook on reality and life.

Many sociologists apparently attempt to evade such charges by pretending that they have no thought of building up a new and revolutionary system in order to direct conduct, or of substituting seemingly equivalent ideas for those which they are striving to eradicate. However, the contest is not about intentions or words, but about what is being done with the realities of morals and revealed religion.

Others would scorn the writer's indictment as the diatribe of a theologian. But let them and, above all, let the open-minded reader judge the cause on its own merits. The writer allows sociologists to speak for themselves, he fairly and accurately quotes their own statements, giving chapter and verse, he dispassionately analyzes their assertions and arguments, and he shows the real significance of their positions in plain language. He ventures to hope that he has not only demonstrated the weakness of the sociological theory and the

character of its subtile, pernicious attack on individual and social morals, but that he has also supplied a positive vindication of the moral law as manifested by right reason and divine revelation.

PART I

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIOLOGICAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS REVEALED RELIGION

The mere introduction of the moral concept into a sociological study, at once arouses the sociologist to suspect an unsympathetic attitude towards him and his science. His fears are not altogether without justification, because morality—in its traditional meaning—can have no part with sociology as it is understood by the majority of writers at the present day. Yet, it is the purpose of this study to show that the idea of morality in its ordinary and accepted meaning is inseparately linked with treatises on sociology.

That the opposition to morality in its traditional sense is real and not fanciful is apparent from even a cursory examination. L. L. Bernard, in his treatment of "The Concept of Progress", is careful to distinguish present day modern thought from all that preceded it. In fact, this writer opposes "science" and theology, refusing to place them in the same category. "We have only begun to think in a scientific sense as distinguished from the old theological and metaphysical theological viewpoints." [1]

There can be no doubting what is meant by "thinking in a scientific sense", for in a previous article, [2] the same writer unmistakably speaks of the subject-matter of sociology. In fact, the general character of his works show that he is predominantly interested in matters social.

Sociology, as understood by present-day writers, studies

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[1] *S. F.*, Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 43.

Because of the frequent references made, the following abbreviations have been employed:

A. J. of S. for The American Journal of Sociology;
J. of S. F. " The Journal of Social Forces;
S. F., " Social Forces.

[2] *J. of S. F.*, "The Development of the Concept of Progress," Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 2, p. 210.

men considered as affecting or affected by association. The explanation of life, understood comprehensively, may be said to form the content of this science. Its method and spirit must be scientific in every detail according to the best standards in vogue today.[3]

Thus understood sociology conflicts with revealed religion, because it, too, undertakes to explain life, solve its problems, and return a scientific answer to the purpose of existence. The immediate cause of conflict centers about evaluations placed on human activity by these two interpretations of life. A certain moral tone must pervade sociological treatises; not, indeed, that sociology "ex-professo" teaches morality, but because sociological pronouncements necessarily influence man's activity. Revealed religion becomes concerned, therefore, about the growth of this literature. It further recognizes the necessity of pointing out that the evaluations of sociology, because of its fundamental principles, are contrary to its own code of morality, and consequently norms of conduct supplied by sociology differ necessarily from those of revealed religion. Just to what degree this opposition extends, will be determined, I trust, in this study. Certainly, sociological findings and directions are unmoral, if they fail to supply some norm; immoral, if they provide erroneous ones. That sociology must provide a norm is expected and required by the premises contained in their treatises.

Sociologists themselves look upon their treatises as a science of life. Their constant preoccupation is that no preconceived notions influence the study of that life, so that investigation may be conducted with an unprejudiced mind. Great insistance is placed precisely upon the necessity of approaching the study of human conscious activity with a proper viewpoint. In fact a special philosophy of education is necessary according to R. L. Finney, who expressly states this conviction in

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[3] C. A. Ellwood, "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," p. 14; F. H. Giddings, "The Principles of Sociology," p. 8; *A. J. of S.*, E. B. Reuter, "The Relation of Biology and Sociology," Vol. XXXII, No. 5, p. 707; E. A. Ross, "The Outlines of Sociology," p. 9; F. E. Lumley, "Principles of Sociology," p. 541; *J. of S. F.*, L. Bigood, "A First Course in Sociology," Vol. I, Nov., 1922, No. 1, p. 19.

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the preface of his work. "To the establishment of the sociological point of view the first nine chapters of the book are devoted." [4] All influences extraneous to man's immediate experience, declares sociology, prevents true scientific investigation, for the reason that the needs of man "can be inferred only from a study of his activities as carried on in organized society. At least so it seems to a sociologist". [5]

Attitude of mind, indeed, seems to be the crucial point at issue. Revealed religion, according to the sociologists, is incapable of solving the problem of life, because it is prejudiced by preconceived theories based upon authority or derived from metaphysical speculations. Sociology contends that the conclusions of revealed religion are based on grounds exterior to the phenomena in hand; the conclusions do not evolve out of facts studied; they are but a statement of a truth previsaged, and therefore cannot be regarded as scientifically deduced. Furthermore, that such an a-priori method does violence to human reason, seems incontrovertible to them, since the principles invoked to support the conclusions are admittedly beyond the scope of physical experience. The Catholic moralist seems to approach problems of conduct with a "fixed" mind, for he does not evolve a solution out of the facts of the case, but simply disposes facts to fit in with some "divinely" received maxim. This attitude is pronounced unscientific by the sociologist and produces the deep antagonism that exists between spiritually-conceived and positivistic philosophies.

The sociological attitude of mind on the other hand, as interpreted by Walter Lippmann, is radically opposed to the one just referred to. Objective facts are the criteria according to this writer, if we would deal with realities and not fanciful theorizing of a fervent mind. [6]

> What is that discipline of the mind, that essentially modern discipline which is necessary to a proper grasp and control upon the complex and unseen environment of modern man? It is fundamentally a training in the capacity to give oneself to the situation, to accept the objective facts as they are, and not to be governed in one's thinking by private

[4] "A Sociological Philosophy of Education, p. v.
[5] ibid. p. 29.
[6] *S. F.*, "The South and the New Society," Vol. VI, Sept. 1927, No. 1, p. 4.

and often unconscious dogmas as to what the facts ought to be. Not many of us have learned how to see the world lucidly and disinterestedly.

While Mr. Lippman is dealing with a subject not immediately connected with the relative merits of revealed religion and sociology, it is nevertheless true that his pronouncements are inspired by "modern thinking."

It would be erroneous to conclude that sociology has no sympathy with theology and God-inspired religion; but it is a sympathy motivated by pity rather than by true admiration. H. W. Carr, in his "Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics", neatly and gently summarizes and exposes the "delusion" of a supernatural origin of values in moral matters.[7]

No amount of genuine admiration for the intellectual eminence, moral force, saintly lives and courageous self-devotion of the founders and Apostles of great historic religions can disguise the fact that our modern conception of man's origin, and of the progressive creative evolution which has determined his present commanding position, has rendered obsolete the whole class of ideas on which their teaching was based.

Consequently, it must be logically inferred, if the basis of a theological system is "obsolete", the resulting pronouncements for the conduct of life must be illusory.

It is quite evident that mutual antagonism must characterize these two viewpoints of life: revealed versus evolutionary concepts of morals. Other writers are not as subtle in their condemnation as the one just quoted. The recent declaration by Professor H. E. Barnes[8] is but a restatement of his thesis as set forth in "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct".[9]

In religion and ethics the approach is more primitive still. Supernaturalism reigns supreme, and whatever supplementary utilization may be made of logic and rhetoric is merely for the purpose of dignifying and rationalizing primitive illusions and spontaneous accepted dictates of the herd. That these may have had great disciplinary and cohesive value

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[7] p. 83.
[8] The Washington Post, Jan. 5, 1929.
[9] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 2, p. 213.

in the past no informed student will deny, but they are today the leading obstacles in the way of a rational efficient reorganization of society.

Sociology and revealed religion are, therefore, poles apart in their respective viewpoints. Any attempt to inject traditional moral notions into sociology would be foolhardy. It would be like the impossible task of squaring a circle, because were sociology to adopt Catholic moral principles, it would no longer be the sociology referred to in these pages. The work of W. G. Sumner, "Folkways", gives one the sociological perspective in this regard. Always concerned to see visible causal connections between effect and cause, the sociologist believes with Sumner that origins are essential if present morals are to be correctly understood and interpreted for "use and wont are products and results. They had antecedents".[10] Consequently, any system that does not make the "mores" the source of man's morality is incapable of returning a scientific answer to the "why" of life.

Sometimes the antagonism is made to center around some specifically harmful "dogma" essential to philosophy and based upon revelation and metaphysics, for it is correctly inferred that were the idea of God a mere anthropomorphism, no scientific system of morals could emanate from that source. Hence sociology alone could give a scientific solution. Revealed religion would then be discredited, because basically, custom or mores are the real foundation of morality. "As the idea of God developed, it was felt that the judgments of such an ideal personality were safer and better than the rule of custom."[11]

While it may be useful for the unlettered to adhere to the popular concept of God, no illusion is entertained by sociologists as to the scientific content of that term. Man can know nothing scientifically except what has resulted from "experimentation and testing", says H. E. Barnes. In his opinion,[12]

the development of human methods of searching for fact has been the rise of scientific and critical thought. This rests upon no as-

[10] p. 7.
[11] C. A. Ellwood, "Cultural Evolution", p. 217.
[12] *J. of S. F.*, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 2, p. 213.

sumption other than that reliable knowledge can be collected only by the observation of the commonplace facts and occurrenes of nature, their subsequent classification, continued experimentation and testing, and the tentative formulation of scientific laws.

Now since God is admittedly—according to revealed religion—a Pure Spirit, "science" can have no part with Him, for He does not lend Himself to the specific accredited tests. The idea of God, as understood by the theologian is entirely foreign to the mind of the sociologist, because mutually exclusive philosophies energize their separate processes of ratiocination. Revealed religion admits and insists upon the "spiritual" and understands by that term a reality differing in kind from the material; further, that the spiritual can only be known to the senses through its effects; also that the spiritual is intimately united with matter in man, and is the vitalizing principle of life, called a soul. This is not the place to enter upon a justification of metaphysics in the Scholastic use of that term. The statement is simply set forth to bring out more vividly the contrast of sociology and revealed religion as to the limitation of man's knowledge. [13]

While there are doubtless many ways in which the technique of the modern scientist can be improved, there is little probability that we shall be able to advance beyond the concepts and methods of the natural scientist in our explanation of the mysteries of the universe, valuable as the philosopher may be in the process of aiding in our assimilation and interpretation of the work of the scientist.

Certainly this limits man to the field of natural science, which deals admittedly with material forces only, even though such forces are only indirectly known, e. g., electricity or even vegetative and sensitive life in plants and animals. The supernatural or spiritual cannot seriously engage the attention of the earnest seeker after truth, according to a consistant sociologist, because in his study of psychology, the science of the "psuxos", the spiritual is discarded. In his article, "The Fal-

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[13] ibid. p. 213.

lacy of Eugenics", J. B. Eggin repudiates the current notions of heredity of mental traits, precisely because such characteristics, granted they exist, depend upon "a recrudescence of the Old Faculty Psychology, long since abandoned".[14] And should Homer sleep and revealed religion become ambitious in recovering her lost prestige by rejuvenation of "psychology", critical investigation will presently make the attempt abortive and return a verdict similar to H. W. Odum's comment upon Joseph K. Hart's "Inside Experience".[15]

> We call attention [writes Mr. Odum] especially to chapter V on "The Nature of Society" and chapter XII on "The Problem of Science". Science, the servant of life, "busy with the task of making this a habitable world" becomes theology when in dogmatism it demands ultimate truth, and every such "science" has had to eat its own words, sooner or later.

Unless the sociological viewpoint is adopted, the following statement of a leading sociologist is unintelligible—a mere jingle of words. "The church is free to mould at will the sprouting conscience and to teach the child always to put her claims above those of the state, although the latter is the organ of the whole society".[16] The particular iniquity of such an eventuality is that the ideals instilled are un-social or even anti-social, for the reason that they are extraneous to society and its interests. Morality, therefore, should arise out of the bosom of society and its interests. A new view is needed to offset the old traditional one that still "unfortunately" obtains, so that sociology may no longer be misunderstood, as only human nature itself can give expression to the requirements necessary for man's welfare. Contrast this notion of morality, especially as set forth in the following quotation of D. Drake with the "ought" of a Sovereign Being obliging our wills to the performance or avoidance of a specific act, at a definite time, and under particular circumstances. "The New Morality . . . is not something imposed upon man from without, it is an expression of his own needs."[17] The reason for so

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[14] *S. F.*, Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 1, p. 106.
[15] *S. F.*, Vol. VI, June 1928, No. 4, p. 644.
[16] *J. of S. F.*, E. A. Ross, "The Quenching of Sectarian Strife", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 560.
[17] "The New Morality", p. 8.

divergent a view is not hard to find. The same author tells us why: "The plain fact is that the infinitely varying cosmological and historical assertions of the vast multitude of ecclesiastical creeds have not the status of actual knowledge, they are at best assumptions, hypotheses, hopes, at worst preposterous absurdities." [18]

There is, therefore, a real antagonism between revealed religion and sociology. It is not a mere difference of accidental features, but one of fundamental opposition. The antagonism engendered arises from the very nature of each one's interpretation of life: their origin, their purpose, and their end, as understood by revealed religion and sociology. Probably the surest way to convey this opposition is to set forth in order the fundamental postulates of the two systems:

Catholic basic assumption:

> The Catholic moral system is authoritative in character, drawing its content jointly from divine revelation and through the exercise of human reason upon man's relations to God, to his neighbor, and in respect to himself.

Sociological basic assumption:

> Sociology relies upon "the development of human methods of searching for fact", which gave rise to "scientific and critical thought". "This", i. e., critical and scientific thought "rests upon no assumption other than that reliable knowledge can be collected only by the observation of the commonplace facts and occurrences of nature, their subsequent classification, continued experimentation and testing, and the tentative formulation of scientific laws. While there are doubtless many ways in which the technique of the modern scientist can be improved, there is little probability that we shall be able to advance beyond the concepts and methods of the natural scientist in our

[18] ibid. p. 253.

exploration of the mysteries of the universe, valuable as the philosopher may be in the process of aiding in our assimilation and interpretation of the work of the scientist." [19]

[19] *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", p. 213.

CHAPTER II

THE NOTIONS: "SCIENTIFIC SOCIOLOGY" AND "SOCIAL WORK"

Sociology has been referred to thus far as an unified science. Such, indeed, is not its status. Divergent views on important parts exist even among the "pauci electi", and their differences in many instances are more than trivial. Consequently a brief resume of their own pronouncements on the science of sociology will not be out of place. Upon one point, at least, there is unanimity, and that point is hostility to a spiritually-conceived philosophy of social life.

A definite content for the term "science of sociology" is gradually clarifying itself, but it may be well to let the authorities speak for themselves. In every description or account, it will be noticed that sociology is pre-eminently "The Science", and that the one preoccupation is to vindicate sociology's claim to our consideration as a solution of the affairs of life. The manner of demonstration usually employed is to show superior qualities of synthesis—as an explanation of life—in contrast with antiquated statements of revealed religion. However, there is a tendency, especially among the more recent writers to treat its claims affirmatively, either because revealed religion can no longer hold its own against "scientific encroachments", or, because sociology is sufficiently developed to leave aside the swaddling clothes of infancy.

The coming of age of sociology in the family of sciences is comparatively recent. Although its content embraces all that is known of man through written history, anthropology, or even by speculation concerning primitive origins of things, the peculiar viewpoint giving a definite meaning to these facts dates only to the beginning of the Nineteenth Century. August Comte (1798-1857) is most usually accredited as the "Father of Sociology". The invention of the term "sociology" is traceable to him.

Many writers really deserve mention as forerunners to Comte, but a recital of their names and an account of their influences, belongs rather to a history of sociology than to a discussion of sociology as a scientific concept of life. The earlier works, especially that of Comte's "Philosophie Positive", differ very much from those held in high regard at the present day. In fact, sociology today has very little in common with its founders, save its title and general hostility to a supernatural view of life.

The method of its pioneers was largely that of deductive philosophy, whereas today more stress is laid upon observation and experimentation, leaving the elaboration of a philosophy to some future time. E. W. Burgess definitely states that the theory preceded investigation.[1]

The beginnings of sociology are to be found in the philosophy of history. Comte, Spencer and Ward, three pioneers in sociology, were social philosophers rather than social scientists. General works on sociology preceded investigation of social problems. Indeed, the earliest sociological research seems to have been concerned with ethnological data, rather than with materials drawn from contemporary social life.

The credit of an original concept for social history remains with Comte despite the subsequent failure of his work to meet the standards of modern scientific approval. Probably the great innovator was too biased by metaphysical speculation to avoid sinning in that regard. In fact, J. P. Lichtenberger in his "Development of Social Theory" explicitly states that only freedom from the "thraldom of Scholasticism" will insure validity of thought. While it is true that Comte undoubtedly must have been familiar with the writings of Descartes and Kant, yet he did not wholly guard himself against traditional metaphysics, so that only his purpose and viewpoint is of genuine use to the sociologist today.[2]

The system of modern philosophy begun by Descartes and culminating in the work of Kant and Hume had laid the foundation for consecutive

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[1] *J. of S. F.*, "The Interdependence of Sociology and Social Work", Vol. I, May 1923, No. 4, p. 366.

[2] p. 237.

and logical thinking, and had pointed the way, if it had not accomplished it, for the unification of human knowledge. It had freed the mind from the thraldom of scholasticism and set new tasks for the human intellect. It has established reason and experience as the ultimate tests of the validity of thought.

This new basis for knowledge gave an orientation to every science that came under its influence. Social thought likewise was no longer guided by metaphysical principles, but with new-found liberty strove to place a "securer" basis for its reasoning. Consequently, any scheme of life that is not cast upon this newer philosophy must necessarily fall under condemnation.[3]

The theologies of the past have been discarded one by one, not through lack of logical articulation, but because these mighty structures were reared upon shaky premises. Discredit the major premise and the superstructure collapses. Grown wise by the experience of the past, and thoroughly imbued with the scientific spirit, our leading thinkers in the religious world do not assume broad generalizations, such as the Fall of Man or the sovereign decrees of the Almighty, upon which to build imposing systems of thought. On the contrary, they are keeping very close to facts of human experience; they deal almost exclusively with the near end of truth. And while undoubtedly their interpretations of the facts and truths may change with advancing knowledge, the foundations are secure. Their appeal is not to dogmas but to life.

A clear analysis of the rise and growth of sociology as a system of thought is found in Chapter IV, "le Conflit de la Morale et de la Sociologie", by Simon Deploige.[4] The antipathy of sociology to the "l'ancienne méthode", as explained by this author is described as possessing great vehemence. The summary found on page 131, shows conclusively this newer concept of science must break unconditionally with all that preceded it. This criticism of sociology, when directed to moral matters, has particular application, for "commencer par définir l'idéal moral et en déduire ensuite la série des fins particulières" is to assume in advance what should be gotten by observation and induction.[5] E. deS. Brunner recognizes that even

[3] *J. of S. F.*, C. A. Dinsmore, "The Influence of Science on Modern Religious Thought", Vol. II, Jan. 1924, No. 2, p. 239.
[4] pp. 111-138.
[5] ibid. p. 131.

the sociologist has not entirely escaped this vice when he says that "some of the early research work . . . was done . . . not so much for the purpose of finding objective truth as for the sake of proving a theory which had been previously propounded".[6]

The concept of scientific sociology is becoming more refined, though the subject matter itself does not enjoy a like distinction. This defect is not due to the scientific method itself, but rather to the multitudinous social facts to be analyzed. Various and often dissimilar materials appear in sociological treatises. This state of affairs is not difficult to understand, since each writer feels free to apply his "concept" of an ultra-scientific method to whatever social facts come under his observation. The one essential requisite is to avoid speculation, as the tangible alone can be a reliable source of knowledge. The social-scientist, to use a modern designation for a true sociologist, must have no sympathy with metaphysics if he would do efficient work. Particular hostility is seen in sociology's bitter denunciation of "metaphysics" for its calm assumption of superiority in applying a "supposed" criterion of truth. There does not seem to be any conception of the true nature of metaphysics by these writers. Their preoccupation is that this science has no connection with reality whatever. They liken it to mere fanciful dreamings, and do not seem to understand that metaphysics is the science of the inner constitution of being, and is itself based upon the tangible. Neither is it apparent to them that the sciences in general depend upon the validity of metaphysical principles to formulate the very findings so much prized by these sciences into a co-ordinate body of truths. The science of society is no exception, but it, too, must depend upon metaphysics for testing the genuineness of its discoveries, although L. L. Bernard insists that no inter-dependence can exist between them.[7]

The method of the scientist, which in its pure form is wholly without mysticism, does not give him any means with which to trace the law

[6] *J. of S. F.*, "Notes on Some of the Uses for the Statistical Method in Social Investigation", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 256.

[7] *A. J. of S.*, "Scientific Method and Social Progress", Vol. XXXI, July 1925, No. 1, p. 6.

further back than his own or other men's psychic and physical reactions to phenomena. As a scientist he is able neither to confirm nor to deny the assertions of the metaphysician or of the theologian who professes to be able to go back of his perception to other sources of truth.

The point at issue is that true science must concern itself with the tangible, so scientific sociology, as a science of life, must only deal with what can be tested by one's own experience, either personally or vicariously.

It is further stated that unless due regard is had for scientific method, as herein described, facts or supposed facts can be made to fit hypotheses wholly foreign to the real import of those facts. "There is a way [says F. H. Giddings] of sorting facts to suit ourselves which is sometimes, but not always, legitimate. We often call it 'classification', but it has little resemblance to classification in the scientific meaning of the word." [8]

The discussion of social work and its claim to our attention does not find place formally in this study. However, to avoid misconceptions, it should be stated that no criticism attaches to alleviating misery in any or all of its forms. To the unfortunate man suffering from hunger, cold, or other physical ills, immediate relief is just as efficacious whether inspired by compassion for that unfortunate member of Christ's Mystical Body, or by an egotistical urge of the social sense to arrest further decay in the social organism. Similarly, correcting social evils already existing or preventing future ones, are works that deserve commendation and encouragement. But there is something more in social good works than the mere alleviation of suffering, namely, the motive which impels the individual to action. When that motive is founded upon the words of Christ, "as long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you did it to Me." (St. Matthew, xxv, 40), it has a special power to sanctify. This motive does not appear in the social good works performed by a genuine sociologist, for the reason that no motivating force embodying man's eternal welfare as complementing his physical well-being has the

[8] *J. of S. F.*, "The Classification of Societal Facts", Vol. II, Jan. 1924, No. 2, p. 146.

sanction of sociology. At best, it is only the necessitated action of a socialized intelligence manifesting itself through him upon another instance of social deficiency.

Contrast this notion with the Catholic notion of social work. In its fullest meaning—i. e. comprehending man's eternal as well as temporal welfare since a modicum of mundane contentment is presupposed—it is to make life more humane for the reason that Christ is seen to suffer in His members. In administering comfort and aid, therefore, even to the body of man, we perform a religious act of worship to Christ Who is represented as suffering in this unfortunate member of His Mystical Body. Such has always been the motivation of the Catholic Church in fostering works of temporal charity among her children, despite the oft-refuted charge that her insistence is wholly upon man's eternal destiny. Such a philosophy for sociology would give a true scientific basis for social work, because it enhances the rational dignity of man. Although the Church's concern is primarily with man's soul, she is genuinely solicitous for the care of his body.

No one, I think, will question that a child will be all the better for playground opportunities; nor will it be denied that occasions of sin are lessened by letting God's sunshine of innocent recreation penetrate the dark immoral environment of neglected children; but no one should commit the stupid blunder of regarding these children as mere composites of forces, of action and re-action, because they respond to surroundings *favorable* to healthy moral growth and development. Have playgrounds, rather than tenement fire-escape outlets for play and recreation, but do not endeavor to find in them practical proofs of social determinism. Such a social philosophy is as pernicious as its credentials to acceptance are specious.

CHAPTER III

MORAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL USES OF THE TERM "VALUE"

The word value requires much refinement. Because of our many contacts with the economic features of life, normally a "quid pro quo" content is given to value. In these pages the term is used in a philosophic rather than a commercial or popular signification.

It is my contention that the findings, deductions, pronouncements, maxims, etc., of sociology, pretending to a final or approximate answer to the questions of life, have first of all a definite meaning in themselves, and secondly, exert an unmistakable influence upon all who come to know them. They have a real worth because, as interpretations of life, they possess a certain degree of intrinsic truth and have a utility for man in his efforts to order his life wisely and effect his end securely. Consequently, value must be understood primarily as having worth in itself and secondly as possessing a quality that makes it useful for the conduct of life to eternal glory.

The employment, therefore, of the word value in the title of this book was chosen after much thought, and was selected precisely because it implies that the writings of non-Catholic sociologists do express the appraisals of social relations and because their pronouncements do have a decided influence upon individuals. By furnishing criteria for the social or non-social quality of their lives; for the utility or futility of their actions; for the moral or immoral character of their conduct, sociology does supply individuals with standards for evaluating their efforts to attain the end of life.

The notion of moral is inseparably bound up with the use of value as herein explained. Furthermore, the note of final,—i. e., last, beyond which one cannot conceivably go—flows logically from an understanding of value, because if value concerns things that affect man in the attainment or non-attainment of his destiny it is final, last, absolute.

It is well to recall briefly that sociology is not a unified science. The bearing of this statement upon the point under present consideration is that at times it will be difficult to determine just what content is ascribed to value by sociological writers. Notwithstanding this indefiniteness, all writers would doubtlessly agree that some kind of worth attaches to social action, and, therefore, they must admit values. Hence, the discussion of methods at this point, though a digression, will bring us to a realization of their use of "value"—the very thing, indeed, that is the main point at issue. "The student who wishes to prepare for advanced examinations in the field of sociology is in a quandry. Not only is there the greatest diversity of opinion as to the scope, the essential principles and the conclusions of his science, but there is no agreement as to which writers should be included among the authorities to be studied." [1] A testimony of a like character is furnished by R. Bain.[2]

It is lamentably true that sociologists have no universally intelligible and accepted concepts, technique or conclusions. Sociology is an essentially anarchic state with regard to these things. It has few, if any accepted measures of accuracy, little standardized data, no clear definitions and generally agreed upon philosophic presuppositions.

This same view is held by F. E. Lumley. His reference to "values" is specific and may be interpreted to mean that until definite methods, i. e., agreement upon recognized principles are forthcoming, staple values will be lacking. [3]

Thus, it will be clear that this newer discipline called sociology does not yet have one thoroughly acceptable and exclusive method; there is not entire agreement among its followers as to just what are the most important methods. Doubtless, all of these proposed methods have their uses and values, and doubtless other methods will be discovered. A very important part of the work in this study is to work out satisfactory methods.

The working out of satisfactory methods is looked upon with great favor and is necessary for establishment of values.

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[1] *S. F.*, H. Hart, "The History of Social Thought: A Consensus of American Opinion", Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 190.
[2] *S. F.*, "Two Philosophic Sociological Theorists", Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 217.
[3] "Principles of Sociology", p. 540.

The following quotation is more explicit in stressing a definite concept for values, and hence recognizes their place in sociology. It is hoped that when once the underlying secret of social relations can be seized, difficulties and inaccuracies as recounted above must disappear, because a definite social order will gradually emerge. This is not regarded as a chimera, for C. C. A. Bouglé sees in the apperception of value, the power that will effect this metamorphosis. "Man has become self-conscious and socially conscious; and he is aware of selection, interest, choice, preference as an intrinsic feature of human living and actuality. It is this outstanding aspect which the term value symbolizes." [4] It should be noted in passing that the evolutionary hypothesis is the basic assumption in this statement.

The use of deductive reasoning here also proves interesting, and incidentally it will serve as an additional confirmation on the part of the sociologist that the tendency to generalize cannot be divorced from human reason. Nothwithstanding this truth, deductive reasoning is looked upon with suspicion by sociologists. They admit that some "theorizing" should have accompanied the beginnings of sociology, but realize also that it is responsible for all subsequent growth of wild speculation that has brought sociology into disrepute. However, as sociology advances into its proper sphere of scientific investigation by observation and induction, the method will be scientific in the full sense of that term. Heretofore, as F. A. Bushee points out, sociology depended upon deduction, because definite materials were lacking, but now the time has come when sociology may depend upon deduction less and "place its chief reliance upon induction, [for] sociology is one of the concrete sciences". [5]

The bearing of "deductive reasoning" upon our subject values, is most intimate. Despite all protests to the contrary, their attempts to evaluate the result of environments, etc., upon man convicts them of philosophising. Although the "law" that they would apply may be only tentative it is con-

[4] "The Evolution of Values", English Translation by H. S. Sellars, Introduction p. xiv.
[5] "Principles of Sociology", p. 13.

sidered for the time a real law. It is the best possible to date, and hence, at this stage, it is a principle from which practical applications may be deduced. Its application is an expression of value, so that the mere striving after values, a thing which they actually do, brings out two important points. First, values are essential to any system dealing with conduct, and second the admission of value implies deductive reasoning.

It will be noted that G. A. Lundberg in the following quotation acknowledges a certain "validity" to conclusions of sociology but he is dissatisfied with the manner of establishing such value. His testimony illustrates the existence of values and deductive reasoning. "It is only comparatively recently that the need for exclusive and painstaking scientific inquiry into the validity of the generally accepted conclusions of sociology has been emphasized. So far, the science consists chiefly of conclusions and very little scientific data." [6]

The attention paid the subject of values is very encouraging for this study. It will be remembered that sociology is a science of life, and therefore its concern is with the things of life. Now if the "validity of the generally accepted conclusions of sociology" stand in need of "extensive and painstaking inquiry" in order to rest them upon a sound basis, certainly it is because sociological conclusions do have an influence upon society and upon the individual lives of its members; also it is because its pronouncements and directions do have an intrinsic worth in themselves, by resting upon "scientific data"; and it is because they do have a real value in the life of man due to their influence as an accepted interpretation of that life. [7]

> it [very concept of value] implies organic needs, in the satisfaction of which the organism experiences pleasure and its promotion of life, or in the deprivation of which it experiences pain and the thwarting of life. *Human value* has a fundamental relation not only to survival, but to the affective aspects of our experience. The joy of life is a biological desideratum.

Even though Finney limits the working of value to evolutionary considerations, the fact remains that he recognizes its

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[6] *S. F.*, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion," Vol. IV, June 1926, No. 4, p. 709.

[7] R. L. Finney, "A Sociological Philosophy of Education", p. 75.

existence and asserts that it expresses what is worth while in human life.

This same view is held by N. J. Spykman. In his book review of "General Sociology: the Theory of Relations and of Social Structures" by Leopold von Wiese, Spykman points out that there is a difference between social relations and social structures on the one hand and social behavior on the other, although he does admit there is a causal connection between them due to values expressing "resulting relationships".[8]

> For this reason it [sociology] is guided by a different abstraction than that which defines the subject matter for the other social sciences. The motives and purposes of social behavior, economic, religious or political are not the primary consideration of sociology. They are of importance only insofar as they determine the formal aspect of the resulting relationships.

Although these "motives and purposes" may not be the primary consideration of sociology, Spykman's testimony nevertheless shows that they are of importance; are indications of value, necessarily connected with that idea.

The recognition of social values is essential for the science of sociology. F. E. Lumley declares that any science must acknowledge some "purpose", and contends that "purpose" is one of the three necessary terms for a "system of knowledge". Unless this factor is duly acknowledged, social relations would be only imperfectly investigated with the result that sociology would be unscientific because it would lack a definite value. "Science is a system of knowledge built up on the basis of a characteristic mood, by means of amply tested methods, and with a definite purpose. Three terms in this definition give us points of departure for what we have to say, the mood, the method, the purpose."[9]

The trend of quotations thus far reviewed, indicates that values are a reality in sociology and that they vitalize sociological pronouncements into becoming factors in the conduct of life. The evidence thus far adduced has not been forced, for the following statement of R. L. Finney in a recent book on this phase of the question emphatically states that values

[8] *S. F.*, Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 211.
[9] "Principles of Sociology", p. 5.

have an influence upon the minds of the social individuals. "Now it is this inner awareness of values which constitutes the essential substance of mental and social realities. The phenomena of the sociologist are bound to display a normative aspect, however religiously the sociologist may aspire to bind himself to the fact." [10] C. H. Cooley bears witness to the same testimony.[11] L. L. Bernard's judgment is substantially that of Finney. In his treatment of the idea of "analysis of social phenomena and enforcing the findings of the analysis", he makes their (i. e., social phenomena resulting from a "functional unity of society" through social processes) efficacy in evaluating social activities contingent upon those "actual concrete social processes". The fact remains, however, that Bernard acknowledges social evaluations.[12]

Up to the present, the discussions of values in the sociological sense has been objective, that is to say, these realities have been viewed in themselves as distinct from the individuals possessing them or being affected by their influence. The following quotation is of interest, because the author, F. A. Bushee, considers the subject's reaction under objective influences. He centers the discussion about "hypothetical" freewill of man, and adds that even though human beings are reputed to be free agents, this element (freewill) does not really enter into the question. The very possibility of a science of sociology is denied, it is maintained, if freewill is a fact, because actions cannot be predicated or reduced to law. Bushee solves the dilemma by denying a place to freewill. His solution is indicative of the tone of sociological literature in general. "Fortunately for the sociologist, the question of freewill and determinism does not have to be settled before social phenomena are studied, for these terms merely indicate methods of explaining human conduct which may be left to philosophers to decide." [13] Consequently the importance of freewill is relative, for, as Bushee points out, conduct should be evaluated by the play of social forces. Regular, definite, and tangible social

[10] "A Sociological Philosophy of Education", p. 26.
[11] "Social Process", p. 283.
[12] "The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control", p. 96.
[13] "Principles of Sociology", pp. 7-8.

events are the term for discussion and object for investigation in sociology and not a fantastic concept such as uncaused freedom. Values cannot be attached to a whimsical "faculty" that acts from its own caprice: values can only arise from objective facts.

The possession of freewill is essential to man in revealed religion and is absolutely vital to a discussion of moral values. In sociology on the contrary, such an analysis is faulty, for the true meaning of value for a sociologist can only be had by repudiating all theological interpretations and by relying upon "moral discriminations" developing "with changing conditions of social life and . . . with the progress of psychology and sociology."[14]

The popular "confusion" of the idea of value with freewill is sometimes treated as the following quotation shows, namely by simply lifting the whole question from the domain of theology and locating it in sociology.[15]

> Science and the scientific spirit, however, are still supposed by many earnest religious people to be hostile to religion, because science refuses to regard man as separate from the rest of nature. Many religious people still object when it comes to human affairs, if a natural and common-sense view is taken of things which they regard as supernatural and divine. Some even look upon social science as an intrusion of scientific method and spirit into a realm where they have no business.

It is most important not to regard any activity of man—especially that his freewill, as outside of supernatural concern, even though the sociologist's notion of freewill places man "as separate from the rest of nature". Hence in the question of determining the existence and influence of sociological values, due regard must be had for their misconception in regard to freewill. Unless this is done the mere use of the word "values" by sociologists might lead the unwary into the fond assurance that all is well.

The caution to be on our guard is timely, because even the notion of morality itself, which is intrinsically connected with values, as we have seen above, is often considered as irrele-

[14] E. A. Ross, "The Outlines of Sociology", p. 344.
[15] C. A. Ellwood, "Christianity and Social Science", p. 5.

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vant in sociology. Park and Burgess' work, "Introduction to the Science of Sociology", is a striking example of this mentality. Man is simply regarded as a natural force and entirely subject to experimental laws, although admission is made that he differs somehow from other animals. Man's full and complete rational nature—intellect and will—is not, however, acknowledged. On the contrary, the thesis is maintained that he is a creature of his environments and apparently nothing more. The special connection of the use of morality with the subject of values, is that no matter how erudite a work may be, it can only return an inadequate appreciation of social principles determining the values of life. H. E. Barnes, in his introduction to V. F. Calverton's "Sex Expression in Literature", would also despiritualize all "conventual theory of sex and guiding ideals of conduct." Sumner's "Folkways" he maintains has dispelled all illusion upon this point.[16] C. A. Ellwood concedes some social worth to the supernatural character of values, but vitiates his definition of the term by naturalistic interpretations of its content.[17]

In concluding this chapter it may be well to review briefly the main points brought out. Values are essential because of the intrinsic nature of the thing or object itself, and secondly, because that object, as far as finite objects are concerned, may have a utility for something else. It follows that morality is necessarily connected with the idea of value, because morality is an appreciation of conduct as advancing or hindering man in the attainment of his last end—possession of God by the use or abuse of the thing or object that has value. Moreover, sociological writers themselves seem to see some essential relationship between social activities and their influence upon man.

Sociology cannot help being moral, even though the "newer scientific" spirit disclaims any such concern. This proposition is based upon the fact that the wellsprings of man's conduct are at the same time the matter of sociological investigation, because all activity of man resulting in social realities flows

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[16] Introduction, p. xxiii.
[17] "Christianity and Social Science", pp. 47-8.

from these sources. Hence the answers returned by sociological research into the social relations of man are after all the general laws of sociology. They are at the same time the scientific analysis of society and represent what is equivalent to a code of morality, because social non-survival is the sanction for observance or non-observance through a developed social sense.

In Parts III, IV and V of this book will be found a detailed setting forth of this contention in logical order. As previously announced the sociologists will tell their own story by means of quotations extracted from their works. The arrangements of these quotations will be according to a well-worked out plan, that will conclusively prove that sociological findings lead inevitably to judgments affecting morals. Before entering upon the matter proper of this study, it is necessary to discuss some preliminary notions essential to a thorough understanding of the viewpoint of sociology, because without such preparation much of what is contained in the work proper might be misunderstood.

PART II

CHAPTER IV

VIEWPOINT OF SOCIOLOGY

The attempt to describe what is the special viewpoint of sociology is not an easy task. It will be recalled that many authorities on this subject have testified that the science is not clearly defined as yet and consequently it may be impossible to fulfill the expectation aroused by this heading. In order that I may be acquitted of blundering in the use made of quotations, and to show that the difficulty of handling the authorities is not personal, but intrinsic to the matter itself, I quote F. N. House. This writer certainly describes a rather amorphous mass of sociological writings.[1]

> In 1880, there was no separately existent discipline of sociology, in this country or anywhere else. Within two decades after that date there existed, not a science of sociology, but at least a half-dozen different doctrines consisting of attempted answers to the question, What is Sociology? drawn from as many divergent sources; from Darwinism, Comtean positivism, paleobotany, from Tarde's rather offhand generalizations concerning the communication and imitation process, from Ratzenhofer and the ethical permutation of economic theory, and from ethnographic data. Since, then, these different streams of sociological or near-sociological thought have mingled and fertilized one another, until today one can almost say that there are as many sociologies as there sociologists; while the number of sociologists is constantly increasing. Indeed, there are at the present time signs of integration in sociological thought; but this integration process is only beginning, and it is still possible for any sociologist or teacher of sociology to appropriate one idea here and one there, to the end that his sociology is more less original as a synthesis; while, at the same time, if he has moderate powers of systematizing his own thought, he can cause his doctrine to present a degree of internal unity and coherence which compares favorably with that of his contemporaries.

[1] *A. J. of S.*, "The Concept 'Social Forces' in American Sociology", Vol. XXXI, Sept. 1925, No. 2, pp. 149-0.

The problem upon closer inspection is perhaps not so formidable as it appeared at first sight. Sociology, at least, the subject matter of this study—drawn from the writing of non-Catholic sociologists—easily marks itself off. The outstanding quality that distinguishes it is total disregard of, if not actual hostility to, the principles of a spiritually-conceived philosophy and divinely revealed religion. This line of cleavage sharply separates Catholic from the non-Catholic sociology.

Sociology is by assumption based upon principles that deny the very possibility of the traditional explanation of the origin of man, the cause of his existence, his mental powers, and finally his very purpose in life. This doctrine is not taught so much by explicit statement as inculcated by inference. While some authorities explain man's evolution by purely natural forces, the tendency is rather to assume this as an incontestable fact, and simply begin with man as evolving. Others, frankly say that this question is one for philosophy rather than sociology, as though their reaction to fundamental postulates were an indifferent matter. This position is untenable, because subsequent views are largely determined by these initial postulates. Consequently a writer's philosophy will determine the character of his findings in his study of society.

There are many variations in viewpoints of sociology, and a recital of them would hardly promote the purpose of this chapter. Even a casual perusal of "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences" will convince one of the vastness of the undertaking, as a detailed list, appearing therein shows various categories of social thinkers and also their dominant characteristic. An idea of the vast array of names may be gained from the immediate introduction to the list. "As one leaves the founders and approaches the highly complicated but still amorphous body of writings which constitute the literature of sociology today, he is rather bewildered by its luxuriance and variety and appaled by its mass." [2]

Another writer, C. A. Ellwood, in his article, "Recent Developments in Sociology", has also prepared a survey of socio-

[2] F. A. Hankins, in H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", pp. 307-30.

logical literature, purporting to give detailed accounts of various viewpoints. While the enumeration of writers is not as extensive as that in "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", yet it is extensive and the theories are arranged according to their chief characteristic.[3] There is still another exhaustive article upon the same subject by B. L. Melvin.[4] This array of contradictory statements leads us readily enough to agree with this writer that " . . . we have not clearly defined the field of sociology."

As a matter of fact, a precise notion of sociology is not absolutely required for my purpose, because the current literature sufficiently expresses what values sociology places upon man's actions, and one meets pronouncements on conduct and values almost on every page. "A great many others [books] contain a combination of social philosophy and social ethics."[5]

One special characteristic should be noted: namely, a common trait to regard sociology as a natural science, and as such subjected to laws precisely the same as any other natural science. One further qualifying note is necessary to complete a more or less common notion: since sociology deals with consciousness, the writers likewise agree that it is not exactly like the natural sciences.

Because of the mental characteristic just referred to, many writers realize that a mere recital of laws, causes, conditions, of social organic concepts does not complete their task. Since the subject studied is also the subject studying, much effort is expended to direct that study most profitably for society. Hence the appearance of appeals in sociological writings.[6] This feature in my opinion, deserves a specific mention, because it brings out predominantly the psychic character of sociological treatises.

Nevertheless, as pointed out in the beginning, there is a

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[3] In E. C. Hayes, "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences", pp. 1-49.
[4] *S. F.*, "Sociology in Process", Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 1, pp. 52-6.
[5] N. J. Spykman, "The Social Theory of Georg Simmel", p. xii.
[6] *J. of S. F.*, A. W. Calhoun, "The Moral Challenge of Sociology", Vol. III, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 681; C. A. Ellwood, "Cultural Evolution", p. 223; C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 4; F. A. Bushee, "Principles of Sociology", p. 27; *S. F.*, H. Hart, "The History of Social Thought: A Consensus of American Opinion", Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 191.

remarkable consistency about these writers despite all that has been said. Upon one point, at least, there is complete unanimity; it is the positive denial of the supernatural, or negative denial by setting forth contradictory doctrines.

Although the supernatural has been ruled out of court, its place has been taken by a counterfeit—we would say; by the genuine article, the sociologist declares. There is little hope of a common understanding because the contestants speak different languages; and use similar terms with dissimilar meanings.

This observation brings us to another consideration connected with viewpoint. Frequently, one is at loss to understand the meaning intended and must have recourse to just such studies as the present one.[7] It is not always easy to detect the real meaning, although at times this difficulty is not evident. Drake's definition, as it stands, is not as harmful as it is later on when qualified at the end of his book. "By the 'new morality' I mean the morality which, basing itself solidly upon observation of the results of conduct, consciously aims to secure the maximum of attainable happiness for mankind."[8] In the next quotation his real meaning appears. Certainly if such realities as God—Universe—human soul are of doubtful character, surely the "new morality" can only partially if not totally, misrepresent man's true norm of right action. "Whatever be the truth about God, the Universe, or the destiny of the human soul, justice and mercy and loving kindness are right, selfishness, lust, hate are wrong."[9] No one, I think, would question the pronouncements of the rightness or wrongness of the virtues and vices enumerated, but one wonders upon what standards their morality is determined.

Sometimes there can be no mistaking the intent of an author; his meaning is clear; his intention is the destruction of "old" ideas of morality. While the particular reference in the following is to sexual morality, it condemns the whole systems as well.[10]

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[7] G. Chatterton-Hill, "The Sociological Value of Christianity".
[8] "The New Morality", p. v.
[9] ibid. p. 254.
[10] *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 217.

Such is the price which we pay for subservience to the sex mores of primitive Judaism, Catholicism and Puritanism; what are the gains to be balanced against these? It must probably be confessed that they are purely hypothetical. We assume them to be chiefly the monogamous family, the dignity of woman, and the reduction in the amount of sexual intercourse, which is in itself held to be a most vile and degrading evil.

Morality without God, because man has no soul (spiritual) may summarize this particular viewpoint of sociology. Evolution has made this man-made system of right and wrong possible. [11]

While viewpoints of sociology are difficult to set forth, unanimity is found in the denial of the supernatural. Yet it is a hopeful sign, and not without some significance, that Albion W. Small would state in his comment upon M. Schelers' work, "Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens", "unless we are willing, however, to assume that wisdom begins and ends with us, here is a challenge to reconsider all our fundamental conceptions—a challenge which we cannot afford to decline." [12] This declaration shows some hesitation, and probably distrust of present tendencies. Just how far the search after truth will prevail, is doubtful, in view of the remarks of R. Bellamy in his review of C. C. Miltner: "The Elements of Ethics". [13] The criticism indeed is favorable enough, but an attitude of mind is revealed that indicates the whole Catholic position is not understood. No doubt, our system of morality, based as it is upon scholastic philosophy and revealed religion mystifies as to its real meaning, but we hope that the spirit of fairness encouraged by A. W. Small will eventually prevail.

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[11] *S. F.*, D. Fryer, Book Review of "Instinct, Intelligence and Character: An Educational Psychology", by G. C. Thomson, Vol. IV Sept. 1925, No. 1, pp. 249-0; Finney, R. L., "A Sociological Philosophy of Education", p. 82.

[12] *A. J. of S.*, Vol. XXXI, Sept. 1925, No. 2, p. 262.

[13] *S. F.*, Vol. IV, June 1926, No. 4, pp. 249-0.

CHAPTER V

THE CLOSED-NATURE THEORY

In the preceding chapter, a description was given of the content and viewpoint of sociology. It was found that an attitude of mind rather than a distinctive objective theory describes current sociology. At best only a broad outline, an orientation of mind, was found to exist in sociological literature, chiefly characterized by hostility to the spiritual. In the present chapter an examination will be made of this aspect of the sociological mind in the hope of determining what underlying causes have brought it about. Many causes may be advanced, but in my opinion, they are best summed up by the three following: The theory of closed nature; a positivistic concept of life; and, making the tangible the ultimate criterion of truth. In some respects the proposed three causes, are but different ways of stating the same idea, viz: autonomy of man. However, the advantage of separate treatment brings out more forcibly the complete opposition of non-Catholic sociology to the fundamental principles of revealed religion.

The term "closed-nature" implies that nature, whether physical or psychical, is sufficient unto itself, and does not need nor cannot be influenced by a cause extraneous to itself. It is simply another form of denying the existence of the spiritual, or at least, its influence upon the world such as we do and can know it.

The closed-nature theory as expounded in sociological writings denies the supernatural as a necessary consequence of its denial beforehand of the spiritual. This statement is no mere surmise on my part, for J. A. Leighton states that the "totality" of orders are in one class unequivocally.[1]

> For the modern mind there is but one universe of reality which includes in its organic totality several levels of existence—physical things,

[1] "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 103.

living organisms, minds of various grades (subhuman, human and presumably superhuman).

This author goes to great lengths to make clear his views upon this doctrine and a study of his work will give a clear idea of the fundamentals involved.

Once the unity of all orders of existence, as just explained, is granted, consequences in morality follow as a matter of course. I am not referring to such examples of actually good deeds, as might be brought forward, although men have been ignorant of spiritual or supernatural forces, and yet, their conduct was exemplary and outwardly, at least, conformed to all the canons of revealed religion for correct conduct. My reference is not to individual or specific instances, because an exhaustive analysis of each case is necessary to determine what other factors—human motives perhaps—dictated this praiseworthy conduct. But taking the avowedly "naturalistic" basis for morality, the principle vitalized by it could only be of like character. It is sufficient here only to point out the natural quality of such morality, leaving the criticism to professional books dealing with the subject: treatises on morality. These authorities will readily enough show that a principle cannot rise higher than its origin. Now naturalistic morality, attempting to comprehend all of man's actions is handicapped, because man has also a spiritual soul that cannot be compressed into the same order as understood by Leighton's single universe theory.

The immediate connection of the foregoing with conduct in sociology is seen from the following quotation of H. E. Barnes. Additional value attaches to the reference because of his recognized pre-eminence. The statement is pertinent, because failure to adopt the monistic view hindered a "healthy" development in sociology. [2]

There was no general comprehension of the fact that the only sure guidance for human conduct was to be sought in a study of human nature and social relationships, or that such information is to be procured only from competent scientists in the various fields and subjects involved, rather than from a metaphysicians and theologians.

[2] "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", Introduction, p. xiii.

This view has many supporters as the following citations will show. In an article appearing in "Social Forces", L. L. Bernard practically summarized what has been stated thus far. It will be noted moreover that he also mentions "theology" and "metaphysics" explicitly and opposes them to "science" as he understands science.[3]

> The method of science is just the reverse of that of metaphysics and theology. The latter conceive of the directive power and organization as outside of and beyond the limits of the phenomena themselves, and therefore as imposed upon the visible world as we behold it; while science sees the world of phenomena as the product and functioning of the interrelationships of the phenomena themselves. To science there are no mystical causes. All causes are known and measurable or they are conceived as capable of an analysis and measurement.

Other references may not be so clear at first sight, but when correctly understood in their sociological settings little doubt can remain as to the exact meaning intended. In one of the acknowledged works "Recent Developments in Social Sciences" collaborated in by such men as Ellwood-Wissler-Gault-Sauer-Clark-Merriam-Barnes, and edited by Hayes, all the individual's powers are to be explained without recourse to "external" interference. "Individual is purely a social product, and all of his behavior is to be explained through social environment."[4] In a similar vein Ellwood further explains behavior, thus showing sociology's appreciation of the spiritual influences of revealed religion.[5]

> It is probably true so far as can yet be discovered, that the individual variations in behavior initiate all social changes. These variations in individual behavior, however, are themselves frequently expressions of changed conditions in the social environment. In the social life causation undoubtedly moves in circles.

Man's social personality is a product therefore from forces within his own being, consequently a higher causality than

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[3] "The Concept of Progress", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 38.
[4] C. A. Ellwood, in E. C. Hayes, "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences", p. 30.
[5] ibid. p. 31.

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nature is not required. In a footnote to "Christianity and Social Science", the same author makes naturalism explain his views on the "supernatural", in fact, the one becomes the other.[6]

> The salient thing [quoted by Ellwood from Professor Edward C. Moore] in modern science is the ever-increasing degree in which we have tended to include man, with all of his possible relations within the complex of nature. In truth, we go on to a naturalism larger than was conceived. The new naturalism includes the supernatural, if you like that phrase.

The sufficiency of human nature finds expression in many forms. A reference to the notion of religion influenced by this concept throws additional light on the sociological attitude. F. H. Hankins in his review of "Contributions of Science to Religion" by Shailer Mathews, makes naturalism the standard by means of which the merits of the book are judged.[7] L. L. Bernard[8] and A. W. Calhoun[9] agree in this that reliance upon natural powers alone can effect a safe criterion for man's progress. Likewise H. M. Parshley, in his article appearing in "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences" gives as his opinion, "the laws of human behavior are properly an outgrowth of his bodily structure, not a code to be imposed upon it."[10] And further on when referring to "good" and "bad" he states these are to be "determined scientifically on the basis of the needs to be filled."[10] Here mere utility does not fully explain his meaning.

Religion, therefore, or morals even, is made to conform to the notion that whatever efficacy there is in these ideas, is derived from man himself because of his social relations. A litany of names could be adduced in support of this state-

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[6] C. A. Ellwood, p. 5.
[7] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. III, May 1925, No. 4, p. 748.
[8] *S. F.*, "The Concept of Progress", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 41.
[9] *J. of S. F.*, "The Moral Challenge of Sociology", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 680.
[10] In H. E. Barnes, p. 154.

ment.[11] Perhaps it will not be amiss, after this array of references, to give the words of S. Eldridge. This statement, as well as those referred to, makes man a law unto himself.[12]

> The attitudes of mind inculcated by certain types of religion, resting not on investigation but on authority, are incompatible with an unprejudiced study of ethical, political and social questions generally. A mind that accepts its religious beliefs on the authority of a book, or some man's interpretation thereof, is apt to come by its beliefs on the other questions in a similar way, and real questions cannot be settled in this manner. The result is that scientific conclusions on these questions do not have as much influence with the mass of people as do the pronouncements of newspaper editors, business men, and others of influence who *appear* to speak with authority.

Such is the story of man's attempt to eliminate the spiritual—the supernatural.

Sociology therefore is a theory of closed-nature, and strives with an ingenuity worthy of a better cause to make its science acceptable to man. No better appreciation can be given at the close of this chapter than the words of Henri Massis taken from his article on "The Decline of Bergsonism."[13]

> Drunk with its own independence and deceptive autonomy, and after committing self-destruction by claiming to find reality in itself and nowhere else, human thought consented to accept matter as the sole reality, abdicated its reasoning faculty and agreed to recognize no other existence than that of accident and phenomenon.

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[11] *S. F.*, G. B. Logan, "Guides to Periodical Reading", Vol. V, June 1927, No. 4, p. 602; C. H. Cooley, "Social Process", p. 75; *J. of S. F.*, A. E. Sheffield, "Three Interviews and the Changing Situation", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 692; F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 130; B. B. Lindsey, "The Companionate Marriage", p. 337; *S. F.*, A. W. Calhoun, "Social Development", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, pp. 45-6; *J. of S. F.*, L. L. Bernard, "The Concept of Progress", Vol. III, May 1925, No. 4, pp. 617-8; *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1926, No. 2, p. 213; S. Deploige, "le Conflit de la Morale et de la Sociologie", p. 242.

[12] In Davis and Barnes, "An Introduction to Sociology", p. 661.

[13] *The Commonweal*, Vol. VIII, No. 24, p. 595.

CHAPTER VI

POSITIVISM AS A POSTULATE

That sociology admits of a philosophy is made evident by the peculiar meaning ascribed to scientific by its writers. Scientific is understood to mean a particular kind of method in investigation that only accepts as evidence what is susceptible of physical measurement. Hence, experimentation is regarded as the key to a scientific system. Such a system, indeed, virtually implies that truth cannot be known in any other manner.

It is of the highest importance to know what philosophic background lies behind the use of a word. Thus scientific to the theologian and sociologist has vastly different meanings. It is the difference of a dual against a single universe theory, as referred to in the previous chapter.[1] Positivism, limiting truth to the tangible, gives sociology its distinctive character. There is little need of showing historically that this statement is true, for Comte, who is "glorified" by the sociologist as the originator of their peculiar point of view, is also recognized as the founder of positivism. If, therefore, it can be shown that sociology does understand scientific in the sense of closed-nature, the conclusion must be that it subscribes to a positivistic system of thought.

Sociologists are not professionally philosophers, so that their principles will not be expressed in succinct and exact philosophic language. To obtain their fundamental concept, the social setting will have to be brushed aside. For instance, R. G. Demaree, in "Religion and Research", compares faith and experience, and informs us that positive evidence alone yields truth through experimentation.[2]

> If faith is in harmony with experience it is reasonable to assume its truth. If faith and experience are in conflict the mind is confronted

[1] J. A. Leighton, "The Individual and the Social Order", pp. 101-3.
[2] *S. F.*, Vol. IV, Dec. 1925, No. 2, p. 366.

with the necessity of choosing between the two. Either faith must be revised or the testimony of human sense refused credence. Does experience mean anything? Is not experience 'the progressive discovery of the nature of right and wrong'; the discovery of truth?

Although L. L. Bernard is speaking of "personality" and "natural law", his criticism is equally applicable to faith.[3]

Although the scientific method of creating a projected and natural order began with the apparently minor relationships among immediate physical phenomena, it has spread beyond these beginnings until latterly it has come to replace in large measure the personality and natural law explanations of cosmic order and control. It derives the preference accorded it from its superiority as a method of interpreting phenomena and relationships of the highest and of the lowest orders of generality.

Other statements by this same writer on this point explain his meaning more fully.[4] His full mind is revealed in the following, wherein "theology and metaphysics" are explicitly mentioned as unable to help man in a truly scientific investigation. "Science views processes from within, it studies relationships among the things themselves. Theology and metaphysics look upon concrete phenomena as extensions or consequences of a personality or of a principle which dwells or obtains outside of the phenomena themselves."[5] A. Sutherland also concurs in same opinion.[6] B. L. Melvin[7] and R. Bain[8] go as far as to advocate methods for social study similar to those used in a laboratory. Redefining our concepts to bring them in line "with the principles underlying denotation in the natural sciences" is the advice of F. H. Allport.[9] To the same thought C. A. Ellwood leads us when he says: "The method of science is not to build itself upon some universal assumption, but rather to start with common sense, and to build up our gener-

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[3] *S. F.*, "The Concept of Progress", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 43.
[4] *A. J. of S.*, "Scientific Method and Social Progress", Vol. XXXI, July 1925, No. 1, p. 18; *S. F.*, "The Concept of Progress", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 36.
[5] *S. F.*, "The Concept of Progress", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 36.
[6] "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct", 2nd Vol., p. 320.
[7] *J. of S. F.*, "Laboratory Work in Rural Social Problems", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 263.
[8] *S. F.*, "Trends in American Sociology", Vol. V, March 1927, No. 3, p. 414.
[9] *S. F.*, "The Nature of Institutions", Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 177.

alizations out of all the facts of experience." And to make sure that we understand his meaning he continues: "These facts appear to us as both physical and psychical." [10] Finally all the testimony thus far adduced showing that sociology does uphold a closed-nature interpreted by positivistic principles, is summed up by Park and Burgess. Experience, the sole criterion of truth alone can interpret religions—hence moral values. "It is upon the interpretations of the facts of experience that we formulate our creeds and found our faiths. Our explanations of phenomena, on the other hand, are the basis for technique and practical devices for controlling nature and human nature, man and the physical world." [11]

The adaptation of this principle—as outlined in these references, to morals whether viewed from the standpoint of revealed religion or ethics is met with frequently in sociology. [12]

Complete autonomy is thus secured to man. Little need he concern himself about the metaphysical or theological—even though he once childishly relied upon such explanations. Experimentation has dispelled all illusions and nothing remains to be done, but to work out a mundane salvation. Secure in this belief, one cannot but believe that the following is intended as a bit of irony. [13]

The old notions of supernatural ethical revelations and sanctions for conduct, and the related view that the chief objective of right living is to secure an assured entry into a heavenly paradise, must be abandoned as anachronisms as antiquated and insupportable as magic, astrology or witchcraft. This does not involve in any sense the problems, thus far purely philosophical and theological, of the existence of God or an immortal existence after death, for it would require a charge of over inconsistency against God to assume that the most scientific method of living

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[10] *J. of S. F.*, "Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society", Vol. II, March 1924, No. 3, p. 331.

[11] "Introduction to the Science of Sociology", pp. 23-4.

[12] *S. F.*, W. Lippmann, "The South and the New Society," Vol. VI, Sept. 1927, No. 1, p. 3; B. Kidd, "Social Evolution", pp. 74-5; *S. F.*, M. J. Herskovits, "Social Pattern: A Methodological Study", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 58; *S. F.*, J. Q. Dealey, "Masters of the Social Science: Lester Frank Ward", Vol. IV, Dec. 1925, No. 2, p. 270.

[13] *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, pp. 219-0.

while a member of human society would meet his disapproval or prevent our rapid and successful translation to the empyrean area.

It is indeed strange that "metaphysics and theology" should constantly turn up in these writings. Doubtlessly, they are not intended to be taken seriously, but still one wonders, at times, if the protagonists of positivism really discountenance their use. Acknowledgment is not made indeed, but omission is no criterion. A careful analysis of C. A. Ellwood's article, "Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society" will reveal a real "schoolman." [14] Another instance and a striking one is the particular reference to the formation of an idea. The author, E. Sapir, favors Nominalism and one easily imagines that he is reading a review of the famous controversy on universals. It is needless to remark that moderate realism is not chosen to express the writer's views. Of course, his treatment is not a formal one, so social terminology will appear, as, f. i., "social pattern" substitutes for "universal". Unmistakably the author is describing the formation of an idea, a so-called past time of the philosophers. [15]

Take so simple a social pattern as the word "horse". A horse is an animal with four legs, a mane and a neigh; but as a matter of fact, the social pattern of reference to this animal does not exist in its purity. All that exists is my saying "horse" today, "horse" yesterday, "horse" tomorrow, etc.

Notwithstanding the above, the author had previously repudiated the very notion of "universal concept." We heartily agree with him: it is not a universal concept, but a poor substitute for it. The much-abused and oft-misrepresented scholastic philosophy would have saved him this embarrassment.

This tendency to use metaphysics without admitting it—or perhaps without knowing it, has been noticed by others. Rev. Dr. F. J. Sheen, a Catholic apologist, in his work: "Religion without God," expressly condemns the substitutes that

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[14] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. II, March 1924, No. 3, p. 331.
[15] *A. J. of S.*, "Speech as a Personality Trait", Vol. XXXII, May 1927, No. 6, pp. 892-905.

are made to serve for the reality,[16] so also does W. S. Lilly, in his work: "On Right and Wrong."[17]

That there is a tendency to philosophize, I do not think can be denied. A careful reading of B. L. Melvin's article "Sociology in Process"[18] convinces, although Melvin says quite plainly:[19] "Sociology today is passing from the philosophical to the scientific and upon the basis of continued observation depends the future use and development."

We are in perfect accord when emphasis is laid upon careful and painstaking research work.[20] It is only too true that much psuedo-science results from theorizing upon insufficient data. There is, however, an implication in this statement that should be noted: namely, though formal philosophy is condemned, a certain spontaneity[21] of grouping of principles is present. Hence it is only a question of selecting a new name for a wellknown object.

Melvin's insistance upon a correct sociological content for "method" and "terminology", convinces that he does not fail to realize that a philosophy is needed to evaluate terms properly. Furthermore, sociology is made by him to depend upon "the rise of a fuller, more exact, and distinctive terminology for sociological phenomena".[22] Now despite this eulogy of philosophy, the writer does not seem to think that philosophy deserves consideration for itself. His immediate reference in the following quotation is to "process", by which is meant the accepted sociological interpretation of the scientific findings from society. This preference for "process" also indicates that philosophy may be used but not acknowledged. "Indeed, at this point, there is room for naming a process, rather than having abstract discussions on terminology where philosophy and logic are used and manifested."[23]

The use of deductive principles is what is considered "un-

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[16] p. 233.
[17] Third edition, pp. 61-2.
[18] *S. F.*, Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 1, pp. 52-6.
[19] ibid. p. 52.
[20] ibid p. 54.
[21] ibid. p. 56.
[22] ibid.
[23] idem.

scientific", yet Melvin has worked himself into their use, when towards the conclusion of his article he describes what comes dangerously near a scholastic definition of "material" and "formal" objects of sociology.

Sociology does have a philosophy indeed, but not a healthy one. By postulate, it is limited to philosophy of the senses and its pronouncements upon religion and morality are humanistic. There is another consequence of such positivistic philosophy that is very evident in sociology: it is the lack of "finality." By this is meant that only what has been tested can be known, so knowledge only keeps pace with experimentation. The adaptation of this principle to morals will form a special consideration. For the present it suffices that lack of finality is characteristic of sociology.

F. N. House is definite in his statement that complete knowledge is unattainable. His is not a reference to verification of a known principle by new applications, but means that every possible instance should be examined before a true generalization may be made. This is precisely the difficulty seen in "universals" by a non-spiritual philosophy. The following is but to be expected from positivistic principles. [24]

> It is to be emphasized, however, that the purpose of scientific method, in sociology or in any other field, is not finality, but the conquest of fields of inquiry which laws as yet escaped explanation and control.

Or, as the same writer expresses it elsewhere, "there can be no universal permanent generalization." [25] In this view he is supported by L. L. Bernard. [26]

Aside from the fact that such statements are to be expected in treatises on sociology, a further study will reveal the reason for them. The real cause, in my opinion, is their virtual denial of the ability of the mind to seize upon the substance of an object by the process of abstraction from accidental notes and

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[24] *A. J. of S.*, "Social Relations and Social Interaction", Vol. XXXI, Mar. 1926, No. 5, p. 630.
[25] *A. J. of S.*, "The Concept of 'Social Forces' in American Sociology", Vol. XXXI, May 1926, No. 6, p. 797-8.
[26] *A. J. of S.*, "Scientific Method and Social Progress", Vol. XXXI, July 1925, No. 1, pp. 3-18.

to express in one word—called a universal idea, what it recognizes as essential to the object studied, even though the mind has not exhausted all existing or possible objects of the same kind.

This view differs radically from that expressed by L. L. Bernard when commenting upon this phase of scientific thought. It must be further noted that he limits generalization to the objects existing "within our view". This notion of scientific generalization is common enough, but its acceptance by sociologists concludes the demonstration that their "findings" in sociology can never have the certainty of a philosophic truth. What is more to the point, this lack of finality is not only acknowledged by them but considered as an indication of true science.[27]

> It is equally true that there are not permanent and constant or final and absolute facts and principles and ends in any science. All scientific laws merely generalize abstract norms for measurement of specific variation out of the concrete instances which exist within our view."

The immediate bearing of this upon "Final Moral Values in Sociology" is quite evident when it is recalled that all reality —and consequently all values, have their origin in God. Theology would be spurious were it not for the unity that underlies all existence. Hence it is that no truth—even that scientifically *induced*, if it is really a truth, can contradict the unity of knowledge as known by direct revelation or by science whether physical or meta-physical.

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[27] ibid. p. 15.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIOLOGICAL TRUTH IN ITS RELATION TO MORALITY

The Closed-Nature Theory discussed in Chapter V, and Positivism as a Postulate in Chapter VI naturally lead to a consideration of the sociological notion of truth. Truth has been defined as a conformity of the intellect with the thing, so that a true concept of sociology will be a mind-picture of what was found to be sociology. Two chief characteristics exert a marked influence upon this representation of sociological truth, because they were found to be inherently connected with sociology as expounded by modern writers.

It remains therefore to show that because of the "sufficiency of reason" in itself, together with "immunity" from extra-mundane forces, sociology only admits as true what may be experimented upon, or, "limited to a single universe theory", to use J. A. Leighton's phraseology.[1] Truth, therefore is colored by these fundamental postulates, and their bearing upon the practical colors moral applications.

What is implied by morality is the very center of controversy. Since truth cannot possess finality, it follows that morality likewise depends upon known customs for its determination, if it would be scientific. To define norms of morality, by an ideal order of supposedly intrinsic nature of things in themselves, is simply to project our aspirations or even "feelings" into an imagined reality. When human nature is autonomous, society is sufficient unto itself; and the God-given morality is but anthropomorphism that must give way to a scientific notion. A true social analysis according to L. L. Bernard reveals a "self-existent, and organic and self-perpetuating unity".[2]

It has been extremely difficult for even the later ethicists and sociologists, with their subjectivistic philosophic bias to arrive at the idea that

[1] "The Individual and the Social Order", pp. 101-3.
[2] "The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control", p. 89.

society is a self-existent, and organic and self-perpetuating unity, that it is not the creature of deities, sovereigns, parliaments, public opinion, acting as genuine or quasi-independent entities, but that it as a unity creates these as incidents and forms of its existence. Likewise they have not readily grasped the facts that an adequate social analysis must be primarily an analysis of this social unity, rather than of the variable and indefinite phenomena "mind" and "feeling", which are merely phenomena and forms of the greater social whole.

Morality as understood in sociology necessarily excludes objectivity as a note. In fact this quality is representative of an improper analysis—as Bernard points out, and follows from an imperfect concept of truth. Incidentally the following, besides giving a sociological definition of truth, shows also that "morality" follows the nature of truth. It will be noted that although the adjective "objective" is applied to truth, its meaning is really subjective.[3]

The objectivity of truth lies in the recognition of facts as true by all who understand them fully, whilst the appeal to a sufficient knowledge assumes their objectivity. To the verdict of a perfect intellect, that is, an intellect which knows everything existing, all would submit; but we can form no idea of a moral consciousness which could lay claim to a similar authority. If the believers in an all-good God who has revealed his will to mankind, maintain that they in this revelation possess a perfect moral standard, and that, consequently, what is in accordance with such a standard must be objectively right, it may be asked what they mean by an "all-good" God. And in their attempt to answer this question, they would inevitably have to assume the objectivity they wanted to prove.

Morality assumes a special meaning in sociology, a meaning which makes it unrecognizable as morality to revealed religion.

The radical differences between revealed religion and sociology are noticeable here perhaps more than elsewhere. Instead of viewing morality as conformity of man's conscious actions to some "scheme" of life, with finality about it, the sociologist reverses the process and determines a "scheme" of life from a study of man's actions. This method, he argues has scientific merit, whereas the traditional viewpoint is simply without actual basis in fact. Accepting his fundamental phil-

[3] E. Westermarck, "Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas", pp. 12-13.

osophy, such a contention is but logical. Whatever content may be found to be in morality is the result of a scientific study of man's actions. W. G. Sumner, in his epochal book "Folkways" has gone over the whole field and has orientated sociological thought for two decades. Mores—custom—opinion—taboos—physical force (when necessary)—morality, tells the story, presupposing a soundness in human nature in contradiction to original sin.

No higher sanction is obtainable than that contained in human society as understood from a naturalistic point of view and hence physically. "Rights" as described in the following simply makes them society-given not God-given, as W. G. Sumner clearly states: "Therefore rights can never be 'natural' or 'God-given' or absolute in any sense. The morality of a group at a time is the sum of the taboos and prescriptions in the folkways by which right conduct is defined." [4] Consequently, sociology consistently makes the ultimate test for morality the physical, as it previously had done for truth.

I do not presume that "physical" will be misunderstood, for I use this word in its ordinary and common meaning. What falls under the senses is the physical, whether that testimony be by sight or any other sense in man. It is referred to as material, as opposed to spiritual—i. e., not evident to the senses.

Furthermore, the stressing of the physical as noted above, has a particular bearing upon the matter at hand. For under this term, the sociologist includes what is properly psychical, i. e., spiritual. Yet such psychical phenomena are subjected to experimentation, because sociologists speak of activities of the mind as though they were but so many measurable forces and nothing more. In other words thought and volition are only manifestation of material forces by consciousness, which is also of the same nature. In short, the spiritual character of these processes—thought and volition—is a "terra incognita" to them, and psychology has become an experimental science, fully competent to account for the "so-called" spiritual phenomena.

[4] "Folkways", p. 29.

Convinced of the reliability of scientific experimentation,[5] sociology judges what is moral by the same standards as used for determining what is true. Sociology is ready to discredit the old because it does not meet the tests applied, and labors a new concept, called "morale" by H. E. Barnes. "In fact, it will probably be desirable to give up entirely the old concept of morals or morality, and substitute the more accurate term descriptive of the new objective, namely, morale."[6] In this writer's opinion physical and psychical fitness will result because reality itself is made the subject matter for "moral" investigations. Hertzler further explains the new "objective". "It is now definitely a search of human reality, of useful social facts upon which it develops a method and technique and practical devices which will assist the race in working out its own destiny."[7] Further on the exact meaning is made clearer by defining the criterion to be used as "demonstrated fact or verifiable hypothesis."[8]

Morality is indeed a favorite topic to illustrate the benefits of the new sociological viewpoint. Sometimes it is by explanation, at others by ridicule, but consistently the teaching is that traditional morality is unsatisfactory.

C. A. Ellwood sees the practical uses of morality and seeks rather to rejuvenate it by giving a correct notion of "God as a Father" because this idea "has been found best suited to the social needs of human groups".[9] In his book "Christianity and Social Science" great emphasis is placed upon good will or love but the author makes them wholly subjective, depending for their efficacy upon the inner attitudes and predispositions of individual. A high moral idealism is certainly in evidence, but it is based upon subjectivism.[10] Furthermore his insistence

[5] *S. F.*, G. A. Lundberg, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion", Vol. IV, June 1926, No. 4, p. 709; *S. F.*, H. W. Odum, "Books of the Year and Selected New Books in the Social Field", Vol. VI, June 1928, No. 4, p. 644; *A. J. of S.*, L. L. Bernard, "Scientific Method and Social Progress", Vol. XXXI, July 1925, No. 1, p. 6.

[6] *J. of S. F.*, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 220.

[7] *A. J. of S.*, "The Sociological Uses of History", Vol. XXXI, Sept. 1925, No. 2, pp. 175-6.

[8] ibid.

[9] "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 321.

[10] p. 27.

upon the uniform character of physical and psychical [11] makes us certain that the supreme test for morals as well as religion is for him the tangible. Do not be mislead by the condemnation of "the doctrine of materialism" found in the article just referred to, "Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society", because his treatment of the subject shows that he does not subscribe to a spiritually-conceived philosophy. He is contrasting physical and psychical and wishes to bring out that psychical facts also have reality—but a material one.

Rational bases for morality and religion are not as safe as "social processes" according to C. H. Cooley. An implication from such advice is that intelligence is incapable of directing us, because for religion as for morals, experimentation can alone determine what is of value. [12]

> We find ourselves in the midst of an onward movement of which our own spirits are a part, and most of us are glad to be in it, and to ascribe to it all the good we can conceive or divine. This seems the brave thing to do, the hopeful, animating thing, the only thing that makes life worthwhile, but it is an act rather of faith than of mere intelligence.

With like purpose does D. Drake's "The New Morality" undertake to establish a "rational" basis for morality by means of a scientific interpretation of behavior. Though he uses the term morality, he empties it of all its proper content. In the following, he condemns *external* morality, meaning by external, imposed from without. The inference is that only a morality that rises from within man himself is a profitable one, and in consequence thereof based upon scientific law. "Morality is a set of rules which men for good reasons impose upon themselves; it remains always more or less external to their nature, crossing their desires, demanding repression and conformity." [13] Acceptance of norms of conduct from God through revelation is rejected by this same test of "externality", [14] as "authoritarian morality is blindfolded morality. Not

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[11] *J. of S. F.*, "Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society", Vol. II, March 1924, No. 3, p. 331.

[12] "Social Process", p. 408; also cf. *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "History and Social Intelligence", Vol. II, Jan. 1924, No. 2, p. 156, for sociological meaning of faith.

[13] p. 347-8.

[14] ibid. p. 9.

being founded upon a study of the consequences of conduct, it is not open to correction by the sight of disastrous results." Sociology, therefore, leaves little to the Catholic notion of morality. In fact, a supernatural morality must yield because a monistic philosophy does not admit its possibility. [15]

Our notion of morality is radically opposed to that of the sociologist. As expressed above, these views are mutually exclusive, so that adherence to one necessarily implies denial of the other. No doubt particular instances may be brought forth, showing that certain actions could be justified by either system, e. g., alleviating suffering. Nevertheless a close scrutiny will reveal that these recommendations are inspired by different philosophies, i.e., evaluations of life. It really does make a difference, what principles motivate a man, evaluate the act performed and sanction the effect produced, because necessarily many factors enter in an act that no amount of subsequent approval could justify. The appraisal must be anterior to, not subsequent upon the performance of the act, and it is only by means of evaluating principles that this morality may be known.

Furthermore the discussion of morality as viewed by sociology, has demonstrated that only a naturalistic content should be given to that term. The "old" notion is pronounced faulty precisely because it is not founded upon experimentation. The following quotation may be given as a summary of all that has been said relative to morality. It will also serve as an excellent introduction to the subject-matter proper of this book, since its reference to social improvement demonstrates that sociology has values, i. e., norms for appreciating social actions. [16]

It is surprising how many apparently well informed people are still in the mythological stage of thinking when they approach certain subjects. Take morality as an example. Most people think that goodness can be produced merely by wishing or willing it. They do not realize that the development of a good character is the result of many factors,

[15] (Mr. Drake's treatment by me as a sociologist is based upon internal evidence of his book and also on its classification among social sciences by the Library of Congress.)

[16] R. M. Binder, "Major Social Problems", pp. 303-4.

e. g., heredity, proper family life, health, appropriate teaching, opportunities for suitable play and recreation, clean dwellings and streets, and the absence of bad examples. Owing to this lack of knowledge of the causes which produce character, teachers of morality and of religion have often asked immoral men to reform merely by the assertion of their will.

PART III

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF SOCIOLOGY

Section I—*Treats About Life*

Discussions about life never fail to intrigue our attention. This interest is probably explained by the fact that we see, or seem to see our own experiences reflected in the discussion before us. This fact probably accounts for the keen interest taken in sociology at the present time. The literature in this subject has grown apace so that it is almost an impossible task to really read everything that appears on sociological subjects. However, a careful analysis of a goodly portion of current literature, books and articles in magazines, will supply ample material for a satisfactory, and at the same time adequate synthesis.

Society as representing the organized life of man is the subject-matter of sociology. Sociologists give much attention to describing what is meant by society.[1]

> Society is any considerable number of human beings living and working together, and more or less enjoying themselves with one another; and a lot of ways, more or less organized into arrangements, and more or less made orderly by precedents, and rules, in which we, human beings, carry on and help one another to make life secure and desirable.

Certain activities are necessarily inherent in an association as just described. These activities have results, and are known as social results. A "social result" writes the same author is defined. "Any thing or quality inherent in association and inseparable from society is social".[2]

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[1] *J. of S. F.*, F. H. Giddings "The Measurement of Social Forces", Vol. I, Nov. 1922, No. I, p. 3.

[2] ibid. p. 3.

Activities are inseparable from society, and any study of the one is also the study of the other from a sociological point of view. Social relations brought about by a "considerable number of human beings living and working together" are by that very fact manifestations of social life. Consequently a study of society necessarily implies, in the study of sociology, a study of life itself. This view is upheld by the same authority for the two definitions just given, and shows that society cannot be viewed as a separate entity from social life.[3]

It [i. e. society] is a product of association, and association is a by-product of the collective, or pluralistic, mode of the struggle for existence. Collective struggle by comparison with struggle by solitary units, multiplies the chances of life. Society further multiplies chances and makes life increasingly desirable, by deliberated policies and procedures, and reactions consequent upon them.

Society then is acknowledged as the subject-matter of a sociological inquiry. Social relations become a very necessary consideration, since they comprehend chiefly the activities of man, who is a social animal. Man has intelligence, and that prerogative makes science possible, but because of intelligence man is not thereby superior to the social organism. He is simply another instance of social activities in that he shares in the social life of society, not by participation alone but chiefly by real dependence. He is a social product, especially in regard to mental equipment.[4]

First and foremost, is the fact of our long animal heritage. No inconsiderable part of our mental equipment is one which we share in common with the animal kingdom. The great mass of our instinctive urges and drives are those which we have inherited from our animal ancestor. Genetic psychology, then, is the threshold of intellectual history. It holds, in the thought of Stanley Hall, that "mind and body have evolved together in the race, and have developed together in the individual in one continuous process . . . " The mind stretches far beyond the limited experience of the individual. It contains within itself all the past and all the future. It is a product of millions of years of struggle.

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[3] ibid. p. 3.

[4] *J. of S. P.*, H. E. Barnes, "History and Social Intelligence", Vol. II, Jan. 1924, No. 2, p. 153.

Man in his social life becomes thereby the chief interest of sociology. Life and all its activities are at the same time social facts and seek their explanations in the explanations of society.

It is important to insist upon the identity of social relations and human activities, if an intelligent understanding is to precede an inquiry into the real nature of sociology. The mental quality of social relations was selected for prominent treatment because it is almost exclusively with this aspect of social relations that the notion of morality may be connected. And although morality, as understood by theology, is mainly an affair of the individual, yet the term is also used to designate an objective system of coordinated rules comprehending all of man's relations, i. e., to God, to his neighbor, and in respect to himself. The notion, therefore, of the mental quality of social relations corresponds roughly with morality broadly used. Hence when comparisons are instituted between sociology and moral theology, it is these parallel notions that are meant.

It is not easy to convey a definite concept of what is precisely meant by "mental quality of social relations" as used above. The emphasis is thrown by sociology not upon the individual's mental powers, although his possession of them is not denied. The totality of all human mentality is rather meant, with the implication that the whole social life is manifested in an individual, rather than vice versa. The expression "mental quality of social relations" summarizes, I believe, what is given by C. H. Cooley as "the social self." [5]

> The social self is simply an idea, or system of ideas, drawn from the communicative life, that the mind cherishes as its own. Self-feeling has its scope within the general life, not outside of it, the special endeavor or tendency of which it is, the emotional aspect, finding its principal field of exercise in a world of personal forces, reflected in the mind by a world of personal impressions.

Man's mental life is admittedly the chief concern of sociological investigation. This limitation in viewing human activ-

[5] "Human Nature and the Social Order", p. 147.

ities does not on that account really simplify the task of sociology, for what might be a narrowing down in scholastic philosophy or moral theology by the qualification "mental" does not similarly affect sociology. As was stated before, all social relations are brought within the meaning of the "social self." Hence "mental" for the sociologist is but an aspect under which social life may be viewed. In fact, it may be said it is the only aspect, as it is the channel through which social relations become conscious to the individual mind. To understand fully what is contained in the word "mental" thus used, requires a study of all factors contributing to a complete notion of social relationships. These factors are as varied as are the elements found in social organism.

Some idea of the factors entering into a complete social organism, may be gained from the following, though this enumeration is a modest one when compared with others.[6] S. N. Patten in his article, "The Basis of Civilization", however includes a variety of factors. "It is for us to unite the social activities—whose motive forces are charity, religion, philanthrophy, revolution and unrest—into a philosophy that is social and not sectional in that it gives to them all a reorganized rational body of evidence upon which to proceed."[7]

The result is that the science of sociology, as understood by current sociological writers, is co-extensive with the subjects of interest for man. The unifying element is their participation in social life. Everything that exists, therefore is matter for sociological investigation because everything has an influence upon social life. While this statement is true of moral theology as well, it assumes special meaning in sociology. Every writer in sociology assumes the evolutionary hypothesis, and freely acknowledges his belief in the sufficiency of nature. In books of a generation ago, an explicit affirmation of evolution is more frequently met with. At times long and learned expositions were given accounting in detail for the various stages preparatory to the inception of living matter.[8]

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[6] *A. J. of S.*, E. C. Hayes, "Some Social Relations Restated", Vol. XXXI, Nov. 1925, No. 3, p. 344.

[7] In Ross and McCaull, "Readings in Civic Sociology", p. 235.

[8] L. F. Ward, "Pure Sociology: A Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous Development of Society". pp. 116 ff.

At present, only seldom does formal treatment occur, as compared with earlier times. The omission is explained rather by implicit acceptance of the "theory", rather than by wavering "faith" in its validity. Occasionally, indeed, the position is assumed that life is simply accepted without concern as to its first origin or ultimate end. C. H. Cooley, for example, in his "Social Organizations" starts with consciousness as a fact. "Mind [he says] is an organic whole made up of co-operating individualities." [9] Evolution is not therefore discredited. It is a vital principle of sociological philosophy and its influence is traceable on every page. R. M. Binder shows the effect of this influence. "The animal remains on the plane on which it started; man rises to a higher level. He grows into self-consciousness, because his feeling is differentiated into intellect, will, and emotion." [10] His whole book,[11] from which this quotation is taken, is a striking example of the case in point. Another instance is found in J. M. Baldwin's "The Story of the Mind". [12]

Reference only needs to be made to W. G. Sumner's "Folkways" and E. Westermarck's, "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas" to show the credence given to a single interpretation of life. A single universe of reality theory dispenses with the necessity of spiritual principles to account for life and its multifold manifestation. Logical development soon brought the interpretation of man's conduct—morality to the theologian, to a level of mere behaviorism. [13]

> Thus the sociologist describes social or collective phenomena and explains them in terms of individual behavior; the psychologist describes behavior and explains it in terms of reflex mechanisms; the physiologist describes the reflex mechanism and explains it in terms of physical and chemical change. [Statement of "Allport", and quoted by Bernard]

At best, these attempts to explain morality by evolution from primitive "mores" or what not, hardly satisfactorily account for man's distinctive quality, rationality. It is quite evident

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[9] p. 3; and pp. 3-12.
[10] Infra p. 19.
[11] "Feeling as the Principle of Individuation and Socialization".
[12] p. 2.
[13] *J. of S. F.*, L. L. Bernard, "Recent Trends in Social Psychology", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 739.

that intellect and freewill may not be absolutely ruled out by any one statement, yet an accumulation of such statements makes their existence, in the sense of moral theology, correspondingly difficult to explain, and ultimately compels the denial of their existence altogether. Even if an intellect and will are insisted upon by evolutionary ethics, they are not what scholastic philosophy or revealed religion means by those self same terms. Examine the following statement of A. M. Tozzer, and as it progresses the truth of my judgment regarding the presence of an evolutionary basis for morality becomes more and more evident. Tozzer centers the thought about law, but law in its true meaning is a promulgation of "Reason" for reasonable beings, whether human or divine law is in question.[14]

> Morality, both to the savage and to civilized man, is often nothing but conformity to tradition and custom. It is not universal but particular in its application. It is quite evident that primitive man has a code of conduct that is prescribed for him by the society to which he belongs. It is precise, and there is no possibility of hesitation since his laws and customs coincide in a way not found in civilized communities . . . With us, law has only to do with the codification of those customs which are so fundamental in the life of group that society has found it necessary to enforce them.

Life, then as understood by sociology is limited to what is known, in philosophic terminology, as "natural." This designation is not fully acceptable, because all nature they argue is natural. Furthermore, its use is liable to mislead, because traditional usage has associated natural and supernatural as the two orders of reality.[15] All writers are not as blunt as C. K. Franklin, who contends "there is nothing gained today and much lost, by keeping up the fiction of a God-control society, and not showing how society controls itself by laws, just as natural as the laws of the individual or the laws of nature."[16] The "fiction" is supernaturalism—an institution of priestcraft, so, much may be expected from the scientific exposition of social principles.

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[14] "Social Origins and Social Continuities", p. 231.
[15] E. P. Payson, "Suggestions Toward an Applied Science of Sociology", p. 137; H. P. Fairchild, "Outline of Applied Sociology", p. 26.
[16] "The Socialization of Humanity", p. 366.

All that can be known of man, must be in terms of monistic philosophy, according to Franklin. This position seems definite enough to warrant the conclusion that life for sociology means the present life and nothing more. Franklin's testimony may be questioned by some sociologists because he shows tendencies to idealize future happiness of man—a quality of sociological writing not in good standing today. However, M. J. Karpf, whose article is quite recent gives evidence of the same tendency. He is considering sociology in its relation to social work and declares that "betterment" of social conditions is the logical use to which sociology may and should be put. "Sociology needs social work because the latter could provide it with the material for experimentation and could apply its findings to the treatment and control of human behavior which must be, in the long run, its raison-d'etre." [17] The obvious conclusion is that sociology has not repudiated the single concept theory for life, since "idealism" is found even at the present time.

Final values in sociology can only be those that are in harmony with its fundamental philosophy. The idea of "moral" moreover does not add any specifically new note from the sociological viewpoint, since all social action has to do with man in his associations and relations. Consequently, it must always be borne in mind, while reading these pages that sociological terminology has a meaning all its own, and furthermore that its pronouncements always and necessarily so are about life and its activity. In short, society is living.

Section II—*A Philosophy of Life*

Sociology has become an interpretation of life with principles that influence not only that outlook, but also evaluate specific instances in the individual's conduct. To appreciate man's relations in sociology properly and according to the spirit of that science, great care must be taken to understand its fundamental philosophy.

The statement may be made that everything influences

[17] *J. of S. F.*, "Relation Between Sociology and Social Work". Vol. III, Mar. 1925, No. 3, p. 427.

man, and, therefore, a certain morality may also be ascribed to it due to its connection with man. This is undoubtedly true, and explains why "human" acts are so comprehensive in sociology. The quality "human" arises because all social relations finally find conscious realization in man. For the sociologist, however, human acts do not require advertence of the intellect and free consent of the will. The distinction implied by "human" as opposed to "non-human" does not really find a place in his explanation of things, for that terminology he argues, represents a philosophy not subscribed to by sociology. Consequently "human" acts, when appearing in this book, are made to cover more than contemplated by moral theology.

A "human act" in moral theology is a prerequisite before any individual's action can come within the scope of that science; a social act in sociology, the result of social activities, presupposes that social continuities have brought about this particular result and it is, therefore, a fully social act. Social as here used corresponds to human as used in moral theology. Both adjectives are intended to describe the process whereby the self same act of an individual becomes "moral" for the theologian and "social" for the sociologist. Alleviation of suffering, as treated in Part I gives a practical application of the fact that the particular act of an individual may receive opposite interpretations.[18]

"Conscious" acts would perhaps better have fitted the sociological meaning, but fully to adjust "conscious" so as also to include a theological "human" act, was thought to be more difficult than reversing the process. Moreover the employment of "human" has the advantage of bringing the discussion immediately within morality proper. "Conscious social" acts—if that phrase were admissable might approach nearer to the sociological equivalent of theological "human" acts.

While it is true that sociology pays attention to every object, animate and inanimate, that affects men in their relations one with another, it especially addresses itself to human activity as such and in all its manifestations. "Social sciences" writes H. W. Odum, should "be centered upon human

[18] cf. Part I, Chap. II, pp. 14 ff.

problems through their research and guidance".[19] In fact, writers on sociological matters devote much space to these considerations, as is evidenced by E. S. Bogardus' work, "A History of Social Thought". Moreover, it is not uncommon to find statements setting forth characteristically human activities.[20] "What are the really satisfying interests, experiences, and achievements of life, and why are they so?"

Sometimes, the reference is directed rather to the individual who is spoken of as the one experiencing, "new interest in the values of . . . human life, which is the essence of the new individualism coupled with the realization that each individual destiny is involved in the universal interrelationship of causes and consequences, makes of the social sciences a philosophy of life."[21] The individual, therefore, precisely in his human qualities is made the subject of interest. It is seen that human relations cannot exist without him. Consequently the individual's acts are also social acts in that they are part of a "universal interrelationship of causes and consequences."

Social relations when viewed comprehensively receive much attention in sociological writings, and are, according to L. Bigood, the very substance of sociology.[22] When these same relations are viewed not in themselves, but in their terms, it is the individuals in their social relations that receive attention. Frequently, however, the precise term "individual" is not used, but is really meant as a careful analysis of D. H. Kulp's article, "The Interrelations of Social Psychology and Sociology," discloses. Yet, despite this recognition, this writer seems to acknowledge the group idea when he says the "structural and organizational and solidary phases of human relationships" are the matter for sociological study.[23] Groups viewed abstractly by C. A. Ellwood are called "humanity", and it is precisely out of it that everything, we included, arises. "The developing so-

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[19] *S. F.*, H. O. Odum, "Books of the Year and Selected New Books in the Social Field", Vol. VI, June 1928, No. 4, p. 643.
[20] R. L. Finney, "A Sociological Philosophy of Education," p. 72.
[21] E. C. Hayes, "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences", Introduction, pp. vi-vii.
[22] *J. of S. F.*, "A First Course in Sociology", Vol. I, Nov. 1922, No. 1, p. 19.
[23] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 260.

cial life" he says, "of humanity has made us and given us all that we posses." [24] But since we also have consciousness of our individuality, social life has also developed that in me. Consequently my very person is a social product. Here will be seen that the "individual" receives consideration, though only of a secondary character.

The group idea is an essential one in sociology. It would appear, moreover, that socialization works through it to influence the individual. Here is another radical difference from moral theology in that social "morality" is preferred to that of the individual.

The relative inferiority of the individual is assumed, so that society-in-general is of more worth than the individual member thereof. Individuality is made by C. H. Cooley to take all its content from society, so that the very idea of "vagus" is not considered a possibility. "The key to this matter, in my judgment, is to perceive that there are two kinds of individuality, one of isolation and one of choice, and that modern conditions foster the latter while they efface the former," [25] "Choice" is not exercise of freewill, because in the same paragraph he explains choice as "that which is really congenial to the choosing mind", a phraseology that indicates the "pull" of social forces and denies a spontaneous act of the will. Moreover his meaning is clear because there is also an extensive treatment of individuality as a social product. This same idea is expressed in other words by E. C. Hayes, who views society as "revealing the fact that each individual life insofar as it is anything distinctively human, is a participation in the social life, and each historic event or epoch is a ripple or a curve in the one great river, the flowing life process of humanity." [26]

There is a sense indeed in which "participation in the social life" may be understood that would involve no contradiction. Were this participation to be by cultural heredity in the meaning that the accumulated knowledge of the past is accessible, such a control of the individual by the social past

[24] "Christianity and Social Science", p. 92.
[25] "Social Organization", pp. 91-7.
[26] "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences", Introduction, p. vi.

is understandable. But sociology holds a contrary view. It holds that the very make-up of the individual as a "human" is from and by the social processes. Before citing an authority for this last statement, it is well to state that physical independent existence of man does not formally enter into the discussion, for the separateness of individuals cannot be seriously doubted. When individuality is referred to, man's special mentality is meant as is found in the following. [27]

> Of course the view which I regard as sound, is that individuality is neither prior in time nor lower in moral rank than sociality; but that the two have always existed side by side as complementary aspects of the same thing, and that the line of progress is from a lower to a higher type of both, not from the one to the other.

Similar uses of "individuality" occur frequently enough. Sometimes treatment accorded behavior is made the occasion. [28]

The material for discussion in sociology comprises social relations in their entirety, and does not stress the individual member in his social relations. Individuality moreover, as was seen, is a product of those very relations so that whatever man has, he owes most completely to society. All these facts however are not to be viewed as isolated instances of social or human activity, but are the very subject matter of a science. They are, as F. N. House tells us, the "raw material from which scientific concepts can be extracted." [29] Consequently since sociology is a science dealing with life, Parks and Burgess, would even require that the introduction to sociology be made into a "systematic treatise." [30] A science about life, describing its many sidedness is the province assigned to sociology. It must be kept separate from social sciences in general, although it is indebted to them for its working materials. This is the view of I. W. Howerth. [31]

[27] C. H. Cooley, "Human Nature and the Social Order." pp. 10-11.

[28] *S. F.*, L. A. White, "The Concept 'Social': A Critical Note", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 72; C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 15; *A. J. of S.*, F. N. House, "The Concept of 'Social Forces' in American Sociology", Vol. XXXI, Nov. 1925, No. 3, p. 365; *S. F.*, E. C. Hayes, "Masters of Social Science: Albion Woodbury Small", Vol. IV, June 1926, No. 4, pp. 671-2.

[29] *A. J. of S.*, "Social Relations and Social Interactions". Vol. XXXI, Mar. 1926, No. 5, pp. 619-0.

[30] "Introduction to the Science of Sociology", Preface, p. v.

[31] *J. of S. F.*, "Relation of Sociology to the Science and Art of Education", Vol. III, May, 1925, No. 4, p. 608.

> Sociology, then, is not the sum of the social sciences from which, if these sciences be subtracted, nothing remains. Nor is it the synthesis of the results of the social sciences. It is synthetic, of course, but all sciences are synthetic. It is the *science of the social process.* And this, too, whether we consider it from its static or dynamic aspect.

He concluded, it will have been noted, by stating that "Sociology, then, is the science of the social process." [32] This idea is further developed by F. R. Clow in that he speaks of "principles". "Sociology, [he says] as a body of principles, is new."[33]

Reference to sociology as a philosophy should only be made with great caution, for there is danger of confusion both for sociology and for philosophy. In the first place sociological writers shy at such a designation for their science, because the trend of the modern sociological thought is to repudiate all appearances of "speculative theorizing". As a science of society, sociology is claimed to have suffered greatly from want of scientific basis, for an overemphasis on speculation endangers true science. Much effort, therefore, has gone to set forth a proper notion of sociology as a science. [34] Among the eminent authorities just referred to, the names of Barnes, Goldenweiser, Hankins, Parshley, Ellwood would surely establish a strong probability that as one of the writers, B. L. Melvin, puts it, that "sociology at present is emerging from the realm of the philosophical by putting more and more dependence in observation and classification." [35] Real concern exists among writers that sociology be freed from the tutelage of metaphysics.

On the other hand, philosophy proper is not overjoyed at being identified with sociology. Always seeking to know the inner causes of phenomena presented to it, so that it can form-

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[32] ibid. p. 608.

[33] *J. of S. F.*, "Rise of Educational Sociology", Vol. II, Mar. 1924, No. 3, p. 332.

[34] *S. F.*, G. A. Lundberg, "Case Work and the Statistical Method", Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 1, pp. 61-5; *S. F.*, B. L. Melvin, "Sociology in Process", Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 1, pp. 52-56; In H. E. Barnes, "History and Prospects of the Social Sciences"; C. A. Ellwood, in E. C. Hayes, "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences".

[35] *S. F.*, "Sociology in Process", Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 1, p. 52.

ulate principles governing such phenomena, philosophy is straitened by the naturalism of sociology. Realizing that human intelligence is not limited to the sensuous, but goes beyond externals to the inner principles of being, philosophy also deals with supra-sensible realities. An object for philosophic inquiry is just as real for the mind through its abstractive processes as when obtained through the medium of bodily senses. Likewise, real objective existence is made as a correct predication for purely spiritual forces, even though only their effects in matter are at hand for investigation. Thus it is that much antagonism should exist between philosophy and sociology. It may be pointed out such antagonism is not intrinsic, but arises because of the principles underlying current sociological philosophy.

The view of theorizing condemned so roundly by present-day writers in sociology finds a hearty approval from the true philosopher as well. Improper analysis of facts presented can never lead to sound principles,[36] however well subsequent work may be performed.

That there should be a philosophy in sociology; that some attempt should manifest a desire for unified knowledge is not surprising, for the tendency to philosophize is but natural in man. For proof of this statement we need to go no further than the testimony of sociological writers themselves. And despite the protest against the wild speculations of some earlier writers, philosophy itself is not wholly discredited. An article by J. W. Hopper entitled "Five Years of Ph.D. Research in Economics and Sociology" discusses the explicit question, "is sociology philosophic or scientific?"[37] A study of this article reveals that mutual co-operation is a desideratum. It is the hope of this writer that a sound social philosophy will develop from consideration of data drawn from actual experiences of workers. However, philosophy for him is not to dominate, but grow out, as it were, from the facts themselves.

Consequently philosophy such as understood to be helpful to this science is not frowned upon by writers in this science. In fact they well realize, as expressed by F. H. Hankins, that

[36] cf. Manuals of Philosophy.
[37] *S. F.*, Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 75.

"the era of system building by men of outstanding pre-eminence now seems, however, to be passing and the era of more patient and less spectacular research appears to be arriving." [38] It will be noted that the earlier stages just referred to are not really condemned, but, insistence is upon the need of an observational spirit rather than a mere ideological bias. Yet this "gentle" criticism is not shared by all, for in his review of the problem from the viewpoint of "Sociology and Economics" A. B. Wolfe shares the opinion that sociology must develop principles peculiar to itself. This declaration is striking, because in the mind of the writer "the old sociology has gone into more or less voluntary bankruptcy." [39] A like view is held by E. J. Urwick. [40]

The desirability of a distinctive mental attitude undeniably is maintained by sociologists. Some writers even go as far as to state definitely that some system of philosophy will form almost of itself. "As for metaphysics the significant fact is that it cannot be kept out of the individual's intellectual equipment. By informal, if not by formal, instructions he is sure to imbibe some sort of a metaphysical conception of life and the universe." [41] This same tendency has been remarked upon by others. [42]

A further remark on the relationship between philosophy and sociology. When viewed by the genuine sociologist, there are not really two terms to the comparison. In fact there is no comparison at all, for all human experience is sociology. Consequently whatever arises from investigation into social phenomena, is at the same time sociology and philosophy. All possible events are explained or described by their antecedents so that the result is just as much philosophy as sociology. Precisely because of its attempt to outline, describe and direct social processes, sociology is a philosophy.

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[38] In H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 256.

[39] In Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "The Social Sciences and their Interrelations", p. 301.

[40] "Philosophy of Social Progress", p. 112.

[41] R. L. Finney, "A Sociological Philosophy of Education", p. 173.

[42] S. Deploige, "le Conflit de la Morale et de la Sociologie", p. 85; N. J. Spykman, "The Social Theory of G. Simmel"; H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Political Theory".

SECTION III—*Society Viewed as A Living Entity*

Society is spoken of as a separate living entity, as is shown by the many references to "living", "conscious", etc. that a survey of the statements describing society-in-general brings forth. The life predicated is not only that connoted by the usual meaning of the term-movement from within, but comprehends psychic qualities as well. Entity implies complete individual unity, so that society-in-general has a definite oneness about it. There are, in consequence, no unaffiliated parts, so that the relations between these parts arise by very necessity of the parts so related. It is not to be understood that individuality is denied to the component parts themselves. Thus, sociology views man as an integral part of society, yet with a certain completeness about himself. By society as a living entity, therefore, is meant that the whole complexity of the social organism composed of animate and inanimate parts, is viewed as possessing a full nature all its own, distinct from, yet participating in, each individual manifestation by any or all of its social parts.

Intelligent consciousness in man makes it evident that personality and motive are experiences for him. "Mere mechanism [as K. Young agrees] alone can never solve the problem of personality and motive." [43] A separate quality is found in man chiefly because he is man, though he is not all psychic life. Therefore man should be studied in his entirety, in his "body and mind together—as a bodily organism, subject to conditions operating in time and space, which bodily organism is in intimate relation with a psychic life also subject to the same conditions." [44]

Psychic life itself is found in its fulness in society itself. Of course, here as for the physical independence of the individual, each member of society has his or her own conscious life. But society is looked upon rather as the source from whence this consciousness is drawn rather than as a product—as it

[43] In H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 206.

[44] *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "Some Contributions of Anthropology to History", Mar. 1924, No. 3, p. 363.

were—of each individual's contribution. A. M. Tozzer in "Social Origins and Social Continuities" seems inclined to this view.[45] Substituting the idea history for society, but meaning practically a conscious social entity, P. S. Flippin calls "history . . . the biology of human conduct." Furthermore he speaks of history, endowing it with psychic consciousness, as "pulsating with life."[46] E. C. Hayes speaks of a psychic life in society as though it were existing yet separate from each individual composing that grouping.[47]

Just what kind of existence may be predicated of society because of its psychic life is difficult to say. That some sort of independence is assumed for it can hardly be doubted, as an examination of sociological texts illustrate. In reality some such notion seems demanded, especially since the evolutionary origin of man is a postulate of sociology. In reviewing the works cited, due allowance was made for rhetorical language, but the "living" attribute predicated of society is too pronounced to be understood as figurative speech. In my judgment the statements are intended in their literal meaning, because sociology is a "natural" science, although, I will admit, such an idea as a "living" society is hard to realize. At any rate, sufficient evidence is at hand to warrant a strong presumption that somehow or other there is a general psychic consciousness in society.[48] However statements to the contrary are not lacking. In the opinion of R. L. Finney as found in the following, the existence of an independent "social mind" is denied, though unity of corporate action is spoken of just as if the activity resulted from an individual entity. Of course, I do not for one moment suppose that any sociological writer

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[45] pp. 37-8.

[46] *J. of S. F.*, "The Importance of Historical Research to the Teaching of the Social Sciences", Vol. I, Nov. 1923, No. 1, p. 50.

[47] *A. J. of S.*, "Some Social Relations Restated", Vol. XXXI, Nov. 1925, No. 3, p. 344.

[48] F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 223; *S. F.*, M. C. Elmer, "Evaluating Community Activities", Vol. VI, Sept. 1927, No. 1, p. 88; *J. of S. F.*, C. A. Ellwood, "Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society'", Vol. II, Mar. 1924, No. 3, p. 331; *J. of S. F.*, H. W. Woolston, "The Dynamics of Population", Vol. II, Jan. 1924, No. 2, p. 176; C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 126; E. A. Ross, "The Principles of Sociology" p. 693; R. M. Binder, "Major Social Problems", p. 44.

would seriously look for the "One" man of "Mother Goose Rhymes", but I do think that some sort of separate existence is given to society by the causality assigned it. A purely mental concept—as explained above hardly suffices. [49]

> The social mind is a term much used in sociology. It is a metaphor. Individual persons have each a mind of his own. But society has no mind. The metaphor means that many minds act harmoniously together, so that social group acts as a unit. The member of the social company keep step in their minds, as it were. Many associates act as if they were of one mind. It is obvious that this mental harmony and unity are necessary to social life; without it no society would be possible at all.

It will be noted that the individual is brought into comparison with the social mind in this quotation. It is inevitable that consideration of individual consciousness would receive attention. From Finney's account just given, man seems assured of his complete dignity by reason of his individual possession of rationality. Yet the acknowledgement does not really give full dignity of personality to man, because as G. Wallas points out man receives from and does not give to the body sociologic. [50] F. H. Giddings explicitly states the dependence of man upon society, thus making a personality concept in a scholastic sense impossible. It should be said that, of course, man actually does receive from "society", but that expression should not make the existence of a "rationalized suppositum" impossible. It is precisely the intelligence of man that is in question and this is made a social product, for "the individual is a receiver from society, in fact almost takes his whole being—at least his social being from it entirely." [51] Indeed "individual personality" cannot be the real meaning of R. L. Finney for he says that it "is itself a product of the learning process." [52] Accepting Religion as the highest expression of social value, C. H. Cooley simply uses it as an illustration of the same fact of society's creative powers. "Re-

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[49] In Ross and McCaull, "Readings in Civic Sociology", p. 86.
[50] "The Art of Thought", p. 50.
[51] *J. of S. F.*, "The Classification of Societal Facts", Vol. II, Jan. 1924, No. 2, pp. 148-50.
[52] "A Sociological Philosophy of Education", p. 64.

ligion is, — the sense of a man's self as member of a worthy whole, and his sense of self is formed by his striving." [53]

It is extremely difficult to convey just what meaning is attached to the idea of social consciousness and personality. Sometimes the first is extolled at the expense of the latter, and on the other hand the integrity of the individual seems to be assured and the full dignity as a man amply protected. The two terms under discussion have many meanings in sociology. All shades of possible meanings are found for personality from apparent absolute independence of the individual to a mere abstraction of the "social mind." The individual is submerged in one instance, [54] at other times the community profits by the exercise of individualism,[55] whereas an almost completely opposite view is expressed by K. Young as previously quoted. [56]

A definite pronouncement for the predominance of the social over the individual is found in I. W. Howerth's article. There is no question here, as pointed out above, of physical independence of the individual units of society, but reference to man's individual personality. From the following quotation, it appears that man's whole mental equipment is derived from society so that he is really a social product so far as his psychic life is concerned. It is important to mark this overlordship of the social mind, for man really derives moral life as well from society in consequence of his dependence upon it. He simply participates in social morality as he does in psychic life. [57]

> Is the individual an entity that has any real existence, or that can be conceived of entirely apart from the group to which he belongs. I think not. That conception belongs to the earlier stage of sociological thought. It is now antiquated and I suppose almost generally discarded. In the group, we live and move and have our being. Goethe said, "Im Anfang

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[53] "Social Process", p. 76.
[54] W. B. Brown, "Social Groups", pp. 49-50; E. A. Ross, "The Principles of Sociology", p. 655.
[55] *S. F.*, Geo. B. Logan, "Guides to Periodical Reading", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 80.
[56] In H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 206; see quotation on p. 63 above.
[57] *J. of S. F.*, "Relation of Sociology to the Science and Art of Education", Vol. III, May 1925, No. 4, p. 607.

war der That",—in the beginning was the deed. With respect to man, we may say, in the beginning was the group. We cannot speak of education, then, as if it concerned the individual alone. There is no strictly individual process of education. All educational science is, from one point of view, a social science, for all educational procedures have a social reference.

The possession by the individual of a social mentality seems certain enough,[58] and most probably he is a debtor to society for it. The forces, therefore, operating in society are given an important role, that affect all human behavior, social as well as individual.[59] The influences exerted are not considered as unimportant, but are described as dominating,[60] because "they are in a sense, the work of this same society, whose life they safeguard."[61] Society then is an index of the mentality of the units found therein. The bearing of this statement is that group-life is reflected by the individual. Let the group run down, as W. B. Brown expresses it,[62] the individual likewise depreciates in mental perfection as well as in physical qualities. Should this group vitality deteriorate or disappear altogether man would be compelled once more to begin the painful and laborious process of acquiring those mental traits that mark him off from the brute. This, we are told, is the process by which he has reached his present state of mental development.[63]

Originally man must have started without a social tradition. Like the brutes he lived merely in the world of objects. The earliest men, in other words, began without human accumulated knowledge and without definite beliefs or standards. But as soon as the power of abstract thought and articulate speech began to develop, men could accumulate knowledge and pass it along to their fellows.

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[58] *S. F.*, J. M. Gillette, "Nature and Limits of Social Phenomena", Vol. V, June 1927, No. 4, p. 562.

[59] *A. J. of S.*, F. N. House, "The Concept of 'Social Forces' in American Sociology", Vol. XXXI, Sept. 1925, No. 2, p. 149 and pp. 155-6; C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", Preface p. vii.; C. H. Cooley, "Social Process", p. 158.

[60] C. A. Ellwood, "Sociology and Modern Social Problems", pp. 407-408.

[61] C. C. A. Bouglé, "The Evolution of Values", English Translation by H. S. Sellars, p. 16.

[62] "Social Groups", pp. 116-7.

[63] C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 193.

Even though a distinctive mentality from the brute now characterizes man, there must have been some quality in our ancestors that made this evolution possible. R. L. Finney says that some law existed and ascribes man's progress to his obedience to it. "It is clear that Kipling's jungle stories are more than mere stories; they are allegories intended to show why the human animal must obey the law of his herd. For there are order in the human group and law in human society, just as there are among animals." [64] Failure to obey meant destruction for primitive society, because "whatever the law of the human herd is called, it has to be obeyed, or the members would scatter and perish; the members of the pack would finally destroy each other." [65]

Accordingly, if even physical existence is dependent upon "social" co-operation, surely mental preservation all the more would require social control. Such is the view given by Ruth Messenger in her appreciation of C. C. A. Bouglé's definition of sociology. [66]

Some force then is at work that compels the individual to associate with his fellows. Moreover "human sociability" as H. E. Barnes terms it results from such forces [67] and not indeed from blind forces, as perhaps might have been imagined, for Park and Burgess declare that "there is in all distinctively human activities a conventional, one might almost say a contractual element which is absent in actions of other animals." [68] Consequently, man is under compulsion to socialize himself.

Surely there is one outstanding feature; it is man's conscious activity. It is precisely this quality that has been produced as a special trait in man by reason of his living in society. This trait is of special interest to establish the contention that society as understood by sociologists creates the psychic personality in social man. Now certainly society must have the qualities that it bestows so lavishly. Therefore, society, because of the prerogatives enjoyed by the individual,

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[64] "General Social Science", p. 24.
[65] ibid. p. 24.
[66] *S. F.*, Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 1, p. 9.
[67] In Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "The Social Sciences and their Interrelations", p. 333.
[68] "Introduction to the Science of Sociology", p. 189.

possesses a psychic consciousness that is at once residing in man and participated in by him. This is true, beyond a doubt in regard to all social activities. N. J. Spykman, commenting upon "The Social Theory of Georg Simmel" gives expression to the view that "he [i. e., the individual] is at the same time social product and social factor, the result of socialization and the producer of socialization; and it is this double capacity that determines him as a social being." [69]

Man's whole being is therefore intimately bound up in the social processes. Whatever the individual thinks, reflects social processes. [70] Likewise the manner in which man expresses himself in action is also patterned by social forces, so that even greatness "must be conceived in terms of inherited qualities and environmental traits." [71] All of man's activities come within this explanation so that moral qualities also must be understood as developing out of the social forces. H. Carter in his "The Social Theories of L. T. Hobhouse" speaks of Hobhouse referring all these and similar activities to a soul. This would seem to be opposed to the theory that psychical life is a product of society as previously claimed. However, his use of "social", as reported by Carter, really strengthens the preeminence of the "social" over the individual and even his reference to "soul" is not a profession of faith in the supernatural, for here as elsewhere the individual is a recipient in the sociological use of that term. [72] As a consequence all activities, moral as well as purely intellectual, requires a knowledge of social origins if a thorough understanding of them is attempted. It is essential to grasp the social philosophy thoroughly if moral problems are to be intelligently solved. Such indeed is the view of J. A. Leighton when treating the preliminary question of the "Scope of Ethics and Social Philosophy." This writer positively states that "The heart of ethics is the heart of social philosophy." It follows that to be moral means to be a useful member of the "community of mora.

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[69] p. 264.
[70] F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", pp. 134-5.
[71] *S. F.*, W. F. Ogburn, "The Great Man versus Social Forces", Vol. V, Dec. 1926, No. 2, pp. 225-31.
[72] pp. 12-23; p. 15; p. 120.

selves." It is clear to him that the individual—in as far as his moral qualities are concerned, has no separate existence.[73]

It is often said that ethics deals with the individual as the source and bearer of moral values, whereas social philosophy deals with the moral relations of individuals, as members of society. But the individual, as the source and bearer of moral value, is already a member of social groups. He cannot be a *human* individual otherwise and social groups consist of individuals in various relations of contact, cooperation, communion, conflict.

The psychic life predicated of society really comprehends all its "moral" activities. Distinction between these terms, as is seen from the foregoing, does not exist, for the reason that the right way is the social way, and the social way is the intelligent way, consequently the social way is also the moral way.

Section IV—*Social Energy is Sufficient unto itself.*

Psychic life as just outlined, exists in sociology in a most comprehensive manner. By its vitality, society certainly does mould our mentality according to social patterns. Indeed, not only our complete mentality is a social product, but its very origin and development are likewise products of society. While this statement is generally true for sociology, the separate existence of individual minds is not thereby denied. It is difficult to represent just what is meant by "social mind". However, further characteristic features found in sociological writings, describing that social mind, will help us to a clearer concept. Before doing so, it is well to avoid some possible misconceptions as to the exact meaning of the term "social mind". No one, I think understands that sociologists mean separate physical existence in an absolute sense, although their statements sometimes might bear that interpretation. The idea of a real force resulting from and residing in human associations, capable of forming individuals into useful members of society, would convey a truer concept. Nevertheless the influence is real and its efficacy as a conscious directing force is also just as real as though the social mind were some concrete—independent—and existing causality.

[73] "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 7.

Again, no one, sociologist or theologian, questions that social heredity or, as it may also be called cultural heredity, does influence the young child entering upon social life. Surroundings, or environments, determine largely the stock of ideas in any particular individual's mind, so that that mind may be said to be patterned upon those types presented to it. In reality environments are the media whereby the child's mind is brought into contact with the accumulated knowledge of the past. It may even be said that many persons hardly ever add anything by their own efforts, so that all their ideas and moral notions are acquired by simple acceptance of ready made patterns.

The analysis put forward by the sociologist, explaining intellectual attainments and moral standards for conduct unfortunately is substantially correct for many persons. However, it is a wrong inference to state that all knowledge, speculative and practical, must be gotten by impressions of patterns previously existing in the "social mind". In the first place, the analysis is not true for the entirety of the human race, nor does it hold even for that portion large as it may be, that simply accepts whatever is presented to it without adding some "personal" modifications to the social heritage received.

The sum total of human knowledge is advanced by the individual's efforts, because of his ability to do independent thinking. It is precisely because he can make this "social heritage" his own, add his little "mite", that knowledge accumulates. The "imposing" of external knowledge, as divine revelation is referred to in sociology, offers no contradiction because, even revealed doctrine must conform to man's intellectual processes, before he can even "know" about it. The revealed "message" must be understood by man so that its content may become vital to influence the human race. Such a functional knowledge is only gotten by thinking, and thinking is a personal achievement—not simply the enjoyment of an impressed quality from the "social mind". Furthermore, when ideas are simply accepted, even this acceptance demands some little personal spontaneous activity and may be known from the degree of acceptance given to those "ready-made" ideas.

The sociological explanation for "increase" of knowledge

is that the individual does actually work out problems, however, the content of his mind as well as the directing force are but manifestations of an all pervasive social mind. This position is logical to sociology, for to presuppose autonomous and spontaneous activity on the part of the individual's mind would break social continuity.[74]

The writer just referred to, C. M. Case, deals with this problem. He acknowledged the importance of the individual by stating that "it takes but little thought to realize that the changes in civilization are each and all due to the emergence of new things, inventions, ideas, which in the last analysis, are always emanations of the minds of Individuals."[75] The sacredness of individual personality seems to be sufficiently safeguarded, though certain expressions like "emergence", "emanations" are a bit unhandy, but when this declaration is modified by the following statement, the interpretation apparently favorable to individual independence becomes less so, for "it is important to remember that civilization, psychological and individual though it may be when resolved into a chronological series, is not at all the outgrowth of the minds of individuals or of any particular generation. On the contrary. It comes to them from without it moulds them, it forces itself upon them".[76]

Although the writer refers to an educational process at this particular point under discussion, his general theme is "Social Heredity". Consequently society is the great "Mother" of our knowledge. She exercises her maternal authority and instills this knowledge very often without awareness on our part of her gracious bounty. "Not only is man at the mercy of civilization, but he generally remains either partly or wholly unaware of what he is thus forced to accept."[77]

Circumstances, or environments—to use a sociological term—are therefore real factors entering into morality. This does not imply that they are the chief ones or even the only ones. In fact, other factors are present and exert a deeper causality.

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[74] C. M. Case, "Outlines of Introductory Sociology", pp. 258-71.
[75] ibid. pp. 268-9.
[76] ibid. p. 269.
[77] ibid. p. 270.

These are, first, the thing done, and second, the intention of the person performing that act. Acts tend of themselves to a definite result and this fixes the "objective" morality, as it is called; and equally important is the intention of the agent because it determines his conscious and free acceptance of that act performed.

To speak therefore of a social mind as endowing the individual mind with a stock of ideas and consequently moral notions is to present an imperfect analysis. Such an explanation of the social life, viewed abstractly if you will, fails to account, as has been seen, for the spontaneous activity of the individual member of society. And although it is true that man is influenced by his surroundings, it is also true that he can, although he may but seldom do so, acquire new knowledge by his own initiative. And what is more important, he is able to select, i. e., choose freely between various suggested ways of accomplishing an end forseen, despite his environments.

The above will doubtlessly seem naive to the sociologist, because to his mind, all that has been said simply begs the question. Were one to grant such a "hypothesis" it would be equivalent to admitting that social processes of themselves are inadequate to account for the existence of socialized man. There is no need, says the sociologist, of invoking an outside or spontaneous causality when social forces are sufficient to account for all the phenomena considered. An outside causality, he will argue, breaks continuity of life, and is discredited by scientific investigation. Furthermore social energy is sufficient unto itself to account for all activity studied in man and adventitious happenings in nature or influences extraneous to it are inimical to a healthy social vitality, because such influences do not rise out of society itself. In fact there are no forces or powers other than social forces. If others were once thought to exist, it was due to an improper understanding of nature and its forces. The solution to the problem of life can only be gotten by an analysis of social processes. This alone can furnish a satisfactory explanation.

Sociology today does really subscribe to such a program. And although sociology admits readily enough that its find-

ings are only tentative, it is nevertheless convinced that its interpretations, based as they are upon the principle of the sufficiency of nature, alone are sound. Little by little will nature give up its secrets, as it has been forced to disclose, by evolution, man's progress from former brute associates.[78]

The task of sociology is to describe this social process which forms the human personality, builds a culture, and guarantees social continuity. It also essays an explanation of the process by which change is brought about in the life-organization of persons and in the culture of the group in so far as these changes come as a result of contact and communication. This latter task involves explanation of the place of social change, its direction and social determination, and the means by which change takes place and values become defined, as well as the mechanisms by which the group controls value realization. The units of sociological investigation are the behavior tendencies of persons and the culture facts towards which they react; the method of investigation is that common to all science—observation, classification, and generalization in terms of units.

Implications perhaps may be drawn from such terms as "contact" and "communication" that could bear other interpretations than that given here as the sociological one. However, the reference to behavior in the same paragraph, and the importance given to it, will convince that spontaneous and freely chosen actions are excluded from consideration. E. R. Groves' thesis maintaining the sociological viewpoint might be summarized in a word—man is simply a resultant of forces,[79] so he "will come to respond to every situation habitually",[80] because social forces are all comprehensive.[81]

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[78] *A. J. of S.*, E. B. Reuter, "Relation of Biology and Sociology", Vol. XXXII, Mar. 1927, No. 5, pp. 705 ff.

[79] "Personality and Social Adjustment".

[80] *J. of S. F.*, E. S. Bogardus, "The Concept of Unselfish Service", Vol. I, Jan. 1923, No. 1, p. 102; *J. of S. F.*, F. H. Allport, "Social Change: An Analysis of Prof. Ogburn's Culture Theory", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 671; *J. of S. F.*, E. C. Hayes, "Three Aspects of a Social Situation", Vol. III, Mar. 1925, No. 3, p. 405; *J. of S. F.*, C. C. Josey, "The Instinct Controversy", Vol. III, Mar. 1925, No. 3, p. 538; C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society," p. 296; p. 382; E. J. Urwick, "A Philosophy of Social Progress", pp. 53-4.

[81] *J. of S. F.*, F. H. Giddings, "The Measurement of Social Forces", Vol. I, Nov. 1922, No. 1, p. 3; F. E. Lumley, "Principles of Sociology", p. 540.

Social energy is inseparably linked with society for in society alone do we "live and have and being". Is not therefore such social energy all pervasive, leaving no sphere of activity to the individual? Despite H. E. Barnes' protest that sociology is not social determinism, and although he allows the individual an influence in society [82] it must be remembered that that individual receives his whole social-self ready-made. Society, indeed, is superior to the individual for it directs him in his social activities. This thought underlies many statements in sociologies when the social forces are treated comprehensively. [83]

Exact statements in precise language setting forth the propositions that society is sufficient unto itself is only rarely met with. The idea rather forms the background of all sociological writings and for that reason does not receive formal treatment. In fact it is viewed more in the nature of a postulate than of a truth that needs any scientific demonstration. The concept is an important one, as it offers a logical explanation for the origin of values found in sociology. It also accounts for the special viewpoint of the science of sociology.

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[82] "Sociology and Political Theory", p. 197.

[83] L. L. Bernard, "The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control, p. 90; A. M. Tozzer, "Social Origins and Social Continuities", p. 24; E. R. Groves, "Personality and Social Adjustment", p. 21; W. G. Beach, "An Introduction to Sociology and Social Problems", Introduction, p. 1; D. Drake, "The New Morality", p. 352; *S. F.*, I. M. Rubinow, "Social Case Work: A Profession in the Making", Vol. IV, Dec. 1925, No. 2, p. 287.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL PATTERNS BRING ABOUT CONFORMITY AMONG CONSCIOUS HUMAN ACTS.

SECTION I—*Conformity Dependent upon Knowledge Possessed by Individual*

The activities of man in society are also social ones. Moreover, they are endowed with a definite consciousness that makes them of particular interest in the search for final moral values in sociology.

It was seen that all of man's actions are social, because the social processes realize in man their fullest expression. When this has been done, man is said to be socialized. Consequently all of his social activities, especially his mental ones, derive their origin, development, and complete being from the social processes.[1]

Socialization is a result of the socializing process, and may be understood to mean the degree possessed or advance made in social progress. It also expresses another note, namely, that of "conformity" to the types or patterns inherent in the forces immediately bearing upon an individual. J. M. Gillette explains "socialization" in connection with the rural problem. This specific adaptation does not detract from its more general meaning. It will be seen that it is as comprehensive as the social culture possessed by any single individual,—or for that matter by all individuals.[2]

Socialization may mean all the processes in the development of society by means of which human beings have become the social beings they are now, the taking over of property by the state, the reconstruction of institutions and organizations to make them more adapted to modern social purposes, and the impartation to individualistic minds a social outlook.

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[1] C M. Case, "Outlines of Introductory Sociology", pp. 268-71.
[2] *J. of S. F.*, "Socialization of Rural Minds", Vol. I, Mar. 1923, No. 3, p. 290.

The one element that needs stressing is that of "consciousness." This quality, as has been seen, is certainly concomitant with socialized activities in man. In fact, social activities in man constitute consciousness, because all of the mind's content has been received from society through the process of socialization.

Consciousness is usually described as awareness, and such a definition is correct. In our subject, consciousness implies that the individual, whose particular conscious activities are in question, recognizes them as his own. That individual is aware that his activities are socialized activities, and consequently arranged according to pattern. In the quotation just given, socialization means precisely that the individual's mind is organized, and the present point is that that individual is aware of it. Every individual exhibits the degree of social knowledge possessed by him according to his ability for absorbing and making the social forces about him his own. To the extent that his powers are socialized, to that extent does he understand the explanation of phenomena. In like degree will he be able to control the forces of nature about him, and thus avoid much discomfort or even pain that follows from ignorance of nature and her laws. Socialization, therefore, is a conscious participation in a "social outlook", with the result that the knowledge thus gained enables the individual to progress, but mainly permits society to protect itself from previous untoward conditions occurring in its future evolutions. The individual by his incorporation in society is assured against destructive influences, provided the socializing process has not encountered some antagonistic influence or anti-social force in his particular regard.

Does not this portrayal of the individual take away from him all initiative? This is a much mooted point.[8] Some sociologists answer affirmatively, while a tendency may be noted in others to allow for a first admiration of external greatness, then acquisition through attraction. In my opinion this is but a species of the former, because the very recognition of greatness—real or imagined—operates as a social force. More probably the simple explanation, "innate needs of human nature",

[8] C. M. Case "Outlines of Introductory Sociology", pp. 550-576.

as given by R. L. Finney,[4] would better account for personal initiative, in that this particular individual has been more favorably endowed by nature: his impulse for self-preservation is stronger than that of other men.

Conformity, then, to some standard, seems to belong to the very nature of social forces, especially when they result in socialization, for "an analysis of the social forces, that is to say of social activities, is plainly the proper task of sociology."[5]

An examination of social activities will show the types or patterns that bring about this conformity among human acts. It will reveal how socialization, viewed as a process, directs the conscious human acts of man in some definite manner. In other words sociological laws are directive of social evaluation.[6]

There is a definite curve or direction given to social activities dependent upon the particular social pattern effective at the moment. Social forces express themselves in this fashion, because these forces embody all that custom and previous conscious adaptation have decreed to be beneficial to society. Were one to know precisely at what stage of socialization any individual is, it would be a simple matter to forecast his particular behavior. This behavior would follow the pattern—present at that moment in his mind, and which pattern directs the social force operating through him.

When the processes of socialization are not fully known, a specific action at a definite time under particular circumstances is erroneously said to be free. Apparently the agent could have with equal consciousness performed some other act or abstained from acting altogether. Hence, freedom in the scholastic meaning of that term is due to a false

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[4] *S. F.*, "The Problem of Social Evaluation", Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 207.

[5] *J. of S. F.*, I. W. Howerth, "Relation of Sociology to the Science and Art of Education", Vol. III, May 1925, No. 4, p. 610.

[6] *J. of S. F.*, A. J. Todd, "The Place of Sociology in the Curriculum of the Modern School of Science", Vol. II, Jan. 1924, No. 2, p. 202; *J. of S. F.*, A. W. Calhoun, "The Moral Challenge of Sociology", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 680; *J. of S. F.*, F. H. Giddings, "Social Work and Societal Engineering", Vol. III, Nov. 1924, No. 1 pp. 9-10; *S. F.*, G. B. Logan, "Guides to Periodical Reading", Vol. IV, June 1926, No. 4, p. 737.

analysis of conscious human activities. Judged by sociological standards, the "uncaused interpretation" of freedom represents an imperfect knowledge of causation. Social continuity is broken by "uncaused" freedom and such a phenomenon is contrary to all scientific discovery. It follows that any system that maintains such possibility of arbitrary choice for an individual is based upon a wrong concept of man's nature. This misconception is more manifest, when norms of morality are prescribed as though the individual could select from among the social patterns for his conduct. It is impossible to give directive rules for man's actions, claim the sociologists, because obedience would presuppose a free will in man: a hypothesis that is disproven by scientific investigation of social processes.[7]

The very word "conduct" so prevalent in treatises inspired by revealed religion, implies that human conscious actions are capable of more than one, nay even of a contrary, manner of execution. The opposite is rather the case, for control of social forces, operating in a given situation, shows that an intelligent and fully conscious agent is conforming to definite patterns, and not acting without previous antecedents. To describe such action as "fatalism" indicates that the fundamental tenets of sociology are misunderstood, for no sociologist denies that behavior follows definite laws. Consequently only the knowledge of socially patterned behavior can be a scientific explanation of the much "misunderstood" notion of freedom.

Sociology, therefore, does have a definite explanation for man's actions. These actions do not happen haphazardly, but follow exact laws. Every socialized individual therefore must conform his action—call it behavior or even conduct—according to a definite pattern, if social well-being is to result. Or, socialization itself is directive of men's actions.

Disregard for a proper performance of actions cannot be charged against sociology. Conformity to its standards is required so that a socially "good" act may result. This concern manifests the spirit of a theologian who insists that a complete human act must possess a like set of qualities,

[7] cf. Part IV, Chap. XV.

namely, intelligent direction of a definite action, freely performed.

From the foregoing, it will be seen that despite evident differences, there is great similarity between sociology and moral theology in regard to prescribing definite norms for the proper direction of conscious human actions. Realization of this fact is most important, because, after all, the findings and pronouncements of either science do influence human acts. This statement does no violence to sociology, for it follows logically from the fundamental principles laid down; it is in accord with moral theology, since treatises in moral theology are designed for directing human conduct. Directive norms are to be found in both sociology and moral theology.

Sociology is therefore a scientific explanation for a properly directed life. The conscious activities of man needs some sort of guidance, if an intelligent manner of acting is to result. [8]

Like the mind the body operates according to certain orderly processes. These bear a striking resemblance to the working of an infinitely complicated machine. These mental processes are, hence, appropriately called mechanisms. The operation of these mechanisms is much affected by the physical condition and the social environment of the individual.

The comparison of "physical" parts of man with "social" operations does not detract from immediate application to behavior. In fact it strengthens the analogy, since contact with these media only makes the mind conscious of social processes. This contact is explained through "stimuli" by J. H. Sherman. [9] Moreover, an understanding of these mental reactions are insisted upon, if a thorough knowledge of behavior is to be obtained. [10] Furthermore, the account of these mental activities, "interpretation of collective human behavior," as C. A. Ellwood[11] names such mental activities, distinguish "the social life of man from the social life of the brutes". [12] Consequently

[8] *J. of S. F.*, E. F. Reed, "Psychic Mechanisms and Social Radicalism", Vol. II, Nov. 1923, No. 1, p. 36.
[9] *S. F.*, "Labor and the Courts", Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 1, p. 136, ff.
[10] *A. J. of S.*, F. N. House, "The Concept of 'Social Forces' in American Sociology", Vol. XXXI, May 1926, No. 6, p. 799; E. R. Groves, "Personality and Social Adjustment", p. 13.
[11] "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 11.
[12] ibid. p. 11.

a study of behavior, if undertaken scientifically, will yield the basis for an intelligent control of conscious human activities by man. A study of the results will reflect the mental processes utilized in the production of those results, as [13]

> the scientific student of human society must study social facts, if he is to proceed according to a sound method. Where then shall he get his facts concerning human society? Manifestly there are three sources; first, from anthropology and ethnology, both physical and cultural; secondly from written history; thirdly, from the observation and collection of facts regarding present social life.

Society, used in a comprehensive sense is represented as consciously controlling the knowledge thus obtained, so that social activities do follow some norm or pattern if socialization is to result. "There came a time, however, when society felt its power to shape its own course, and that is the beginning of social consciousness. The social mind then recognized itself and its power to modify and control social action." [14] The direction of its activity is in its own hands. C. A. Ellwood informs us that the curve of cultural evolution, though only "a play of fancy, . . . seems at least to indicate to us where we are in the process of human evolution and why things are as they are in our world at the present moment." [15]

Man's control in the sense of making his environments rather than being a product of them is contrary to a sociological interpretation of behavior. Man is under compulsion, as it were, and he is entirely unable to change the environments among which his lot may be cast. Truly that man is a creature of his surroundings is the judgment of E. A. Ross in his "Principles of Sociology". And even though F. H. Allport may disagree with Ogburn as to the respective influence of "original nature" and "culture heritage" for determining behavior, their verdict is unanimous that man himself is under a control of some kind. [16] The basis for such control was not possible

[13] *J. of S. F.*, C. A. Ellwood, "Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society", Vol. II, Mar. 1924, No. 3, p. 329.
[14] F W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 229.
[15] "Cultural Evolution", p. 262.
[16] *J. of S. F.*, "Social Change: An Analysis of Prof. Ogburn's Culture Theory", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 671.

in the past, "since it [the past] has had no science of conduct." [17]

Man in his behavior, i. e., in the conduct of his conscious mental activities is necessarily determined by the social forces operating upon him. And while it is conceivable that all men's behavior could be fashioned according to the same mould, in reality it is not. Were the mental processes in all men to be caught at a uniform level of evolution, made possible because of their like "basic nature" and similar "culture heritage" referred to by Allport and Ogburn, undoubtedly all men would act alike. This phenomenon however does not appear in behavior, and sociology explains the differences in behavior, or even "conscious wrong-doing" as C. H. Cooley terms it, in an ingenious manner. [18]

The use of the word "wrong" deserves comment, because it has a strong connotation of "freewill" about it, though not necessarily so, as only false premises for judging may be involved. However, when the discussion is most about "behavior" or "conduct" morality is intrinsic to the notion of wrong. The author referred to (Cooley) evidently must intend the moral meaning for he is careful to point out that such actions as are consciously "wrong" are also harmful to society. Incidentally the sociological notion of freedom is brought out in this quotation very clearly, but it is particularly the influence given to social forces that deserves attention. A fuller discussion of freedom will appear at its proper place, although I cannot resist the observation that sociological "freedom"—to persist in the use of the term—means rather intelligent conformity. "The Truth will make you free" expresses for man, in his present condition, that he "frees", i. e., protects himself from anti-social forces because of his superior knowledge. Furthermore there is also an element of compulsion about his action.

The terms "rightness" or "wrongness" is of special interest to show the establishment of sociological norms for the proper exercise of social activities. It will be realized that the

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[17] *J. of S. F.*, E. R. Groves, Book Review of "Logic of Conduct" by J. MacKaye, Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 661.

[18] "Social Process", p. 100.

basis of determining the "rightness" or "wrongness" of an act of behavior is some standard drawn from social well-being, because that behavior is either good or bad, because it is helpful for, or, harmful to society. Conscious conformity on the part of the individual shows to what degree "social truths" are grasped by him,[19] since

> there is never a conflict between a real or inner righteousness and a real or inner success, they are much the same thing; but there may easily be a conflict between either of them and an apparent or conventional success. Conscious wrong-doing must always be detrimental to a success measured by self-development and social service. Its effect upon the wrong doer himself is to impair self-respect and force of character. He divides and disintegrates himself setting up a rebellion in his own camp, whereas success calls for unity and discipline. A man who is bad in this inner sense, is in so far a weak and distracted man.

Conscious human activities reflect the amount of socialization possessed by an individual. Due to his participation in the social mind of his group he acts in accordance with its accepted standards, conforms to its social practices, and evaluates results of his activities by the views current at the time. The social success that he will attain depends principally upon the amount of knowledge possessed by him for controlling the social processes in and about him. He feels impelled, by a sort of instinct for social preservation, to conform his activities to the social pattern thus recognized by him. His actions are truly social when they conform to the common social patterns generally accepted by his group.

Yet this same individual's actions are properly ascribable to him. This reference to the individual as the "responsible" agent does not mean that, given his knowledge of the socializing process of which he is part, he could have done otherwise than he did. Nevertheless the actions may be assigned to him as his, because he is the immediate "causality", bringing a whole host of other causalities, to bear upon the particular "thing" to be done.

The manner of conformity of social activities receives much attention from sociologists. Most frequently treatment cen-

[19] ibid. p. 100.

ters about the "erroneous" notion of freedom that is in the popular mind. The following allusions to "freedom" therefore, cannot be avoided, though formal discussion, as already stated, will take place elsewhere.

Recalling the quotation of C. H. Cooley regarding of conformity of man's actions so as to avoid "conscious wrong-doing" and to assure "self development and social service",[20] a striking feature is the linking together of badness and weakness accompanied by distraction. There is no denying that poor physical conditions do impair facility of action, so as to make the exercise of "freedom" impossible, if not to cause doubts as to its very existence. However, physical interferences are always external. The inward choice, that is to say, the acceptance or non-acceptance rests with the mind itself, although it may be quite impossible to manifest externally what is the inner choice of the mind. In this analysis, the interference has not been such as to render man incapable of performing a human act, one with deliberation and free will. It may be that the full integrity of the human act is impaired, but it remains sufficiently in force so as to maintain its identity. Should, however, the "weakness" or other proposed obstacle be such as to deprive a man of his senses, permanently or even temporarily, freedom of will has no meaning because a human act is impossible.

Sociologists speak much about freedom, but they mean something entirely different from the scholastic when he uses that term. The very term in its traditional usage is not suited to sociological thought, consequently sociology is at pains to attach a proper meaning to it. In connection with conformity of human activities to social pattern, the possibility of "interference" becomes a real preoccupation, and great efforts are made to show that true freedom means social control.

"Conscious wrong-doing", as described by Cooley does not involve morality as understood by the theologian. It is rather a lack of the social sense, but even this deprivation is not due necessarily to any want of personal activity. I say neces-

[20] ibid. p. 100.

sarily because nature may have been more bountiful in one instance than in another. The knowledge was inadequate to the situation, consequently complete conformity to the proper social type was not possible.

"Freewill" is regarded as a chief obstacle to a proper understanding of social happenings, and this erroneous notion must be corrected, if social progress is to continue. The sociological idea is that "freewill, if you call it that, is then simply a power of creative growth, which we all have in some degree, and starts from our actual situation. No one is free to do anything he has not worked up to." [21]

Social forces do indeed exert an influence upon the individual, and he enjoys most freedom when he is most controlled according to this view. H. E. Barnes, for instance, when discussing liberty in connection with political theory represents "individual freedom" as being under restraint, through the operation of customs, usages, folkways, but also adds that these influences do "determine to so large a degree most phases of human behavior and conduct." [22]

Sociology has definite meaning for the terms "freedom" and "liberty", so that all interpretations contrary to "creative growth" are excluded. For example, absolute reliance upon efficacy of naturalistic forces, in opposition to exertion of will power in a traditional sense, is seen in F. S. Chapin's article "Socialized Leadership". [23] F. A. Bushee, even finds the motive power to have no higher source than physical well-being, thus dispensing with the necessity of spiritual values for man's choices; [24] and the morality resulting therefrom, according to J. A. Leighton, is nothing more than an indication of the social culture possessed by an individual. "The human objectivity of *moral* values consists simply in the *mores* necessary to maintain a given type of social culture." [25]

The morality possible under these notions differs radically from that spoken of as "traditional" morality. Nevertheless,

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[21] ibid., p. 171.
[22] H. E. Barnes, "Sociological and Political Theory", p. 141.
[23] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. III, Nov. 1924, No. 1, p. 59.
[24] "Principles of Sociology", p. 57.
[25] "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 343.

there is a similarity of function—to use a sociological term—namely, both guide the actions of man. Sociology and moral theology have a common ground between them, although their explanation of control exercised over actions of men imply premises that are contradictory, the one of the other. A noteworthy difference is that knowledge alone is made supreme in sociology, whereas in moral theology, this dignity rests in the will.

Section II—*Knowledge Varies with Current Views.*

Social knowledge may be said to be affected by each new discovery about the inner workings of society. The sum of sociological findings or tentative truths put forth represents the knowledge thus far attainable about society and its operations. While knowledge indeed exists in a definite man's mind, colored by his individual bias, it represents his personal appreciation of social forces that affect him. This particular man's views represent his level of socialization and to which his thought has given concrete expression.

There are implications in this statement that need comment. In the first place, sociological truths cannot be expressed in their entirety for the very simple reason that society has not yet completed its full course of existence. The very best that can be hoped for is an interpretation of its history, laws, spirit, aims, accomplishments, especially concerning man, up to the present moment. Consequently even an adequate and full sociological knowledge could not possess the finality of absolute or metaphysical truth as claimed by philosophy. Only a tentative kind of truth is possible in sociology, and this truth results from the very analysis of conditions.

By referring to truth as "tentative" it is not intended to imply that sociologists consider their findings as unworthy of adherence; nor do they intend their conclusions, in as far as representing an analysis of particular investigations, to be taken as only provisional for the analysis made; nor do they flagrantly violate the principle of contradiction. Sociological laws or principles are elaborated with all care and full at-

tention paid to scientific precision. But by "tentative" is meant that a particular finding may be true for this special set of circumstances, at this definite time and place only, admitting other possible answers even though no radical change occurs in any of the contributory factors. Of course, it is even an axiom of scholastic philosophy, that, change in the essentials of a problem involves substantial change in the solution; change the accidentals, and modifications will appear in the application of the principles involved. The formulation of such an axiom pays deference to a fundamental distinction existing in the nature of things,—namely a distinction of substance and accidents; of substance, i. e., what is unchangeable as long as that object persists; and accidents, i. e., what may change without making that object cease to be what it was before the accidental change took place.

In sociology little deference is paid to speculative reason probably because it is redolent of "scholasticism". The sociological position is not merely a disdain for things metaphysical, but is taken logically in virtue of fundamental principles. Were the notion of substance and accident—as used above, current in sociology, a philosophy would be implied that would thereby alter the very concept of science championed by them: for the distinctive and spiritual power of man's intellect to seize upon and define an object by one term called a general concept does not find favor with the sociologist. The term "general concept" may appear, but its meaning and application is determined by an experimental criterion of truth. It is really a name that only successively fits the objects designated, e. g., a horse, and is not intended nor understood to express in itself a universal concept that it applicable to all horses actual and possible, and having an objective reality corresponding to it.

Were the latter notion of general term or universal idea to obtain in sociological terminology, sociology would be inspired by a wholly different philosophy than that manifested in its present literature. Sociology would recognize then the existence of absolute truth objectively real and would also understand that this absolute truth is knowable to man, not by experimental tests designed for one department of truth—

the natural sciences, but by the higher powers of reason, dealing with supra-sensible realities beyond physical tests. Such a turn about of the sociological viewpoint would spiritualize it, because sociology would then acknowledge the true principle of causality and be equipped to deal with supra-sensible verities.

Knowledge, of course, is made the property of the individual mind doing the thinking, and is called when thus referred to "subjective" knowledge. However, knowledge is also about something, and when this something is meant, it is "objective" knowledge. It is evident, therefore, that the criteriology subscribed to governs the findings of sociological investigations.

An obvious objection to the existence of Absolute Truth and spiritual realities is the case of "scientific" truth. It is maintained that "scientific" truth, as a species of absolute truth, prevents the quality of finality, because "scientific" has been known to change and actually has changed. New discoveries, it is alleged of hitherto unsuspected phenomena cause us to reject the previous formulation of "truth", and we change our appreciation by adjusting it to the new truth just discovered. Hence the original statement of the truth was not what it purported to be, final.

Of course, the evident distinction here is between the subjective aspect of an objective truth, and the objective truth in itself. This distinction is a valid one, but does not fully answer the difficulty. It is just possible that the "subjective" aspect may completely correspond to the objectivity thus for discovered, be recognized and stated as such, accepted as a "final" pronouncement of the particular scientific truth in question, and still be made to undergo subsequent changes as described above. Does it not follow, therefore, that the original statement was not the "truth"? And does it not also follow that it is quite impossible to reach objective truth and what is more to the point, to be absolutely certain that we have reached the truth? Undoubtedly in the instance proposed, the investigator or scientist satisfied himself that all the criteria for establishing "objective" truth had been realized.

The difficulty is not as formidable as it would appear and arises logically from a too narrow concept of reality. Underlying the whole objection is the subtle assumption that truth

can be only determined by an experimental test. Here is the fundamental error of modern sociology. In the objection it is further to be noted that there is a confusion in the use of terms. Truth as applied to the results of a process of scientific investigation means that the last result obtained really does represent the "truth" at that moment, but it does not necessarily imply that all possible avenues of research have been explored and exhausted. It may be even granted that what is taken for objective truth, although in reality is not so, represents only an objectivity parallelling the facts thus far inductively studied, though honestly believed to be a statement of finality. Further examination, whether begun by accident or design, will show that its claim to "absolute" truth was not completely, i. e. "scientifically" established. In reality, the supposed "absolute" truth rested only upon criteria of experimental and physical evidence alone, and was never truth in an absolute use of that term.

As long as the process of determining the real truth discovered by "scientific" methods is limited only to what actually those methods discover, there can be no truth of any kind. What has been obtained is simply a number of separate and individual conclusions, all "scientifically" arrived at, if you will, but absolutely valueless unless subjected in turn to the principles of metaphysical inquiry.

Such statements as these are anathema to orthodox sociologists because of the calm assumption of the "sovereignty" of reason. To invoke the aid of "metaphysical" sciences to interpret the findings of natural sciences is to mistake the very nature of truth.[26] Yet sociology fails as a science of life, precisely because it fails to recognize this distinction. Truth for the sociologist must be reduced to the physical (his use of psychical is materialistic). His one criterion of reality does not rise higher than his original postulate; that tangible reality alone can serve as a test for truth. But nevertheless he persists in using this physical standard to satisfy all the exigencies demanded by a philosophic system destined to return a satisfactory account of life and its purposes.

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[26] F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", pp. 45-6.

Truth when used philisophically means that it is consistent throughout; that it has been subjected to critical examination to detect inherent contradiction. Truth, indeed, prescinds from time and space, for it is not necessitated by matter, but transcends it, comprehending supra-sensible and spiritual realities as well. However, the final test and ultimate criterion for all truth—supra-sensible as well as physical, is internal criticism of the ideas put forward to represent these objective orders. Truth is conformity of the mind with reality, and if an assumed reality cannot exist owing to incompatibility of qualities in the object itself, surely the ideal order must likewise reflect that incongruity. Hence inconsistency in concept and "objective" truth are mutually exclusive. Knowledge of objectivity itself, i. e., independent existence of the object outside of the mind, is ultimately based upon the rational conviction of the testimony of consciousness for the physical, and through this consciousness of the physical by means of the valid principle of sufficient reason previously examined, to the existence of the supra-sensible and spiritual.

Our concern is not objectivity, but rather certainty about absolute truth. In short, we hold that metaphysical truth does exist. If contradiction could be shown to exist objectively in the real order itself, in God, we should be forced to declare that not only was our idea of God and Objective Reality erroneous; but furthermore we could never be certain of any truth, because no objective really exists that is compatible with itself. No one seriously believes that at some future time or place a square can remain a square and be a circle at the same time. Perhaps the assertion may be heard that this is possible, because we have not exhausted all reality and that by some power unknown to us now, this seeming impossibility can be realized. This supposition is without any possible foundation in fact. Moreover, philosophy reasons from known facts only, consequently such a supposition is at least initially untenable and excluded from serious scientific consideration.

Should, however, the impossible occur and that supposition become a reality, then philosophy must begin its reasoning processes all over and start with the "new evidence". But until the evidence is forthcoming, it would be foolhardy to act upon

it. Were, indeed, such an impossible supposition to be "actually" realized, and were philosophy to reach a conclusion, which it must, that is diametrically opposed to what is now put forward as absolute truth then philosophhy is discredited and relativism is supreme.

One word more about universal ideas. Their importance has not been overstated, because they reveal at once basic philosophic postulates. It would be quite useless to proceed with a discussion of moral values when the sociological meaning of terms is not understood, and this meaning cannot be understood apart from their theory of knowledge. The sociological viewpoint presupposes assumptions that are contrary to those fundamental to our philosophy, and unless these differences are noted, brought out, and made unmistakably clear, thorough understanding of sociology is an impossibility.

The truths accepted by sociology must influence man's actions for morals imply an ideal of some kind, so that whatever directs conduct or patterns behavior, represents an adaptation of ideals to specific instances. Now sociology does have such ideals varying with time and places. The following will demonstrate that those held forth truly function as ideals, based on assumptions that are philosophically unsound.

The aspect of conduct involving ideals receives much attention from sociologists although references are not as explicit as might be expected. The tone of their writings is often polemical, because effort is made to bring out the "true" sociological notion by reference to or refutation of the traditional notion. In the following quotation, H. E. Barnes does not deny the existence of such ideals, but is simply concerned about a mistaken interpretation of their origin and efficacy for social welfare."

> The conventional theory of ethics is that conduct is something dictated by the gods, complete in scope and permanent and eternal in content. The view that it is socially determined and should be continually revised and readapted to changing social and cultural conditions is diametrically opposed to all orthodox views of ethical theory and practice.

"*J. of S. F.*, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 212 ff.

If adaptation is to take place, a mind is involved, so that some pattern must be understood. This is simply stating that there are such things as ideals. ". . . the folkways of the future may contribute greater satisfaction than those of the present can possibly do under the new and diversified ideas of the next generation." [28]

A definite recognition of ideals appears in R. L. Finney's "Elementary Sociology". "Each age and people has its own peculiar theory of the values of life; in other words, its own peculiar philosophy of life". [29] Also in "The Problem of Social Evolution", R. L. Finney seeks some basis for ideals and settles finally upon human nature as known and manifested in behavior. [30] W. G. Sumner, as would be expected, makes "mores" a criterion for what is correct conduct. And although he makes ideals elusive he does not reject them altogether. [31]

> We shall find proof that "immoral" never means anything but contrary to the mores of the time and place. Therefore the mores and morality may move together, and there is no permanent or universal standard by which right and truth in regard to these matters can be established and different folkways compared and criticised. Only experience produces judgments of the expediency of same usages.

The possibility of ideals is admitted by A. Sutherland though discussions "for long generations" are necessary, he says "before we determine what is right and then the decision is subject to revision and reversal." [32] E. J. Urwick frankly asks "can a social philosophy perform the impossible for us, though science must fail?" Nevertheless, the existence of ideals as factors in life is admitted, though they are only "moving ideals of human society". [33] His statement confirms the views of

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[28] *S. F.*, C. E. Nickle, "Community Control", Vol. IV, Dec. 1925, No. 2, p. 348.
[29] In Ross and McCaull, "Reading in Civic Sociology", p. 86.
[30] *S. F.*, Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 207.
[31] "Folkways", p. 418.
[32] "Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct", p. 18.
[33] "A Philosophy of Social Progress", p. 36.

E. Westermarck.[34] Further corroboration for validity of ideals will be found in numerous writings.[35]

When writers take up the question of ideals, they assume a language that is philosophic in tone rather than purely descriptive. The distinctive tendency in sociological writings to assign causes, establish series, determine sequences of social events readily betrays the philosopher, though his works may bear other titles. However, at times the writers are explicit but more often not. At any rate there can be no mistaking the attempt at orderly expositions of what is of interest here—a rationalized basis for guidance of human actions.

In the following quotation attention is called to the author's insistance upon, the importance of truth for proper ideals of conduct. Surely his language, and particularly his meaning is almost scholastic. But notwithstanding his apparent orthodoxy, a sociological turn of meaning is given to the references.[36]

> The higher values. Man's ideals are the reaching forward of his desires when he is at his best, and progress is an integrated movement towards their fuller embodiment. So in our definition of progress we must give first place to those values that we are surest about—the truth and the seeking of it, the beautiful and the making of it, the good and the doing of it. These values we call absolute because they are desirable as ends in themselves, because we cannot have too much of them, because they never bring satiety, because they are their own reward, and because as civilization deepens they have an increasing survival value.

Even though it might be objected, as is done by other sociologists, that writers using language like the above are social philosophers, idealists and reformers,[37] rather than real social scientists, and for that reason should not therefore be quoted

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[34] "Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas", p. 9.

[35] *S. F.*, L. L. Bernard, "The Concept of Progress", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, p. 41; *J. of S. F.*, J. Q. Dealey, "Government in Relation to Sociology and Social Progress", Vol. I, Mar. 1923, No. 3, p. 210; M. R. Cohen, in Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "The Social Sciences and their Interrelations", p. 463; F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 236; W. G. Beach, "An Introduction to Sociology and Social Problems", pp. 332-3.

[36] J. A. Thomson, in J. Ford, "Social Problems and Social Policy", p. 146.

[37] F. H. Hankins, in H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", pp. 307-330.

as authorities, the fact remains that they are inspired by sociological philosophy. Their only fault is that they are more thoroughly imbued with the spirit of sociology. Then, too, direct treatment of this phase of sociological thought would naturally cause such themes to be more fully developed than some other phases not having as close a connection with the philosophic basis of sociological thought.

Aside from such a consideration, the fact remains that the authorities already quoted and referred to in this section fully illustrate that a philosophy of some sort cannot be divorced from sociology. Other statements are found that almost equally set forth the same doctrine as Thomson and those immediately quoted before him. Now unless these considerations arose from sociology, it would be hard to account for their persistence. Furthermore, the "purists" have no monopoly on what the writers themselves select as sociology proper, especially when their character as sociologists is acknowledged.[38]

While it is undoubtedly true that some sort of ideals are extolled in sociology, the writers are faithful to their principles when they assert, as does F. W. Blackmar, that "there are no fixed ideals of social life or structure to which we may conform in the discussion of the social aims."[39] The same quality is predicated of moral notions by F. N. House,[40] with the added statement that agnosticism or pragmatism are the only two sources whence values are derived.

Probably as complete a summary will be found in A. Sutherland's appreciation of his own book, "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct". It will be noted that ideals are really emptied of their proper content, because they lack the quality of "finality".[41]

> In short, though we have in this book traced from its humble origin, the growth of our conception of right and wrong; though we have found it to be entirely relative to ourselves, our needs and our capacities;

[38] ibid; C. A. Ellwood, in E. C. Hayes, "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences", pp. 1-49.
[39] "The Elements of Sociology", p. 273.
[40] *A. J. of S.*, "Concept of 'Social Forces' in American Sociology", Vol. XXXI, May 1926, No. 6, p. 782.
[41] p. 332.

though we have seen it to be in every respect earthborn, we are nevertheless not in the least degree precluded from utilizing the ideas thus derived to help us in framing for ourselves our worthiest symbolic conception of the universe. All our other ideas are so derived, all are equally unreal as the statement of ultimate fact, all equally real as being our best attainable symbols for things we know to be really existent.

The discussion of "Supreme Values" by J. A. Leighton, leads to a similar conclusion.[42]

The social mind, therefore, requires a pattern or ideal to represent what is socially desirable. The worth of this ideal depends upon the grasp, upon the play of social forces that have affected its present development. Socialization therefore is the final test of correct socialistic behavior. Consequently, a man's behavior corresponds to the particular social pattern or ideal upon which it was fashioned. Inversely, the way a man acts shows what level of socialization he has reached in his social development. It would likewise follow that the social patterns or ideals attainable represent what society as a whole can copy. Consequently a determination of these patterns or ideals represent what society values as socially good or helpful. In short social ideals express social values.

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[42] "The Individual and the Social Order", pp. 336-344.

CHAPTER X

DETERMINATION OF VALUES

SECTION I—*Functional Character of Ideals Acknowledged.*

Many sociologists speak of changes to be brought about by the knowledge gained of social processes. These changes are mainly discussed after the manner of a comparison between present and future conditions of society. For the most part, their scheme is not simply an utopian one, for the reason that progress is seen to follow not haphazardly or by some benevolent agency, but in virtue of the secret of control learned from society itself. Their tone is moderate for the most part, when contrasted with the language of irresponsible idealism which is heartily condemned. So-called Pure Idealism is condemned, because it disregards manifest social contingencies that must be investigated and taken into consideration if society, as we know it, is to benefit by sociological science.

A healthy idealism, such as advocated, describes scientific sociology in its efforts to understand society. This knowledge is not left in an amorphous mass, but is itself organized about certain definite notions that summarize the findings and reported under group headings. A further grouping follows with the result that a definite science, more or less agreed upon, is produced.

Opinions will differ as to the headings themselves, and more especially about their arrangements, and not infrequently about their content. The interesting fact is that some such headings or ideas do appear with more or less persistence, and these are spoken of as forces exerting social influence. Their nature is functional so that to know them, or to be able to recognize their activities, or even detect their results, is equivalent to picking out the "ideals" that inform sociology.

Such "ideals" are in a sense, but another way of describing sociology and its purposes. R. L. Finney's appreciation of ideals illustrates my meaning and shows unmistakably that sociology is based upon an interpretation of positivistic philosophy.[1]

> Civics must rise, therefore to the level of moral education; by nothing less than that can it qualify the "Socius". But that means penetrating to the very depths of the human spirit. Underlying everything else is the individual's philosophy of life; that is to say, his ideals and valuations together with his reasons for the same. Our task is, therefore, to impart to our youth a sound philosophy of individual and social life. That is what we have been groping our way toward in our teaching of civics; and that is the objective toward which this book aspires, however, faulty.

It is clear that ideals possess for Finney the power to influence, and that he wishes them to be lofty precisely because of their motivating character.

The notion of an end to be reached is met with in sociological literature repeatedly.[2] Its presence points to the existence of sociological ideals, because the social pattern, to be conformed to, must first become conscious to the individual or even group. These ideals are really functional—exert an influence, perform a work. C. A. Ellwood, speaking of religion controlling "behavior at its source", has but just previously told us that religion "goes to the innermost motives of the individual and secures social order through the socialization of his inner nature".[3] The function ascribed to religion in this connection is that given to any idea that is to motivate men and influence their conduct.

Socialized man is not generally influenced as an individual, but as a member of a group, and ideals generally exert their influence through the group. In the following reference, the ideal appears as the "structure" of the group or society and functions as a binder holding the group together. "Every group, however temporary or small, has structure. It is the

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[1] "General Social Science", Introduction, p. viii.
[2] C. C. A. Bouglé, "The Evolution of Values", English Translation by H. S. Sellars, p. 75.
[3] "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 406.

machinery by which the group maintains its existence and achieves its purpose." [4]

Whatever may be considered to have an influence upon society, could be represented as an ideal. It is well to remark that properly speaking such a force need not always be representative of an upward movement in social life. The idea is more general, and comprehends whatever exerts influence whether progressive or retrogressive. It is an attempt to reduce to a category the various factors working in and upon the social body. R. L. Finney speaks of "militarism" as tending "in the long run to disqualify a people for operating all their fundamental institutions efficiently". [5] From this statement it is clear that there are practically as many ideals—factors in social life—as ideas may be found to represent influences.

The task of selecting and naming the component factors is distinctly made the duty of sociology. In explaining "Scientific Method and Social Progress", L. L. Bernard ascribes to philosophy the function of discovering and evaluating "forces", productive of the greatest results for society. " . . . it is within the province of sociology as the science of organized human relationships to formulate the objectives and to state the criteria of social progress." [6] The sociologist as a philosopher is to test values, determine ideals, and, in general, formulate fundamental concepts. Among these latter, ideals are recognized as important because of the influence they exert upon social activities.

This program is comprehensive, and substantially contains what is found in other writers. [7] However, L. L. Bernard in an article, entitled "Recent Trends in Social Psychology" goes into a lengthy discussion and points out dominent traits in recent writers, which would characterize them as instinctivists or environmentalists. The point of interest here is that

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[4] B. W. Brown, "Social Groups", p. 63.
[5] *S. F.*, "Problem of Social Evaluation", Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 207.
[6] *A. J. of S.*, Vol. XXXI, July 1925, No. 1, pp. 17-18.
[7] C. C. A. Bouglé, "The Evolution of Values", English Translation by H. S. Sellars, Introduction, p. xxi; A. J. Todd, "Theories of Social Progress", pp. 423-4; H. Carter, "Social Theories of L. T. Hobhouse, p. 89.

he affirms, no matter which group prevails, that definite forces, which I have called "ideals" do function in society.[8]

The greatest latitude is granted, apparently in determining what may or may not be the social forces present in society. Because of this liberal attitude many varied and interesting theories to explain the origin and nature of social forces have arisen. H. Carter agrees that out of variety will come much that is sound, but declares some one evaluating principle really underlies each man's theory thus originating a hierarchy of ideals. "Fundamental to social theory is a scheme of ends or values to the individual which are to fit him into his social group and the older society. Hobhouse has considered this question in detail and posited a rational good as the basis of his social theory."[9]

C. A. Ellwood prefers culture as the centralized force.[10] On the other hand, J. Dewey reports Westermarck as stressing "sentiments of praise and blame".[11] F. H. Giddings refers to visualizing the "end of the telic activity in human society" as societal engineering and so considers this end as an ideal.[12] In a similar manner does C. H. Cooley refer to the "purpose of the group" as a unifying factor in society,[13] as does also L. L. Bernard.[14]

The ideals selected, whether considered separately or as grouped together, all influence behavior. The manner of this influence is of a special interest to us, as it shows man as acting or as acted upon, and indicates that forces serve as motives to influence the will of man. However, it must be remembered that sociologists do not admit the faculty theory for the will, and although the term "will" may appear, a careful study of the quotation, found later on, will give some idea how these social forces which I have called ideals, operate.

First, they do not accomplish what they are said to accom-

[8] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 739.
[9] "The Social Theories of L. T. Hobhouse", p. 2.
[10] In E. C. Hayes, "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences", p. 35.
[11] In Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations", p. 27.
[12] *J. of S. F.*, "Social Work and Societal Engineering", p. 18 Vol. III, Nov. 1924, No. 1, p. 15.
[13] "Social Organization", p. 23.
[14] *A. J. of S.*, "Scientific Method and Social Progress", Vol. XXXI, July 1925, No. 1, p. 11.

plish through the joint operation of intellect and will. For were these social forces which have become conscious in the individual's mind to serve as motives, so that the freewill of man would really be the main factor in conduct, the sociological postulate of social continuity would be discredited. There would be a true causality ascribed to the will of man because an endeavor had been made to persuade, convince, move that will to choose one course of action rather than some other and this implies "uncaused" freedom. The meaning of sociology is rather that of "creative" growth. Man is able to accomplish what he has worked up to, in the meaning that training and facility are a matter of habituation and causation only. When a man apparently chooses, he but follows the course that his intelligence recognized as growing out of the facts in the case. Supposedly different solutions by different persons are not really so, although they appear so, and are due to the varying degree of intelligence and amount of socialization possessed by those individuals.

The intimate relation between society and the individual, as set forth by R. M. Maciver [15] will give a clue to the meaning of "will" as used in sociology. On page 95 of the same work, will and active mind are identified; consequently, since the social mind is influenced by ideals which are conscious the will follows it, because those ideals have really functioned.

The element of consciousness accounts for the ascribed impulse given by the will, because the whole mind is vitalized and functions in its entirety. Hence to persuade a man means to to make him fully conscious of the social forces that are brought to bear upon him. Then realization begets impulse or action of the will. Thus the sociological explanation fully accounts for all the steps insisted upon by a faculty psychology. [16]

> This view [consciousness of self] seeks to account for the sense in a man that he "ought" to do a thing by the tendency in him to feel that things are going well when he is working along the lines guaranteed by his past habits and instincts. What is best for him to do, is what is

[15] "Community: A Sociological Study", pp. 214-41.

[16] J. M. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development", pp. 45-46.

right, and what is best is that which has been established in the course of his life by *adaptation*, utility and *development*. The sense of right, therefore to this view is simply the consciousness of certain habits of the physical or mental organization.

The italics are mine, because these words illustrate that ordered activity, conduct, depends not on the will deciding between various courses of action, but upon energized activity aroused by consciousness and directed according to patterns that had "been established in the course of . . . life by adaptation . . . and development". "Ought" then derives its sanction from self, and depends upon the degree of consciousness experienced.

Little play is left for rationality properly so called in this description, for the consciousness spoken of is better understood as feeling than rational consciousness. Similarly in E. S. Bogardus' notion of socialized behavior as "a product of the process of socialization", the motive power is the "basic stimuli of social environments." [17] Moral matters are also brought under the same explanation. [18]

The term "ideals" as used by me may be questioned as properly fitting what sociologists mean by the forces operating in society. However, these forces are intimately connected with the use of rationality, for in sociology, it must be realized that consciousness substitutes for man's spiritual endowments. It remains that ideals describe better what is really meant since they certainly comprehend a spiritual meaning and have a strong analogy to social patterns.

By some writers, the social process itself is endowed with life, or at least spoken of as though it were living, so that the very forces in that social process must partake of conscious life, must follow life as manifested in man and act upon him in the nature of ideals. Also, even though sociologists do not admit motivation of the free will of man, their language at times closely follows the terminology of a faculty psychology. Furthermore whatever is to influence man, must act in accordance with his nature, and realizing that man in

[17] *J. of S. F.*, "The Concept of Unselfish Service". Vol. I, Jan. 1923, No. 1, p. 102.
[18] J. C. Leighton, "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 341.

his social relations is the term of social activity as well as its agent, social forces must operate upon him by means of ideas. Whether his actions are necessitated or free, does not for the moment matter, because man still remains the agent. Ideals, therefore, better express the notion of consciousness which is inseparably connected with the social forces influencing man in his environments.

Consideration of these ideal-forces in their respect to morals is pertinent. Moral is used here in its traditional sense and as such is opposed to what sociology understands by it. Moral to the sociologist is simply another word for social. "Moral ideals are also social ideals," says C. A. Ellwood, when speaking of the origin and nature of moral values and moral obligations. Whatever morality possesses, it obtains from the social because "[moral ideals] cannot be judged apart from social conditions [for] moral conduct is simply a form of social behavior, and our judgment of its value is itself a social-psychological product . . . " [19] Incidentally here is a definite use of ideals as causal influences in "social conditions". E. Westermarck uses moral ideas in same meaning. [20]

Society does, therefore, criticise its activity as it proceeds along its course. It is conscious at all times of the processes that are going on within its social organism, and constant analysis of itself accompanies sociological studies. Society is able by this self-examination, to know whether its movement is progressive or retrogressive, i. e., whether its ideals function or not, as " . . . an analysis of the social forces, that is to say of social activities, is plainly the proper task of sociology . . . " [21]

Sociological pronouncements in the field of morals proper illustrate the functioning of ideals in the social body. To know what a man's morals are is equivalent to a cross-section of his social development. [22] A criterion of this kind acknowledged by sociology shows that it does have regard for ideals and considers them as indicative of social efficiency.

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[19] "The Psychology of Human Society", pp. 25-26.
[20] "Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas", p. 166.
[21] *J. of S. F.*, I. W. Howerth, "Relation of Sociology to the Science and Art of Education", Vol. III, May 1925, No. 4, p. 610.
[22] J. C. Leighton, "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 191.

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SECTION II—*Sociological Standards Are Tests for Final Values.*

The foregoing discussion has shown that sociology does measure the constant change that is taking place within its organism. The social forces, or in their conscious aspect, social ideals, are the sources from whence springs the power that keeps society running. These ideals are really functional, meaning that ideals do signify the mental representations of social forces.

Society was also spoken of as possessing the power to judge the efficacy of social forces. This judgment is not a formal pronouncement upon social ideals, but is more properly described as indirect, though really made. When certain definite forces or ideals are found not once or twice but repeatedly, their persistence can only be explained as being called for by the nature of society itself. Intrinsic to nature, as this idea is generally expressed, would better convey the meaning. These forces recur again and again because they are social activities, have real worth in themselves, and consequently, are useful to society in its course of evolution. They have value, because they exist, and serve as standards for determining final values in sociology, since by its very definition (according to Giddings) "sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical causes working together in a process of evolution."[23]

What answers are returned by sociology to the inquiry thus defined, will represent its judgment as to the causes of social phenomena. These causes are considered as the true ones, and consequently have real values in sociology. So therefore, the standards by which sociological investigation proceeds furnish a real test of values for that science. The standards themselves are derived from society by means of investigation and represent closer approximation to a full socialization. Now in regard to conscious human activities, the standards will be ideals according to a perfect socialization that is to be effected.

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[23] "The Principles of Sociology", p. 8.

Standards in sociology are understood to mean measures of values. Although they are referred to as "psychic" aspects they are used, nevertheless, in our meaning because they serve as a gauge for measuring social activity. Here then we have definitely stated all the elements insisted upon. These Elements are: Existence of society—psychic life— sufficiency of social energy—consciously directed human activity—movement or change—ideals as functional—declared values. These same elements are also contained in an analysis of an act done by a rational agent, when viewed independently of the agent as acting. A human act, as understood in theology has a—definite existence—performed by man alone—possesses integral unity—results in conduct—affects status—is good or bad —judged by norms. The same elements are treated in both sociology and moral theology, for the analysis is applicable to both interpretations of life. The manifest difference is that sociology lodges final responsibility in society, whereas moral theology makes it personal to the individual. In both instances it is morality that is involved, or the definitely conforming of conscious human activities to some pattern or norm having inherent value, because of an accepted philosophy of life. Sociological treatises substitute for treatises in moral theology, and because of this usurpation, sociology is a moral treatise.

In the following quotation the above mentioned elements are contained, although they are not immediately evident upon a first reading. A closer study reveals that "Existence", "Psychic life", "Integrity" given in the analyses of both sociology and of a moral (human) act are covered by "social activities" as understood and explained by the author. In fact it is chiefly their "psychic aspect" that concerns him. Then the mention of the need of an "explanation" in connection with a "goal of science", shows that a progressive or retrogressive movement follows upon that psychic social activity, parallelling the two next points in the analyses, and finally, "overt aspect" of social activity and "values of life" are unmistakably suggestive of ideals and standards. [24]

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[24] *J. of S. F.*, E. C. Hayes, "Three Aspects of a Social Situation", Vol. III, Mar. 1925, No. 3, p. 407.

. . . the psychic aspect of social activity is the most important from the point of view of explanation, which is the goal of science. It is the most important to explain not only because it is the most interesting since it contains all the values of life but also because to explain the psychic aspect of social activity is also the way and the only way to explain its overt aspect.

The same thought is expressed by F. W. Blackmar, and covers all the necessary elements from existence to standards. The actual employment of the word "standard" in the sense used here certainly confirms that sociologists do recognize that values, that is, the mental appreciation of social activities brought about by the exigency of life, are an integral part of sociological philosophy. The connection is evident, when it is understood that F. W. Blackmar is treating specifically, "Satisfaction of Aesthetic Tastes and of Conscience", and made more so, because the matter treated in the book is "Elements of Sociology". Consequently, the following quotation itself is a "standard" whereby to judge that values are expressed in sociology, and that they exist for the definite purpose of evaluating social activities.[25]

Akin to this is the satisfaction of a desire for righteousness. It is based upon ideals of human conduct. People are influenced in their conduct in the satisfaction of this desire. It becomes a social force and as such enters into social ideals thus furnishing a standard of action. It helps to determine social choices and social aims, and leads the community forward toward a standard of excellence.

The values spoken of are not those of inanimate objects, but refer definitely to social processes which possess consciousness, and which effect change in society. E. C. Hayes says "Sociology is an Intellectual Movement", but G. B. Logan is even more explicit when he gives a norm for judging social activities. His idea of a standard, based on his words, is that, "social progress is an intellectual, conscious becoming, measured by human ideals and purposes and consisting in the adjustment of individuals and groups to one another and to their physical environments."[26]

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[25] "The Elements of Sociology", p. 227.
[26] *S. F.*, "Guides to Periodical Readings", Vol. IV, Mar. 1926, No. 3, p. 628.

Here too do we find all the necessary elements to constitute an action that is necessarily moral in theology and admittedly social in sociology. The actions of sociology follow a mechanism similar to that of a theological act, in that it conforms or does not conform to a norm or test. In this manner sociology has a method for determining the value, the "result" of a social activity set in motion. Furthermore sociologists claim that every social fact "is the result of innumerable causes",[27] hence that social fact, considered as result of a series of causes may serve as an index or as a standard to evaluate the social causes that contributed to its existence.

The task then of creating standards does not exhaust the full complement of sociology's activity. It is also within its province, as the science of society, to show how standards cause values to arise in society. The functioning of standards as producers of values may be described as follows: Types of social activities reveal what standard or social pattern has operated as a principle causing them to exist. Then, because of the causality exhibited these standards also declare values inasmuch as they represent a definite social force which has effected a change in man's social relations.

In discussing standards and their influence in social activities, it is important to realize that the worth or value spoken of as connected with the functioning of these standards, is regarded by sociology after the manner of a natural science. This must be understood to mean that social facts follow definite causes only, and are therefore not subject to any causality outside of nature's own cycle.[28]

Otherwise stated, it is the task of sociology, as a natural science, not primarily to point out the "that" of the social becoming primarily, but to show "how" through working of a process of interaction among the factors involved, a certain typical form of relationship and of activity—i. e., of interaction—succeeds another typical form.

Even though sociological phenomena are "purely" the phenomena of natural science, it also is true that they are sub-

[27] E. J. Urwick, "A Philosophy of Social Progress", p. 3.
[28] *A. J. of S.*, F. N. House, "Social Relations and Social Interaction", Vol. XXXI, Mar. 1926, No. 5, pp. 632-3.

jected to and possessed of consciousness. Likewise as the social mind comprehends the process that is unfolding in the social organism, it understands that the forces effecting that change have also the power to do and accomplish. Furthermore, it recognizes that the result produced is a definite social fact. Above all the social intelligence understands that there were certain energies in social forces that made them valuable in the social process, and that these energies were derived from society itself. Whatever value or worth they have is derived from their being social forces and also that they effect socialization. One result of social forces is the producing of "personality". Consequently, the kind of personality found in sociology will likewise serve as a standard for showing the final value given personality.

In consequence of this all-pervasive socializing process, social forces have specific influence upon the individual members of society. Whatever there is of worth in the individuals, is due to social process, so that if there are real values found in individuals they proclaim their participation in society. Moreover these values are final in the sense that they are the last expression in socialization, for they flow in an unbroken stream from the social body itself. The degree of socialization therefore possessed by a people, is indicative of what value the social processes have been able to effect in their regard. Consequently if a people can speak of "values" it is because they participate in socialization, are conscious of the process affecting them because of their relation to society. When people are so minded, they represent the worth, the value, brought about by the social processes operating in and through society, for F. H. Giddings points out that the understanding of these processes effects "the saving grace and the sanity of common sense". [29]

> But sociology can give them, and should give them poise and balance, a comprehensive view, a sense of relative values, an apprehension of proportions and of probabilities. Attentive study of the trend and sweep of societal evolution from primal folkways through barbarisms and historic civilizations, to the comprehensiveness and complexity of our exist-

[29] *J. of S. F.*, "The Study of Cases", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 645.

ing societal order cannot fail to nurture the saving grace and the sanity of common sense.

Values thus determined, although concerning persons, are not controlled by personal initiative. It will be recalled that "personality" itself is but a result of social forces, and although these forces center about an individual, it is the forces themselves that work and not properly speaking the individual person. Society is functional, that is, the forces or powers inherent in the social organism do accomplish results, so that the only intelligent explanation for a personality is precisely what sociology makes it, a component of forces. In a strict sense, a person does not, and as a matter of fact can not, control anything; at best he simply understands that social forces compose his being and that they do the controlling. There is not and cannot be an "Ego" as a "centrum attributionis" as though it had a substantial substratum endowed with rational intelligence and freewill, because as L. L. Bernard assures us, " . . . the old philosophy will not suffice for the foundations of a new functional sociology." [30] A newer explanation must account for personality, so that its dignity is dependent upon another factor than rationality: it is a social effect. "We can no longer attribute the cause of the act or intrust the regulation of social control to the individual's consciousness primarily, but we must trace both back finally to the social and physical environment." [31] Even "primarily" would not imply independent action by the individual apart from social forces operating in him, but means that his activities are those of the social process.

Sometimes personality is evaluated by the individual's connection with the group, because he realizes and enjoys his individuality through co-operation. [32] A similar explanation is given by H. E. Barnes and W. C. Waterman in their review of

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[30] "The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control", p. 43. (The "Old Philosophy referred to is not Scholasticism proper, but English Nominalism of the XVII Century.)

[31] ibid. p. 43.

[32] ibid. p. 342.

"Sexual Impotence and Other Sexual Disorders in Men and Women", by W. J. Robinson, M. D. In this review the "moralist" is cautioned against seeking "some universal norm in sex conduct which can be recommended to all individuals in society as absolutely right, and be rigidly enforced on valid sociological and ethical grounds".[33]

The greatest variety of meanings obtains in sociology when standards and values are discussed. However, the fact remains that the terms are recognized by sociological writers and this serves to show that they represent definite values for the writers using them. It is impossible to deal with man in his fundamental nature without simultaneously dealing with values. Furthermore, the medium through which these values are expressed, the terms used to designate them, all argue their connection with man's nature. Sociology, therefore, because it deals with human activities, must also speak of values, and must assign in consequence definite meanings to its terminology. This tendency is but natural to any science, and is well explained by F. J. Sheen in his work "Religion without God". Father Sheen, an apologist for revealed religion, gives us a very good appreciation of the widespread influence that "value" enjoys today and at the same time makes references to its many uses by special sciences.[34]

> There is no danger of exaggerating the place which the philosophy of values holds in the world today. Only a few decades ago the term "value" would have suggested nothing more than a term of economies, signifying the price of things. "The value of a thing is just as much as it will bring." Now the term is applied in the field of education, art, religion and all the aspects of human life.

To understand human values fully would be equivalent to knowing all about man and his environments. As a matter of fact, we absorb values without being, during most of the time, conscious of the process going on within us. In sociology to speak of values, implies that it is not only the present generation of the children of men that is being studied, but

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[33] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. III, Nov. 1924, No. 1, p. 150.
[34] pp. 60-61.

the entire race as a unit, because it has built up the values we possess and enjoy today.

Sociology places great emphasis upon social continuity as the originator and the transmitter of the heritage of values. Values therefore in sociology intimately grow out of its philosophic thought, so that a particular value represents the effect of an unbroken line of causality from primeval beginnings.

That man is indebted to society through the social processes for all that is fine in his life, is a postulate of sociology. Nevertheless there is a sense in which a scholastic might admit such a proposition. It is indeed a fact that the matter upon which our mind works is the common cultural heritage of mankind. It is also admitted that uncontrollable circumstances govern the influence this heritage can have over us, by limiting or increasing its activity in our regard. However, there is in addition to the important consideration just made an active quality in the agent that is not taken into account by the sociologist. That the two previous statements concerning heritage and circumstances are factors in determining an individual's culture no one will deny, but the active agency of his own initiative cannot be lacking.

In sociology the social processes are given first importance, and individual man is looked upon as a recipient of society's munificence. In a spiritually-conceived philosophy of life, man is made the great originator of culture by his activity and society in turn assumes secondary place. In this case the viewpoint is called anthropocentric, because man is made the center of values. However, it is just as important in this latter view, to consider man integrally, composed of a material body and a spiritual soul, as it is to make him the king of creation. Unless the spiritual qualities of his nature are insisted upon, resulting values will of necessity be no different than sociological values though begotten by a different or individualistic interpretation of life, and finally a collective view will gradually prevail.

Man when reviewed by these systems must differ accordingly. To spiritualized philosophy he is an agent who is capable of directing his activity in one channel or another, or even conceived as capable of abstaining from activity alto-

gether; to sociology, man is under a compulsion of social forces, and is looked upon as an effect rather than an agent actively working. Sociology explains differences of apparent personal activities by the specific level of socialization possessed by the individual and in consequence man is reduced to the concept of a resultant of social forces.

Whenever therefore values are under consideration, it is simply a conscious realization by man of what society has accomplished in him. When values are made the direct subject of study, it is essential to make their social counterpart the starting point, says M. M. Willey in his review of R. M. Binder's book, "Business and the Professions". "The first step [he insists] is to see how the social organization operates, how it is influenced, and what makes it go. The true scientist takes things as they are." [35] Taking "things as they are" is to be understood in the sense of finding all explanation within the natural processes themselves. This gives us the key to the values this writer predicates for society, only natural ones.

Society is regarded as a huge specimen and explainable only by statistical method,[36] because "other standards of measurement there are, but they are mostly vague and founded largely on faith and hope". [37] Although the immediate reference in the article is to the health of man, it has immediate reference to social evaluations as this is the main subject under discussion. Only that which is found out by experiment can be a value or indicate a value in sociology.

The same idea of "development of scientific knowledge" is spoken of by C. A. Ellwood as the only safe and sure means of determining values. [38]

> The hope of human society . . . lies in the development of scientific knowledge concerning every phase of the social life and concerning the social life as a whole. It is through such scientific study and investigation of the social life that the value of each of its phases as a factor in progress must become apparent. And it is through the bringing together

[35] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. III, Nov. 1924, No. 1, p. 169.
[36] *S. F.*, R. L. Finney, "The Problem of Social Evaluation", p. 207.
[37] In citation of A. J. Todd in Ross and McCaull, "Readings in Civic Sociology", p. 230.
[38] In Ross and McCaull, "Readings in Civic Sociology", p. 232.

and the synthesis of all this knowledge in the science of sociology that the social life as a whole will become intelligible, and so subject to rational control.

Whatever is to be known about man must be learned from sociology, since by its study and investigation alone his actions can be properly interpreted. The very standards for judging, as well as values themselves are obtained from social analysis. Consequently a setting forth of sociological statements concerning human activity is analogous to a theological treatise on morality, because conduct is in question. Pronouncements by sociology upon the origin of conduct, man's purpose in life, and consequential results will constitute sociological values, for "efficient socialization is the advancement of human welfare by the most direct and practicable means which a group can find." And socialization is defined as, "the process by which a group co-operates in the improvement of human welfare. The social motive is inherent in the objective or goal and in the social activity itself." [39] This program includes all possible activities, so that values, would be as Father Sheen indicates, beyond enumeration. E. C. Hayes corroborates this view and makes values co-extensive with all possible activity. "Social activities, customary or institutionalized, are of many sorts, from language to religion and from technic arts to governmental institutions." [40]

The maze of social activity is viewed by F. H. Giddings a little differently than by Hayes, but in his opinion there is also a gradual crystallising of values. It is the determining of values that is of special interest to us because it shows that sociology is built upon values as is any attempted explanation of human life. The place of values is clearly set forth, although supermundane interpretations betrays a false analysis according to him. [41]

It is only after these primary ends have been pursued a long while, that the secondary ends which we call "values" are slowly visualized and

[39] *A. J. of S.*, J. C. Almack, "Efficiency in Socialization", Vol. XXXI, Sept. 1925, No. 2, p. 243 and p. 241, respectively.
[40] *A. J. of S.*, "Some Social Relations Restated", Vol. XXXI, Nov. 1925, No. 3, p. 344.
[41] *J. of S. F.*, "Social Work and Societal Engineering", Vol. III, Nov. 1924, No. 1, pp. 9-10.

begin to influence conduct. The first reactions to this influence are attempts to make individuals of value to the community, directly, or as offerings to a god, or as slaves to a ruling house or class.

Not until late in human evolution is there any considerable and earnest attempt to make individuals of value to themselves. This value is secular and democratic. As a concept it cannot arise while mankind believes that "the chief end of man is to glorify God", and that the lowly should be content in a station of life to which it has pleased the quality to call them.

Moral values, therefore, arise out of social forces, so that they are only social in character after all, and do not receive their "sanction" from an All-Powerful but Unknowable Deity.[42]

Much theorizing may attend just what "moral" values or standards for actions do result from a sociological basis of man's actions. The criterion for truly socially beneficial acts must be drawn from a purely naturalistic society and will by necessity be opposed to traditional notions of morality. The book of (Judge) B. B. Lindsey, "The Companionate Marriage", illustrates the logical consequences of such morality, and represents a consistent sociological interpretation. If happiness is a criterion, and understanding happiness in an emotional sense, it has a sociological warrant; also if self-expression is a natural consequence, a doctrine also held by sociologists, is not the argument for companionate marriage justifiable and most reasonable? Moreover since his comparison between the companionate and procreative types of marriage base their validity upon social welfare, an accepted criterion of sociology, it follows that sociology does furnish values for conduct.[43]

Lindsey's book shows that values are deduced from sociological principles, and at least the Judge has the merit of being logical to his postulated sociological principles, even though his conclusions do shock "pious ears".

One further notion connected with social values deserves mention. It is the question of immortality of man. It is connected with personality, and a sociological interpretation of immortality must follow its naturalistic principles. Values have been emptied of all spiritual meaning, so whatever con-

[42] R. M. Binder, "Major Social Problems", pp. 54-5.
[43] cf. Chapter, "Marriage on Trial", pp. 138 ff.

tent is given to immortality, certainly it is not that of theology. If immortality is treated at all, sociology's attitude is one of hostility.

F. H. Hankins centers his discussion of personality about immortality, and argues that the traditional notion of immortality is harmful to real social welfare. Incidentally the quotation brings out the fact that sociology has definite values for all terms it uses. For instance, personality has a definite meaning in sociology, but that meaning is radically different from the theological definition of personality because immortality is denied."

> To reject the ordinary arguments for immortality only to fall back on the even more mystical notion that personality must be immortal because it is a unique unity and expresses the values of life leaves one gaping. What then, pray, is personality? Does it not rest on flesh and blood? And what are these "values" the author talks so much about? Are they not socially derived, a part of social heritage and do they not change from age to age and place to place? Finally it should be pointed out again that the belief in a future life is not essential to give meaning and value to this one. There is, in fact, a direct antithesis between the two lives. The less the one this side of the grave means, the more the one on the other is glorified. But when this life becomes filled with a vivid reality the other loses interest. It is safe to say that a really intelligent mode of living here and now is not affected in the slightest degree by any belief concerning the hereafter.

This quotation may serve as a summary, giving the sociological interpretation of life. All that can be possibly of interest to man may be explained in a purely naturalistic fashion. This illustrates why values found in sociology do not require any spiritual or supernatural meaning to give them coherency. The criteria for judging a "good" social life cannot be of a higher nature than the values therein described. This statement is not my own opinion but is the common viewpoint of sociology. "Sociology as a science is a study of the natural process by which personality is formed and cultural continuity maintained." [45]

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[44] *J. of S. F.*, Book Review of "The Problem of Immortality" by R. A. Tsanoff, Vol. III, May 1925, No. 4, p. 751.

[45] *A. J. of S.*, E. B. Reuter, "The Relation of Biology and Sociology", Vol. XXXII, Mar. 1927, No. 5, p. 705.

PART IV

CHAPTER XI

SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS REGULATE LIFE

SECTION I—*Substitute for a Treatise in Moral Theology.*

Everything that concerns man in the daily round of his activities receives its meaning from sociology. Its interpretations are co-extensive with man's interests, so that whatever can become an object of investigation to man, is by the same fact also a matter for sociological inquiry. If man is capable of knowledge, it is precisely because social processes have made it possible for him to acquire knowledge at all. Everything that man has, socially at least, he owes to society, and hence a systematic knowledge of society is the greatest boon that can be bestowed upon him. For man, so sociology maintains, is a social being and cannot even exist apart from society.

A correct sociological view of society is one that regards it as an entity endowed with life, for society really does exist, and possesses an energy that is sufficient for all its needs. To insist, therefore, that society is a mere mental abstraction and nothing more; to make it only a figment of the imagination is tantamount to an admission of hostility to the science of sociology.

In Part II of this study, the viewpoint of sociology was set forth, supported by quotations drawn from leading authorities, and sociology was found to be a comprehensive philosophy of life. Its fundamental postulates proscribe every explanation of phenomena that invokes a higher principle than evidence of the senses. Experimentation, conducted according to ultra-scientific procedure, is the final test for truth, with the result that all reality must conform to this standard of measurement. Consequently, whatever can be known to exist as an object of knowledge; whatever can be discovered in the social relations of man; in short, whatever is knowable at all, must be interpreted "scientifically" and without recourse to

any "supposedly" higher principles of reason. Only that which is demonstrable can properly be known to man, so that all the alleged phenomena of a higher order of reality are simply mistaken interpretations, incorrect explanations based upon a false philosophy of things.

Such, indeed, is the viewpoint of sociology as has been fully treated in the preceding pages. The principles that underlie sociology are by necessity subversive of revealed religion. These two interpretations of life have nothing in common, save that they both undertake to explain life and evaluate its origin, meaning, and purpose. This point of contact is really more than casual, for the reason that sociology and revealed religion clash over every detail in the life of man.

Human activity is the content of both, giving rise to a parallel interpretation according with the respective principles of each science. A complete naturalistic view of life, therefore, obtains in sociology, for every detail of life has received consideration.

Co-extensive with life, sociology is able to explain every activity that manifests itself in the social whole. These activities are social activities in final analysis, because they follow the social pattern found in society itself. These patterns are the result of urges or impulses of the social organism that have resulted because of innate needs, originated in and developed by the struggle for existence. The social organism gradually evolving, retained those patterns that were most helpful and discarded those that were found not to be so.

It was especially with the dawn of consciousness, so sociologists tell us, that real progress in social life began, for it is in the case of man especially that social processes are accompanied by consciousness. Each increase of knowledge on the part of man, made his co-operation more intelligent, although that very intelligence is itself a manifestation of the conscious social process, as man receives his very being (social) from society.[1]

Sociological knowledge becomes functional, i. e., becomes operative, causing man to manifest greater social activity

[1] cf. Part III, Chap. VIII, pp. 49, ff.

because he becomes acquainted with new social patterns, upon which to fashion his behavior. Inability to recognize social patterns and the subsequent non-conformity prevents man from sharing this advanced knowledge, with the result that his socialization remains at a correspondingly lower level. These weak and unfortunate members of the social group are outclassed in the struggle for survival altogether, or are seriously impaired from enjoying a healthy development. The laws of social continuities are inexorable, so that social well-being, both of society and its individual members, depend upon conscious participation in the social whole.

The individual's own personal welfare is not the main concern of this social consciousness. The saving knowledge of society is for the benefit of society itself first of all, and only profits the individual because he is a member of the social group. However, intelligent co-operation on the part of the individual is necessary, and that explains society's concern for the diffusion of a proper and true social knowledge. Society itself is necessarily affected by the status of the individual, because that individual reflects the degree of socialization operative in him, and the greater the degree the more secure is society. It follows, therefore, that the sum total of all individuals represents the maximum progress reached by any group in its onward evolution.

Inculcation of educational processes for socialization becomes a material activity in sociology for the reason that conscious, and hence intelligent, participation by man in social processes insures the future of society. Furthermore, when socialization is better understood, the individual in consequence enjoys a deeper knowledge of social processes and can thereby the more intelligently adapt his behavior to efficient social patterns. Did he not come under these influences; were his environments those of a lower level of socialization; were the social types or patterns present to his consciousness less advantageous for social welfare, or even anti-social, society would lose just that much energy for progress,with the accompanying exclusion of the individual from a more perfect social development. Co-operation follows upon knowledge, hence the

concern of sociology that man became like unto God "knowing good from evil" for the truth will make him free.

Advances in sociological knowledge, therefore, improve the life of socialized man. Each real new discovery just makes that much more socialization possible to him, so that the latest findings and pronouncements of sociology, become at once so many helps for solving life and its problems. Man can do no better than to learn from sociology, if he would live his life in an intelligent manner, namely, make it useful to society and pleasant to himself. Sociological knowledge, indeed, supplies man with a way of life, and gives meaning to his every action, evaluating at the same time the degree of human welfare symbolized by those actions. And everything in man's life receives a naturalistic interpretation, so that there is no need to invoke a supermundane principle by which to evaluate life.[2] Truly then does sociological interpretation substitute for a treatise in moral theology.

Morality cannot be divorced from sociology since man's activities are the very matter of its investigation. As stated before, the term "morality" is not, in its proper and true meaning indigenous to sociology, although it occurs frequently enough; it must be understood in a sociological sense when it appears. The following quotation will illustrate this use of morality, but does more particularly show that sociology aspires to an organized explanation of life, capable only of a naturalistic interpretation.[3]

> Above all, the organic view of mind calls for social knowledge as the basis of morality. We live in a system and to achieve right ends, or any rational ends whatever, we must learn to understand that system. The public mind must emerge somewhat from its subconscious condition and know and guide its own processes.

The morality called for by Cooley bases itself upon "social knowledge"; is known by a "mind" that "emerges"; is referred to moreover as "knowing" and "guiding"; and is finally charged with the direction of ends, or even "any rational ends what-

[2] *S. F.*, R. L. Finney, "The Problems of Social Evaluation", Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 204.
[3] C. H. Cooley, "Social Organization", p. 21.

ever". This is certainly a comprehensive program for a morality, a program that bids fair to rival anything proposed or attempted by any "super-imposed" and revealed system.

Sociological treatises do aim at social control, which is the counterpart of direction of the free acts of man by the norms and prescriptions of moral theology. As the revealed science of morals depends upon, so too does sociology require principles to direct this control and formulate rules of conduct. In direct answer to the question appearing in an article entitled "What are Principles of Sociology", I. W. Howerth expressly states that social control is the aim of sociological knowledge. His answer, after due allowance is made for the peculiarities of sociological phraseology, is substantially what moral theology would return to the same question, for the reason that a knowledge of fundamental truths of society, in an eternal as well as in a temporal sense, must precede any particular application, whether that truth is known through divine revelation or reason. The "service of the social act," this author states, is and in this connection is intended to mean a help for the conduct of practical affairs of life. Such a statement is analogous to a theologian's pronouncement of norms of conduct for the daily life of man.[4]

> . . . there are fundamental truths about society that definitely explain social processes. These are important, not so much, perhaps, from the viewpoint of sociological science—although they may be that, too—as from that of possible social control or direction. They are for the service of the social art, for which sociologist science exists.

Practically all that can be found in moral theology about conduct with all its implications has a parallel in sociological descriptions of behavior. Everything may be explained without recourse to the supernatural, so that were morality correctly understood, it is contended, it should adopt the sociological interpretation. Furthermore every instance of supernatural value, ascribed to the act of man, was due to an improper analysis, for "morality, considered historically has been such a re-direction of nature impulses as has made for

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[4] *A. J. of S.*, Vol. XXXI, Jan. 1926, No. 4, pp. 483-4.

the preservation and welfare of the individual or of the group."[5]

This reference appears in a chapter headed "The Supposed Supernatural Origin of Morality".[6] The full force of this statement makes it evident that morality is simply an interpretation of man's social relations considered in their genesis and subsequent evolutions. Social life is the only moral life in a true sense, since it alone is the accredited and intelligent manner of living, as the very existence of society demonstrates. To speak of morality in a theological sense, the sociologist protests, simply declares that man's nature and his social relations have been misunderstood.

Moreover, he will insist, "substitution" as used in the title to this chapter betrays a misconception of the very nature of morality: sociology substitutes nothing; it merely draws out and elaborates what its study of society reveals.

Sociology does not assume the dictatorship and endeavor to force its mandates upon a society that is obedient or recalcitrant according to its moods, but simply explains how society functions. The science of life is not an attempt to persuade man as though he were capable of acting either favorably or unfavorably in a given situation. Every change that occurs in the social body is not "haphazard" or uncaused, but is the result of a continuity that is as vital to society, as the living links themselves are that form its unbroken chain. Consequently to superimpose moral theology upon man in order to regulate him in his activity, is to assume an order of things that has no existence in reality. A system of morals claiming a divine origin, enforced by super-mundane sanctions, and relying upon metaphysical speculation for its maintenance, is something foreign to society as it is known from the scientific investigation of its causes. Insistence upon a supernatural explanation of life betrays an intellectual bondage to an absolute and discarded interpretation of life. H. E. Barnes voices this protest for sociology in his treatment of "conscience".[7]

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[5] D. Drake, "The New Morality", p. 4.
[6] ibid.
[7] *J. of S. F.*, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 2, p. 215.

Directly connected with this metaphysical and supernatural conception which exists in regard to the derivation and nature of moral codes is the prevailing illusion as to how man becomes conscious of right and wrong in conduct, and is able to seek the former and avoid the latter.

The particular reference to conscience is not pertinent here, but Barnes' appreciation of the origin of morality is important; for it affirms its existence, condemns a supernatural view of life, and accepts a naturalistic basis by inference, at least.

That sociology does really so regard human activities is also seen from A. W. Small's comment upon "Social Groups" by B. W. Brown. " . . . every permutation of human experience [he says] is an affair of group relations".[8] Hence there is nothing about man's behavior that requires recourse to outside principles to explain it. Sociology is fully capable of an explanation.[9]

The behavior in which the sociologist is interested is the approximately simultaneous reaction of a plural number of individuals that happen to be in the same situation or circumstances. Their reactions may be alike or different; equally or unequally alert and persistent. This behavior is pluralistic. It develops into group ways, class ways, and folk ways and into organization. The social worker is at all times in contact with it and dealing with it. He should thoroughly know his sociology.

In this manner the full round of man's activities is brought within the purvey of sociological thought and interpretation. The social ideal is the motivating force that unifies and directs human "behavior", as the basis for a concept of morality.[10]

Morality, we are beginning to see consists in the sharing of a social ideal. That is moral which works towards the establishment of an ideal social order, or a perfect human society. We have also come to see that we have not yet made out what an ideal social order or a perfect human society would be like, and that therefore we are still in the process of learning what is right or of determining the correct ideal of life. We no longer assume that we fully know the right. Just as we are learning slowly to spell out what truth is, so we are learning slowly to spell out what the right is. Both are matters of experiment and discovery.

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[8] From Foreword.
[9] *J. of S. F.*, F. H. Giddings, "The Scientific Scrutiny of Societal Facts", Vol. I, Sept. 1923, No. 3, p. 511.
[10] C. A. Ellwood, "Cultural Evolution", p. 221.

The dominant note in Ellwood's statement is that sociological morality does not claim finality. This characteristic, as has been mentioned before, necessarily follows from sociological postulates. However it takes on special meaning when contrasted with pronouncements of moral theology basing its validity and finality upon statements of infallible Truth known by revelation and elaborated by reason. For sociological morality, no such absolute quality is claimed by its protagonists for its pronouncements. "In the absolute sense morality is supposed to be unvarying because there can be only one best method of acting to produce the highest development. It is doubtful, however, if this conception of morality is tenable." [11]

At best only a progressive standard is obtainable, because the social process is in a continual evolution, and cannot therefore present a final social pattern for imitation. Furthermore the true sociological notion of morality does not involve the concept of training a will "supposedly" endowed with choice in the meaning of "uncaused freedom". Their idea is rather one of "working up to an intelligent understanding" of social conditions so that action follows spontaneously. This influence is to be exercised through the group as a whole and in this particular aspect for social control, sociology differs vastly from moral theology. [12]

By public will we may understand the deliberate self-direction of any social group. There is, of course, nothing mysterious about it, for it is of the same nature as public opinion, and is simply that so informed and organized as to be an effective guide to the life of the group. Nor can we say just when this state is reached—it is a matter of degree—but we may assume that when a group intelligently pursues a steadfast policy some measure at least, of public will has been achieved.

Bringing down the group will to a particular instance, involves an application of that social will. Frequently therefore the discussion will turn about "conscience". Here, again, a content is assigned to that word that differs radically from conscience in theological usage. Instead of being an ordination of practical reason, it is rather, for sociology, "the still

[11] F. A. Bushee, "Principles of Sociology", p. 465.
[12] C. H. Cooley, "Social Organization", p. 395.

voice of the herd, as Prof. Robinson has facetiously expressed it." [13]

> From earliest infancy the contact of the child with parents, relatives, friends and associates brings to him a varied but potent body of information, and inculcates ideas, concepts and attitudes which wholly and solely determine his notions of what is right and wrong. It is in this way that the ideas and practices of the great and little herds with which the individual comes in contact are translated into individual belief and action. There is little probability that our convictions as to right and wrong thus derived bear any relation to the scientific facts in the circumstances, as herd opinion and activities have never yet been founded upon scientific investigation and statistical measurement and verification but they do represent what our herds believe to be right, and hence constitute a practical guide to life in a given community. The still, small voice, then appears upon adequate investigation to be not the voice of God.

A conscience-matter, therefore, simply reveals the social patterns in vogue at the moment an individual's mental content crystallizes out of the common group consciousness. There is nothing particularly individual about it, and differences in individual consciences are due to varying degrees the "still small voice of the herd" is present to the individuals considered. Other writers explain conscience differently, but uniformly agree that its true genesis is social.[14]

The introduction of considerations on conscience shows in a practical manner that sociology recognizes that a complete system of morality must, when occasions arise, make some provision for particular adaptations. Therefore it is claimed that sociology affords all the fancied advantages of a revealed morality, with the important difference that the sociological interpretation is drawn from society itself and not spun out of an antiquated and unscientific theology.

SECTION II—*Deal with Wellsprings of Morality.*

A concept of morality involves many elements. First, there is the usual distinction arising from the source whence

[13] *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 2, p. 215.

[14] *J. of S. F.*, H. M. Parshley, "A Physiological Basis for Ethics", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 788.

the ordinations impinging upon the governed, are drawn. For theology, this is the Will of God known to man by Revelation and is called "Divinely Revealed Morality". On the other hand morality is sometimes referred to as natural, and then is classified as ethics, and known to man by his unaided reason. The two great divisions are therefore according to the manner in which the system is known. In scholastic terminology we say the formal element differs.

Difference in manner in which the matter properly belonging under morality is known to man, does not separate that matter into two distinct classes, between which there are no identities. In fact, roughly speaking, the subject-matter for theological or ethical morality is the same, with a greater refinement for the theological species. It would be erroneous to convey the impression, however, that these two "brands" of morality differ only by a mere more or less of content, because while there are many points in common, there are also great differences in the subject-matter itself of each of the sciences.

These differences do not involve contradictions, but simply show that unaided reason, by its own powers, cannot penetrate as deeply into the Eternal Mysteries of God, or explore the secrets of man as fully as does the revealed knowledge given by God comprehend and make known these realities. An instance of the first is God known by reason and then by revelation. His Existence, indeed, as well as His Necessary Attributes may readily enough be known by reason,[15] but a fuller knowledge of His Inner Nature, e. g., The Mystery of the Holy Trinity is beyond man's unaided powers. As for the second set of truths relative to man, reason can tell us much about man's great dignities, e. g., his spiritual soul and its wonderful prerogatives, but could not even surmise the existence, much less describe the nature of incorporation into the Very Life of God by Supernatural Grace, and anticipate the enjoyment of the Beatific Vision in Heaven.

However there is a common element in morality as treated by revelation and as studied in ethics. It arises rather from the very nature of an act than by any standard whereby a

[15] Vatican Council.

human act may be properly considered under one or the other of human activities that are peculiar to him alone as man, we find that the same analysis belongs to an act as act whether it is strictly theological or merely one of ethics. Of course, the question may be raised whether there are, absolutely speaking, any merely ethical acts, since man lives under the promulgation of an explicitly revealed order. However, the two orders may be distinquished speculatively at least and that is sufficient to establish a two-fold viewpoint. Moreover, the designation "Ethics" and its acknowledged place in philosophy, together with the compatibility of its matter with the content of revealed morality, justifies its independence sufficiently for comparative purposes, if not for its complete autonomy as a science.

A conscious act of man, therefore, that is designedly a human act, consisting as it does of reflection and consent of the will, exercised upon a specific object, involves certain intrinsic and necessary elements that fit it in a peculiar manner, for becoming the human component part of morality. This act is generally referred to as conduct and implies thereby certain characteristic features that mark it off from other acts of man which do not involve moral implications and are not properly conduct.

It will be remembered that two mental elements are present in the act under consideration, the actions of the intellect and will: the individual understands what he is doing, and freely wills to do what he understands he is doing. These processes are not the mere functioning of his rational powers without reference to a definite object, but are about a particular act to be performed at a specified time, under specific circumstances. These latter elements, the circumstances, also enter into the composition of a moral act considered ob-objectively, as a complete, existing act, independent of the performing agent, but do not *immediately* produce the subjective morality of the act, either actually performed or only contemplated but consented to. For our purposes, we may dispense with the "circumstances" as these conditioning elements as

they are generally called do not derive their morality from the mind of agent.

Considering therefore the act to be done aside from the circumstance and merely as an objective reality, man's reaction to it brings about conduct, which it turn is composed of the following constitutive factors. Man because of his intelligence forsees the final outcome of the act contemplated by him. Sometimes that end is necessitated, in the sense that the result follows as soon as the causality is set in motion by man. At other times, other causalities enter in and are necessary to bring about the desired result. In either case, however this end must be forseen and accepted by the individual before the morality of that particular act is imputable to him. Of course, I am prescinding from wilfull ignorance that would preclude any possibility of knowledge of the necessitated result of the action performed. But wilfull ignorance presupposes wilfull negligence and this negligence generates culpability on its own score. Consequently ignorance when culpable rather increases than lessens or destroys the individual's moral relations with the act, that he now performs or omits, and that guilt is recognized at the time this negligence becomes conscious. Foreknowledge therefore and consent to the act forseen is the first wellspring of morality, and may be named, for our purpose Telesis.

Consciousness in man of the rationalizing process just described, also includes the conviction that the intended act is commanded or forbidden by a competent authority, and this realization is the "oughtness" of moral acts, and must be present in each case, for without it there would be no compulsion upon his will. This is a second necessary element of morality.

At this stage, the individual agent, is further aware, not by an emotional sentiment, but by a rational conviction that he is able to act or abstain from acting. In other words, he realizes that he has freedom to obey the authority that rightfully and competently obligates his will. Freedom, likewise necessarily enters into the composition of morality, because it gives meaning to the preceding two stages, Telesis and

Oughtness and, makes the following two, Responsibility and Sanction, logical consequences of a human act,

When a decision has been reached the individual accepts the forseen results as part of his resolve to perform or abstain from performing the particular act under consideration. That is to say, he accepts the responsibility of the act done or consented to by him. This, as has been already stated, is another necessary element in morality, because it gives validity to the process thus far described, and is called Responsiblity.

Finally, there is the sanction attached to morality. This is also a constitutive element, since it actually vindicates what was forseen and accepted in the mental processes of the agent as the natural outcome of the act performed or consented to. Sanction, however has a deeper meaning than this, a twofold aspect, temporal and eternal. There is an immediate sanction that follows the performance of any act. Sometines we call it success, at other times, failure, though in reality acts are necessitated by their nature to a specific effect, and are always successful when actually done. Should, however, that necessitated effect actually and objectively produce what we forsaw it would, it is then both successful as an act objectively and as intended by the agent. However, our appreciation of the act may have been incorrect and we actually perform the act, the success of the act as act remains, but our anticipated wishes did not materialize because we mistook the actual causality set in motion by us and then we call it a failure. Also, should some contrary forces have prevented the completion of the act intended and actually started, we also call it a failure, but not precisely in the same meaning as in the previous use of that word.

There is, moreover, a higher sanction that must be mentioned in a discussion of morality, and which is the real and efficacious factor in morality. It is the securing or preventing, as far as the present conditions allow, of our final end, Union with God. This is sanction in a true and proper sense for correct morality, because our separate and individual acts derive their morality from it.

Conduct is therefore not something arbitrarily imposed

upon man by God, although He Wills that we be under compulsion in regard to it, but rises from the inner nature of man himself. Every act of Conduct consequently involves these five elements, namely Telesis—Oughtness—Freedom—Responsibility—Sanction.

The analysis of an act of conduct just given should recommend itself to the sociologist very strongly. Besides being sound theology, it is also good sociology. It is evident that these elements were drawn from the act of man as a human act, and sociologists should first assure themselves that their criticism of the fundamental philosophic postulates involved in this analysis is substantiated before they pronounce the whole survey simply an idle speculation of a "religious" dreamer. The existence of the spiritual as well as the supernatural is demanded by this analysis to give it consistent meaning.

Sociology is not able to disregard considerations bearing upon the nature of conduct, if it would be truly scientific. That science is intimately concerned, as we have seen, with the conscious activities of man so that it is forced to break up an act of conduct, as we have done, into component parts.

This meeting of sociology and moral theology in the matter of wellsprings or sources of morality is so important, that I must state it expressly. It is here that the bond lies that unites these two systems into one common category, namely—a moral treatise. It is, indeed, because conscious human activity is what it is, that sociology, moral theology, or any proposed system of morality, must deal with the self same elements, although each one will view them from its own particular viewpoint. Hence arises the difference between sociological and theological interpretations of man's actions.

Sociology is moral then because it deals with the sources whence the morality of a human act is drawn. These sources will not be formally named under scholastic terminology, but that does not exclude them from being real sources of morality in a sociological sense. In the following quotation, evident attempt is made to include all elements contributory to a "philosophy of life", which is to function through conscious human

activities. The result of this functioning produces the "moral" acts performed by man. Consequently the wellsprings of conscious human activity is a concern of sociology, since R. L. Finney tells us that a philosophy of life so functions. [16]

> The philosophy of life that is to function successfully in our modern world must be synthesized out of the thought-material of our own age. It must take its constituent facts from all the sciences that deal with human life; biology, psychology, social psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, ethics, philosophy and history. It must draw its emotional illumination from literature and other fine arts and from religion.

It is rather morality viewed abstractly that preoccupies R. L. Finney, but the individual as individual also receives consideration in connection with the foundations of morality. Although the individual is "purely" a social product, yet in virtue of his very social origin, his personality reflects the results of definite and intrinsic "moral" influences, that is, of social activities. "Sociology, accepting the individual merely as a datum, studies the natural process by which personality is formed and cultural continuity maintained." [17]

Morality, therefore, according to sociology is intimately connected with man. Indeed, complaint that such was not always realized is made by C. A. Ellwood, and given as a cause for the failure of traditional morality to meet the needs of man today. [18]

> The trouble with most of the instructions in morality in our schools in the past is that it has been divorced from the facts of our social life. If we will, base such instructions upon scientific social knowledge, we can readily inculcate ideals regarding government, law, sanitation, family life, business and human relations generally as we can standards of vocational excellence.

Had the sources of morality been "properly" understood, this author virtually says society would not be burdened by incon-

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[16] "General Social Science", pp. viii-ix.
[17] *S. F.*, G. B. Logan, "Guides to Periodical Reading", Vol. VI, Sept. 1927, No. 1, p. 131.
[18] "Sociology and Modern Social Problems", p. 383.

veniences of a whole host of blunders at the present time. If man were truly moral he would be fully social, because good morality follows necessarily from sound social processes. Such is the burden of writers in sociology when dealing with the causes in social life that makes man truly social.[19]

It may not be amiss to point out that although sociology deals with the wellsprings of conduct, its findings will differ unequivocally from those of moral theology. This should not surprise us, because, sociology is inspired by a system of philosophic naturalism, consequently a corresponding concept of morality is but to be expected. The following statement of F. W. Blackmar makes clear my meaning, and although he specifies "ethics", his remarks are applicable to "morals" in a theologic sense as well, because to the sociologist the distinction between ethics and moral has little meaning.[20]

> It [ethics] represents the moral life which involves thoughts, feelings, intentions and actions, relating to the association of man with his fellows. It has to do with the right and wrong and involves a question of duty as measured by the highest standards of the community. Each community has its own moral standard and its own moral code.

Morality as thus understood arises from the social wellsprings it is true, but does not have stability. This lack is not because the social organism has ceased to function as a source for morality, but because that source itself is undergoing change. V. F. Calverton praises Judge Lindsey's book cited below, just because the Judge recognizes the principle of change. The author is treating "Contemporary Sex Relations in Literature" and picks out the above mentioned book as typical example of a newer but healthier morality.[21]

> But today, coetaneous with the emergence of the new woman, has come a new youth which is an active rebellion "against our system of taboos,

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[19] C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 311; J. M. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations in Moral Developments", p. 228; D. Drake, "The New Morality", p. 353; A. J. Todd, "Theories of Social Progress", chapters III and IV; E. A. Ross, "The Principles of Sociology".

[20] "The Elements of Sociology", p. 176.

[21] "Sex Expression in Literature", pp. 279-80.

tribal superstitions, intolerances and hypocracies." Judge Lindsey in his recent book, the Revolt of Modern Youth, has made a careful and illuminating study of the nature of social and sexual relations between the youths of today, and it is because his conclusions are based on fact, on actual contact and observation, that they are so signal.

Sociology is forced to deal with moral actions of man, simply because they are in the nature of the matter studied by that science. And it is especially because of these distinctive qualities of conscious human acts that sociology willy-nilly is a moral treatise.

CHAPTER XII

CONDUCT VERSUS BEHAVIOR

The search for final values in sociology has narrowed down to a discussion of conduct. This term though a general one, is used here with particular application to the acts of man, performed with advertence and freewill. Conduct is therefore the outward expression of morality by man.

In sociological writings, the term conduct appears, but more frequently, it is behavior that is employed. It refers to the conscious activities of man that are co-extensive with his conscious mental life. Conduct in moral theology does not enjoy so large a dominion. It is limited to the outward manifestation of "human acts", consisting of the joint action of intellect and will, and expressed in some definite and concrete manner. So "conduct" as used in sociology has a wider application than in moral theology.

These two terms serve as test-words for mutually exclusive interpretations of life, so that the adoption of either one, declares which one of the two systems is accepted. To exemplify: A use of behavior in the sociological sense of that word, implies that man patterns his conscious actions after some plan, or according to some mould present to his consciousness, due to its participation in the general social consciousness of his group. This theory destroys personal responsibility by devitalizing intelligence, thereby rendering arbitrary choice by the will an impossibility.

Whereas if the self-same conscious activity in man were studied by moral theology, it would first of all be called "conduct" instead of "behavior", and in the next place, conduct rests upon "human acts", as stated above. Consequently, the identical phenomenon of conscious activity in man is explained by sociology by invoking a principle no higher in value than those principles that are capable of being scientifically drawn out of social relations and tested by tangible criteria; whereas

the very same phenomena of conscious activity require in moral theology a spiritual order of reality and principles in harmony with that order, that differ in kind from, and are superior to, even the exterior and visible manifestations in matter of those very spiritual principles. This statement expresses the fundamental differences of sociology and moral theology in regard to man's "behavior" or "conduct" as one prefers to call the conscious and purely human activities in man.

Behavior versus Conduct sums up in a word the deep antagonism that must appear between sociology and moral theology, as soon as their respective philosophies are examined. Social behavior, indeed, expresses the values that society places upon the activity of man; first as an act, and then secondly, as regards the usefulness of that act for practical life. Moreover, these judgments about behavior represent current views in vogue so that their description in sociology is "final" in the meaning that they are the latest standards thus far obtainable for socially perfect behavior. Social well-being gives validity to the standards so that, in a word, it is a "morality of success" that is meant. "Morality, therefore in the abstract sense is that form of conduct which will produce the maximum of life." [1]

To the man trained in scholastic philosophy, behavior is associated with the actions of irrational animals, while the term "conduct" is reserved for man's rational acts. And while it is true that behavior in animals does include a certain kind of consciousness, it differs essentially from rational consciousness peculiar to man. However, it may be advanced that man has sense consciousness in addition to rational consciousness, so that under some conditions at least, his conscious actions may be behavior after all. It is undoubtedly true that much of the so-called conduct in man does not exhibit real rational intelligence and exercise of will, but that is due to the lack of use of human potentialities rather than absence of them altogether. Furthermore, such actions are not "conduct", but may nevertheless beget culpability in the agent, to the meas-

[1] F. A. Bushee, "Principles of Sociology", p. 465.

ure in which that state of mental inertia is imputable. However, it still remains possible for such a person to "perform" real conduct, were he stirred up to it, and hence the desirability of arousing an individual to his dignity as a rational creature. Behavior, therefore, cannot of itself, adequately account for all "conscious" activities in man.

Now sociology does not subscribe to a two-fold theory of consciousness, and refuses to be drawn into the question at all. It protests that the question of consciousness has been examined by psychology and found to be a single series.[2] Its statements, therefore, reflect a uniform interpretation of consciousness for men and animals, although occasionally a real distinction seems to be implied in favor of the human being. But the judgment, supported by practically any book chosen at random, remains that man's consciousness certainly does not possess a spiritual or rational character as insisted upon by scholastic philosophy and considered a prerequisite in revealed religion.

The one thing certain is that sociology considers all of man's conscious activities as behavior. P. E. Martin, commenting upon L. A. White's article "The Concept 'Social': A Critical Note" appearing in "Social Forces" for September 1925, makes behavior the basis for his judgments regarding collective and individual entities in sociology. The quotation is also important, because behavior is made equivalent to the admittedly higher forms in man called by him "cultural", so that it would include the higher as well as the lower forms of consciousness.[3]

If the term "social" be equivalent to collective, it does not distinguish between organic and superorganic factors in human behavior. If "social" be equivalent to cultural the distinction between individual and collective is lost, for cultural behavior may be either.

The role of behavior in sociology is an important one. Its explanation is regarded as the main objective for all the

[2] K. Young, in H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 202.

[3] *A. J. of S.*, "Recent Literature: General Sociology and Methodology of the Social Sciences", Vol. XXXI, March 1926, No. 5, p. 712.

studies undertaken, because behavior represents the concrete, actual portrayal of the effect of social forces.

The behavior of man results from the conditions in which he finds himself. L. L. Bernard in his "Sociology and Psychology", says it is a group action but may serve to identify the individual.[4]

> Modern scientific sociology is based on the assumption that collective behavior is the result of relatively uniform environmental factors stimulating relatively uniform responses in similar human organisms. This collective response organizes individuals into groups; and the study of groups and of group behavor is the subject-matter of sociology.

Modern and indeed scientific sociology sponsors the behavioristic concept of conduct, so that it likewise accepts all that is implied thereby. By its acceptance of a natural basis for conduct, it places all of man's activities on the same level understanding them to differ one from the other by a mere matter of more and less.

One dominant trait of the theory of behavior, is that all of man's actions, especially all of his conscious ones are brought within its classification. Sociologists do not regard the rational acts of man as possessing special dignity, nor do they give special prominence to those immediately concerned with external actions in contradistinction to those that are purely internal. Every conscious act of man, by its very title of act is an exhibition of behavior they argue, because it is "the result of relatively uniform environmental factors stimulating relatively uniform responses. . . . "[5]

This idea of behavior contrasts its nature with that of conduct as understood in moral theology. The Catholic views conduct as the result of his own action freely exercised about some definite object that exists independently of him, when external acts are considered, and mentally in internal acts. In sociology the individual is but another link in social continuities which bring about every new manifestation of social progress or retrogresson; in theology the individual is endowed with

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[4] In Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations," pp. 366-7.

[5] ibid. pp. 366-7.

personal and independent existence, and his actions are properly his own, because he was free to have withheld them altogether had he so decided.

Behavior may, in a sense, be said to characterize sociology, because it exhibits in a demonstrable way what that science teaches about social processes. These forces reside in the social organism and manifest themselves in social actions, so that it is particularly behavior that illustrates their workings in respect to man. In the following quotation C. A. Ellwood apparently distinguishes between objective and subjective aspects of social processes, but in reality such a distinction, in the scholastic sense, is furthest from his meaning. A closer study of his statement reveals that what he possibly calls "subjective" in one sentence is referred to as "objective" in the next; at least, his words are not clear from this point of view and most probably he had no intention of making them clear in a "scholastic" sense. Had this writer effectually distinguished between subjective and objective in the scholastic sense, he would virtually have subscribed to a spiritually-conceived philosophy which he does not intend to do.

One cannot easily determine from the wording what character is ascribed to these social patterns, and that fact makes an appreciation of behavior which Ellwood makes to result from their operation, most difficult to describe. However, the statement is valuable because it clearly sets forth sociology's viewpoint on behavior, when due allowance has been made for terminology.[6]

> Thus it is evident that culture or civilization is made up not simply of acquired habits, but, on its inner side, of mental patterns, patterns of action lodged in the minds of individuals. It is also evident that these mental patterns are the standards by means of which the members of the group measure and control their behavior and develop their culture. Thus if we take the making of a stone implement we find that it is invariably made with a mental pattern in mind.

Interpretation of behavior therefore, has a definite meaning for a larger view of life. This fact has been referred to several times before but it is most applicable at this place.

[6] "Christianity and Social Science", p. 37.

In contrasting the two notions, conduct and behavior, it is well to bring out the exact implications of behavior as a theory explaining man's conscious activities. Probably the best method to do this is to give the statement of Park and Burgess. Although they do not mention "behavior" explicitly they have it in mind, because they treat of human nature and the activities resulting from its functioning. Before actually quoting their statement, the "original nature of man" referred to deserves special comment, because it predicates an evolutionary notion of man's origin, acknowledging man's common ancestry with brute animals.

Likewise the calm assumption of the absolute "perfectibility" of human nature by its own powers is made, and this is the basic error of all sociology. The acceptance of this postulate means that all causality foreign to nature as revealed by scientific study, can have no valid effect upon that nature. It follows logically from this premise that supernaturalism, as also all spiritual forces, if they exist at all, are of no moment in determining behavior.[7]

> Human nature may, therefore, be regarded on the whole as a superstructure founded on instincts, dispositions, and tendencies, inherited from a long line of human and animal ancestors. It consists mainly in a higher organization of forces, a more subtle distillation of potencies latent in what Thorndike calls "the original nature of man".

Man's special dignity, because of his rationality, does not receive any higher value that mere consciousness which is possessed in common with the brute animals. Man's conscious activities must follow the manner of animals' reaction to stimuli, hence the term behavior. Furthermore, even man's very personality rests upon no secure foundation, for R. M. Binder makes "feeling . . . the principle of individuation and socialization", and declares that it is brought about by "the unity of consciousness [and] found, not in the intellect or will, but in the feeling"[8]

Conduct therefore differs from behavior, because it is

[7] "Introduction to the Science of Sociology", p. 77.
[8] "Feeling as the Principle of Individuation and Socialization", p. 95.

founded upon a totally different concept of worth for the individual. The individual in sociology, does not make social relations: he is made by them. Society, therefore, must generate as much activity in man as it possibly can; it must furnish patterns for a real social behavior, since it is the "creator" of social relations. Consequently, "the organization must aim at producing as many emotions of a positive kind as possible in its members, if it is not to break down."[9]

Evaluating behavior means in final analysis that we regard it as an effect of social forces, even though they themselves are only material forces, arising from society itself. When considered in their relation to man these social forces are also conscious social forces, because they reflect the group experiences. Hence it is as E. R. Groves tells us, that sociology is the science for interpreting behavior for "sociology is the science that assumes the task of interpreting group experiences".[10]

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[9] ibid. p. 95.
[10] "Personality and Social Adjustment", p. 12.

CHAPTER XIII

TELESIS: FIRST ELEMENT OF CONDUCT

(Social Acts Purposive)

In comparing the notions of behavior and conduct, it was seen that sociology has developed a complete explanation for the conscious activities of man. The character of this explanation excluded the introduction of any principles that were not drawn by investigation and analysis from the social body. These principles, moreover, were claimed to be of no higher order than the social manifestations themselves, so that the spiritual, that higher order of reality needed by scholastic philosophy to give coherency to its system, and revelation required by theology, were dispensed with not only as unnecessary but even as positively harmful for a correct theory of life and its meaning.

Human nature, expressing itself in society, is sufficient unto itself and for all its needs. This sufficiency dispenses with any causality that cannot show a "naturalistic" certification and condemns that causality unable to vindicate its claims by appeal to scientific demonstration, as a false interpretation of phenomena. This view makes social facts comprehend all life, particularly the individual's "consciousness".

It is necessary to understand the sociological notion of consciousness, because it really precedes all directing of purposive conscious activity in man by sociology. All consciousness is primarily a social fact and R. M. Maciver treating of the "meaning of social fact", says that "society for every man is origin, atmosphere, environment, life. [He continues] in the world about us there are no facts which we can single out as social facts and thereby distinguish from others which are 'purely' individual, or 'vital', or 'psychic'." [1] Individuality in-

[1] "Community: A Sociological Study", p. 4.

deed, in its sociological meaning as here set forth, is of special interest to us, because it describes the individual's consciousness as it participates in social relations. It is a "social aspect" as the author tells us, and is indicative of a social consciousness, whence a complete socialization results, because "to be completely socialized would mean to have one's nature brought into complete harmony . . . to the ends of the widest community to which the individual is capable of responding, ends deep enough and wide enough to fulfill every potentiality of his being."[2] If "every potentiality" of his being can be filled, it certainly includes consciousness, for that potentiality belongs to the whole content of the individual's mind and is also "social".

In a description, therefore, of an individual's mental processes, the social continuities are very much in evidence, as the following statement of H. E. Barnes illustrates. Because of the eminent powers of social activities, personal initiative in a scholastic sense is entirely lacking. And although there is real evidence of "purposeful" mental activity, it resides in society and exists certainly outside of the individual rather than a proof of spontaneity.[3]

> The most important fact about the mores is their dominion over the individual. Arising he knows not whence or how, they meet his opening mind in earliest childhood, give him his outfit of ideas, faiths, and tastes, and lead him into prescribed mental processes. They bring to him codes of action, standards, and rules of ethics. They have a model of the man-as-he-should-be to which they mould him, in spite of himself and without his knowledge. If he submits and consents, he is taken up and may attain great success. If he resists and dissents, he is thrown out and may be trodden under foot.

Barnes' reference to "consents" and "dissents" might seem to call for personal initiative and independent activity on the part of the individual. Yet, as pointed out before for a like ambiguous expression, the context as shown by the rest of the sentence does not fit the present instance in with the traditional notions of these two terms. When the element "Free-

[2] ibid. p. 215.
[3] "Sociology and Political Theory", p. 141.

dom" is discussed, sociological phraseology bearing upon these and similar words will be explained in their true meaning. For the present it suffices to show that the conscious activity, whether lodged in the individual or in the social whole, exhibits the usual characteristic features of intelligence, namely, the adaptation of means to a preconceived end.

The indefiniteness as to the ultimate location of consciousness is seen also in the writings of F. W. Blackmar. In his description of social activities, that author's use of "human desires" might indicate an independent conscious activity in man. Yet the very next sentence makes such an interpretation impossible because the "conscious social effort" referred to certainly bespeaks purposive direction of activity.[4]

> But primarily the social activities were merely to satisfy human desire and, incidentally, permanent human institutions composing the social structure were created. After the unconscious creation of the chief organs —or parts of society, the conscious social effort appeared and under its direction the social structure was changed and improved by the direction of social forces.

The manifestation of intelligence seems to be on the side of the "social whole" concept of sociology, whereas the "independent and personal initiative concept" of scholastic philosophy is discredited. Yet despite this collective consciousness the process of representing an end to be gained, apparently follows the same process as gone through by an individual in the teleological direction of his conduct. Moreover, the two phases of consciousness just referred to are intimately united. In their operations, the action is a joint one, so that one member does not function without the other. Especially in consciously directed activity does this united action appear.

A striking feature of the social mind and one that will help us to understand how this social mind functions, is its similarity to the individual's mind. It will be seen from the following discussions that the operations of the general consciousness referred to as existing in society, parallels all the intricacies of mental life experienced by the individual in the

[4] "The Elements of Sociology", pp. 75-6.

use of thought and volition. This statement is heterodox to sociological thought, because the individual derives his consciousness, the content at least, from the social whole.

First, it is well to state that the social mind does not have real physical entity, but is only so regarded by sociologists, though their language readily enough will mislead one. "There is no independent entity [declares F. W. Blackmar] in the power over and above each separate individual which moves it and frequently coerces it into a certain line of action. [Yet continues this writer] the social mind through action and research demonstrates its superiority to the individual".[5]

The superiority claimed by sociology for the social mind necessarily reduces the individual mind to a position of only relative importance. At the same time, the inferiority assigned to the latter tends to show that all mental activity has to seek its cause and also its explanation in the more general social mind, with the result that the individual is unable to exercise control over mental activities.

Furthermore since this "superiority" manifests itself by the definite control of social activities, as evidenced by the guidance of group feelings, the whole process is an example of social telesis. This direction is purposive, because it has the welfare of society as an end, and is also conscious, since it occurs in and by means of the social mind operating through social forces. Consequently the social mind does operate after the fashion described by scholastic philosophy for an individual mind, as will be seen in the statement of J. Q. Dealey, "Group feelings, like other feelings, are in need of guidance, or direction, if they are to function safely, so that there is need of social guidance or social control. Social control in its highest manifestation becomes social or collective telesis."[6] In this account the control is located in the social whole, and upon examination will be found to be more in the nature of mechanical action than representative of a display of intelligence and free activity which scholastic philosophy insists is the sole prerogative of man. The "faculty" moreover is lo-

[5] "The Elements of Sociology", p. 245.
[6] *S. F.*, "Masters of Social Science: Lester Frank Ward", Vol. IV, Dec. 1925, No. 2, p. 267.

cated in the social mind and produces socialization which is given as "the goal of social effort". It follows, therefore, that the social mind seeks this "goal" as an end to be achieved.[7]

> Socialization, when that word is used as a term of appreciation rather than of description, sets up as the goal of social effort a world in which conflict, competition, and the externality of individuals, if they do not disappear altogether, will be diminished that all men may live together as members of one family.

The "personal" dignity of society is thus fully assured, so that all intelligent activities that were formerly connected with man because of his dignity as a person, is promptly described as a characteristic of the social whole by sociology. The transfer does not however leave man utterly barren: he shines by borrowed splendor, so that whatever appears to be personal in him, is but a manifestation of social processes working in and through him.

Enhancing social man as demanded by the above at the expense of individual man; lauding collective social activities and belittling personal and independent initiative in man, denotes the effort of sociology to dispense with a spiritually conceived philosophy and to substitute a positivism of nature. By this means the notion of a God-controlled society is no longer necessary to explain society and man's social relations, but by a skillful adaptation of creative evolution, not only man, but even his mental powers, and even his very purpose of living, is explainable by natural values.[8]

A social personality is developed in sociology which the individual can, at best only reflect, and reflect to the degree that no anti-social forces interfere with his development. The social personality that society makes possible to man is continually evolving into newer and more social forms, so that man is constantly conscious of greater dependence upon so-

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[7] Park and Burgess, "Introduction to the Science of Sociology", p. 496.

[8] W. P. Montague, in Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations", p. 468; E. A. Ross, "The Principles of Sociology", p. viii; J. Ford, "Social Problems and Social Policy", p. 2; J. A. Leighton, "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 103; *J. of S. F.*, F. H. Giddings, "The Measurement of Social Forces", Vol. I, Nov. 1922, No. 1, p. 5.

ciety. Consequently society is acting consistently, which means, for a definite purpose, by presenting more and more perfect social patterns for imitation. A. W. Small states such a purpose explicitly as the "indicated task for social science" in the introduction of his book "Origins of Sociology" and especially refers to it as a purpose to be achieved, since "the indictated task for social science before it is entitled to the name science at all, is to interpret the meaning of human experience, and to find out how human experience may be directed in the future toward a larger output of life values." [9] Certainly such activity betokens intelligence, for it is a definite adaptation of means to the accomplishment of an end previously forseen. Similar declarations of purposive direction of social activity are of frequent occurrence. [10]

The attribution of intellectual activity to the social whole is certainly very flattering to society. Of course man shares in this tribute of rationality, but he owes it to the good graces of society, for he is in his mental life only a social product. However, the descriptions given for social control, said to be in society, are like the spiritual activities described by scholastic philosophy when a description of rationality is given, the account of intelligence and free will. At least the language used by sociologists has a familiar ring, and perhaps this is due to the fact that terminology with a spiritual meaning and tradition alone can describe the intellectual activities of a "supposedly" social personality. No doubt, this confusion is harmful to the best interests of sociology, so that effort is being made to develop its own terminology. [11] As conditions now exist the following statement might even be incorporated into a text-book of traditional philosophy were "individual progress" substituted for "social progress". However he is

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[9] p. 7.

[10] W. I. Thomas, "Source Book for Social Origins", pp. 3-26; W. G. Beach, "An Introduction to Sociology and Social Problems", p. 156; F. H. Giddings, "The Scientific Study of Human Society", pp. 140-71; F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", pp. 39-50; R. M. Maciver, "Community: A Sociological Study", pp. 214-241.

[11] *S. F.*, B. L. Melvin, "Sociology in Process", Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 1, pp. 52-56.

describing "The Nature of Social Progress" and not the individual's progress. [12]

> The Nature of Social Progress.
> The conception which we finally come to is this: social progress is increasing rational control over all of the conditions of social existence, whether these are internal or external, resulting in greater capacity for survival on the part of individuals and groups, in greater efficiency in performing the tasks of life, and in greater harmony among individuals and groups in their relations with one another.

Society has a mental life, therefore, that cannot be disregarded, if we would intelligently understand this first element of sociological "conduct", called Telesis. It is "a complex organic structure embodying a still more complex mental system" says E. J. Urwick in his "Philosophy of Social Progress",[13] and this constitutes a reason for explaining "the social process as a constant push and pull of diverse factors, all related to one another as factors in a single movement directed to some end." [14]

The "spiritual" intelligence thus virtually claimed by sociology is made to coincide with society itself, hence the frequent references to society as "living" found in sociological writings. F. H. Giddings is careful, however, to state his doctrine clearly, so his statement will serve as a definite explanation of an intelligence said to reside in society which intelligence is really "spiritual" in its operation. Although he identifies what is properly a spiritual activity with a mere material causality it serves to show the spiritual nature virtually made to exist in society. "The telic activity of socially organized man is an effect of the efficient causes at work in societal genesis, and the visualized ends, or final causes, of the telic process are identical with the inevitable or natural consequences of the genetic process." [15] The collective social mind using this "spiritual" reasoning power has not a real and distinct existence, though

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[12] C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", pp. 406-7.
[13] p. 213.
[14] ibid.
[15] *J. of S. F.*, "Social Work and Societal Engineering", Vol. III, Nov. 1924, No. 1, p. 15.

it appears to have one. However, the notion of a "social" personage is really called for by the writing in sociology.[16]

The Telic Process of Society.

As individuals become more unified in sentiment, thought and action there is developed what is known as social consciousness, whereby society recognizes its own collective power. In its endeavor to use this for the benefit of all members of the society or group it exercises its telic power. In other words the attempt to force society through certain channels, to cause it to perform certain acts for the general well-being of the social body is a recognition of the conscious effort of society to change or reform itself. To a large extent society has been created by the effort of each individual to follow his own personal desires as they relate to himself and his fellows, regardless of any attempt to build the structure of society. However, through the influence of social consciousness there is a realization of social ideals and social aims, as well as social defects and an attempt to remove the defects and attain social well-being.

[16] F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", pp. 23-4.

CHAPTER XIV

OUGHTNESS: SECOND ELEMENT OF CONDUCT

(Social Compulsion)

In the analysis of an act of conduct, special stress was laid upon the individual's recognition that the proposed course of conduct was actually obligatory upon him here and now. It is the realization that he "ought" to do, or that he "ought" to avoid doing some particular act that constitutes his moral obligation. This decision results from two general sources—reason and authority, although they may, and frequently do act as one.

In the case of reason pronouncing an act immoral the act appears as a deordination of nature in general, and a violation of personal nature in particular. This deordination exists because the Eternal Essence is analogically realized in the created realities and in consequence of this participated goodness the proposed conduct is seen to be inimical to their very being. What is thus contrary to the exigencies demanded by the very essence of things violates fundamental morality since it is a derogation of the Immutable Essence of God, the Divine Prototype, as represented virtually and analogously by created reality.

However there is another ought, the one deriving its efficacy from authority. The morality dependent upon authority does not contradict, nor even supercede the morality drawn from the intrinsic nature of reality, for God cannot will the impossible, nor can He arbitrarily or otherwise command what is derogatory to His Essence. However, He can and actually does, as known by revelation, reconfirm by positive ordination what is already moral in the sense defined above. This positive order of morality is theoretically co-extensive with that drawn from the essence of things, and even "ex parte materiae revelationis" there is absolutely no difference in the two mor-

alities, since God is the Author of both. It might even be insisted that there is only one morality, because God, as just explained is the Uncaused Cause, Who ordered all things well by the Might of His Hand. What exists, exists because God willed to draw it out of possible potentialities, freely selecting them from among innumerable free possibles.

"Moral obligation" in moral theology, corresponding to "oughtness" in natural ethics, has a higher kind of compulsion about it than could possibly be claimed for ethics. Moral Obligation as known from moral theology has all the binding force of "oughtness" of ethics, but has, in addition, the commanding force of a positive ordination of God Himself directly willed and revealed to us.

The introduction of metaphysics into a moral treatise is apparently "out of order". In most discussions of morals, doubtlessly, such a criticism would be apt, but not so for a study of sociology. This science of man's conduct, sociology, does not start out as does moral theology or even natural ethics with certain postulates and by means of these formulate a "science of conduct". Its only postulate strictly so called is that experimentation alone can discover truth. In addition, really in consequence, only a naturalistic interpretation of phenomena is scientific to sociology, so it behooves moral theology and natural ethics to turn metaphysician and justify their fundamental and basic assumptions.

An act of conduct involves by its analysis some authority or power, obligating the individual to obey the conclusion that reason has discovered or the mandate of a legitimate authority that reason has recognized as the right way, and furthermore perceives that conclusion or mandate as obligating him, or as we say, binding his will to obey.

In carrying out the analogy between conduct and behavior, between moral theology and sociology, it will be seen that a sociological equivalent for an act of conduct, called behavior, follows substantially all the steps gone through by the former. Of course, due allowance must be made for the sociological viewpoint due to a materialistic concept of things. However, a true act of behavior does conform to what sociology lays down as the social way present in the consciousness of

the individual for its performance. Secondly, socially correct behavior results from scientific investigation of past and present social relations of men viewed as regards social progress. And lastly, these social patterns present in the consciousness are regarded as the scientific pronouncement for socially correct behavior.

Ideals for socially correct behavior are held to rise spontaneously from the investigation and study of society. Much of the later literature in sociology contains many references to a truly scientific concept of behavior. But a clear, concise, and exact definition is not found therein. This is somewhat disappointing, though its absence is due rather to a lack of agreement as to what constitutes a real scientific notion than belief that such a concept is not obtainable.

It is a noteworthy fact for the very seeking of an ideal of this sort betrays the conviction that a standard for socially correct behavior can be elaborated. Moreover, the efforts of sociologists declare their faith in the efficacy of scientific analysis of past and present social relations to produce a talisman for social peace and progress. So both the standard or ideal is acknowledged as well as its nature defined. The social sense present in varying degrees in socialized man will be judged precisely by its conformity to an ideal socialization that society strives to realize. An individual's behavior therefore that has been fashioned by the social pattern vitalized in his consciousness is considered more or less socially perfect according as it reflects a healthy social sense.

It is needless to point out that "oughtness" as it is used in ethics, or "moral obligation" as correspondingly used in moral theology will not appear in sociological treatises. But there is a strong analogy between the obligation perceived and accepted by an individual conscience, influenced by revealed religion, and the compulsion, emotionally if you will, experienced by socialized man.

Even though rationalized accounts of the operation of a social sense are discredited by sociologists, they do nevertheless speak of establishing a "proper liason between . . . mental hygiene and sociology". H. E. Barnes in an article bearing explicitly on the "genetic view of the theory of con-

duct", roundly condemns sociologists in general for their timidity in seeking "valid foundations for individual and social conduct" and taking refuge in semi-metaphysical theories by way of substitutes. His testimony is especially valuable for the reason that he endeavors to formulate a scientific concept for conduct and advocates greater co-operative study as a means to achieve that end.

Surely the attaining of such a goal, the ideal social standard for behavior, must be conceivably possible, otherwise exhortation would be meaningless. Evidently, too, social ideals, when once elaborated, are to serve as a scientifically "authoritative" pronouncement from whence socially correct behavior will draw its social patterns.[1]

This writer strongly condemns "semi-metaphysical systems of sociology", and infers that his advocated ideal avoids even the shadow of such medieval speculation. However, this writer falsely assumes that metaphysical speculations are necessarily faulty and incapable of "scientific" demonstration. The contrary in reality is true for science must use metaphysics. By his own testimony he stands convicted, for metaphysics has a basis in reality, a fact which this writer does not seem to realize. In this quotation he is seeking to discover "valid foundations for individual and social conduct", now such realities, if they are realities at all, are not physical but exist beyond the physical, hence metaphysical.[2]

> They have preferred [i. e., sociologists in general] to build up semi-metaphysical systems of sociology or to construct elaborate rationalized defences of their own orthodox ethical complexes and beliefs. It thus devolved upon socially minded psychiatrists and educators to step into the breach, and mental hygiene has constituted to date almost the only concerted and well organized effort to get at the facts essential to the discovery of any valid foundations for individual and social conduct. Slowly and very recently some of the more progressive sociologists have taken cognizance of these developments, as has been demonstrated by the recent works of Ogburn, Groves, Bernard and Thomas. When and

[1] I have consistently employed the word "behavior" when referring to "conduct" as used by Barnes, because as stated above, sociological conduct is better expressed by the word behavior.

[2] *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 229.

only when, the proper liason has been established between the mental hygiene and sociology will there at last be provided after several generations of cooperative study a real science of conduct.

A similar note is struck by J. Q. Dealey with the difference that this writer views the question under the aspect of "Government in Relation to Sociology and Social Progress". I consider this quotation important also, for it brings out very forcibly the notion of scientifically "authoritative" standards for appraising the social urge, compelling conformity in behavior. It speaks specifically of "general welfare" as stimulating "moral and spiritual values."[3]

There is urgent need for a socialized law with a simplified procedure, not too closely bound to the precedents of an individualistic age; there is need to infuse into the dry bones of political teachings the breath of life that comes from a knowledge of the larger movements in science and society; there is need to stress the applications of sociological teaching to national policies, both domestic and foreign, and there is surely need that "general welfare" should not be interpreted in a materialistic sense only, but be made so broadly inclusive as to include the encouragement and stimulation of those moral and spiritual values that in the long run will humanize man and socialize his activities. Under the influence of such teachings government would promote the general welfare and this would become synonymous with social progress.

Sociology may be said, therefore, to be founded upon a central fact that gives coherence to it. This ideal or central fact grows out of a scientific study of society and is not received "ab-extra" as is charged in the case for moral theology through revelation, or even in ethics (scholastic) by accepting the existence of a spiritualized reality capable of influencing human conduct. This protest is voiced by P. A. Sorokin, who in his comparison of sociology and ethics severely restricts sociology to the actually existing order. "So far as sociology professes that its scientific task consists in the study of social phenomena as they have existed, do exist, and will exist, there is no direct connection between the two disciplines."[4] Conse-

[3] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. I, Mar. 1923, No. 3, p. 213.
[4] In Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "Social Sciences and their Interrelations", p. 311.

quently, it is under the tutelage of sociology that the renovation of society is to take place, for "sociology is in large measure a response to this demand for effective and functional unity in the world under the guidance of science." [5] When once this "scientific" concept for socially correct behavior has been elaborated, sociology will have fulfilled the very function demanded of it according to R. L. Finney. This correct ideal, it is claimed, will give "compulsion" to and will serve as a pattern upon which to model individual behavior. The dedication of his "General Social Science" is addressed "to the thousands of Social Science teachers who are charged with the special responsibility of training young people in their social relationships, and to the great army of boys and girls whose faces are turned eagerly toward the hidden hazards of the future." [6]

Conformity to the ideal thus held forth is not, it must be remembered, accomplished by a free act of the will. It is to be effected by attaining "to a higher degree of world-group-consciousness and purposive control" and, continues this author, unless the group's action is successful, "there will not be any civilization to study, if indeed, there remains any human race." [7] The social pattern that is to regenerate society, and incidentally man operates ruthlessly, as this writer has just explained. Moreover society realizes through social consciousness that the forces operating in behavior derive their "social morality" therefrom. Consequently there is an "oughtness" for social activities that makes a special type of behavior correct, as correspondingly there is in traditional morality a power that makes conduct obligatory. [8]

Sociology has thus set up an authoritative guide for socially correct behavior. It is authoritative not in the sense that an external and independent authority imposes a sociological norm for correct behavior, but in the meaning that

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[5] *A. J. of S.*, L. L. Bernard, "Scientific Method and Social Progress", Vol. XXXI, July, 1925, No. 1, p. 17.

[6] p. x.

[7] *J. of S. F.*, A. W. Calhoun, "The Moral Challenge of Sociology", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 680.

[8] C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", p 276; F. H. Hankins, in H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 258.

socially perfect patterns are scientifically drawn out of the very bosom of society itself and presented to man for imitation. Consequently the latest discovery for scientific morals is always the more correct pattern. A thorough grasp of this latest "finding" will make behavior intelligent, because social consciousness is thus made aware of thoroughly "socially perfect" patterns.[9]

Sociology and education have the tools for measuring unselfish service both quantitatively and qualitatively, a procedure which will lead to the establishment of standards of service on a scientifically graduated basis. By securing trained persons to analyse all the main evidence of behavior which they judge to be unselfish and by securing a much larger number of competent representative persons to grade these evidences and arrange in types these evidences of service it will be possible to grade human conduct everywhere and to think and act more accurately in terms of unselfish or socialized behavior.

S. N. Patten refers to the socially perfect order as "The New Civilization", but disappoints us by saying "An ideal Civilization is not a twentieth century possibility."[10] Possibly our individuality through social consciousness might be made to "scientifically" persist and then the "millenium" could be experienced even by us the "latest seeds of time."

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[9] *J. of S. F.*, E. S. Bogardus, "The Concept of Unselfish Service", Vol. I, Jan. 1923, No. 1, p. 102.

[10] In Ross and McCaull, "Readings in Civic Sociology", p. 232.

CHAPTER XV

FREEDOM: THIRD ELEMENT OF CONDUCT

(Creative Growth)

In the proceding chapter it was seen that social activities are intensely "intellectual", that is, true socialization reflects reason as investigating and as studying social processes. One result aimed at, and perhaps the chief goal for sociological study, is to obtain intelligent control of social processes. When that is accomplished, society is assured of its future destiny, because it has attained mastery over itself, and due to this achievement, furnishes social patterns for imitation by its members. In the degree in which the individual faithfully reproduces these social ideals, to that degree may society feel safe and that particular individual experience the fullest benefits of freedom.

Conscious human activities are erroneously, it is maintained by sociologists, said to be "free" by the advocates of spiritual philosophy or the disciples of revealed religion. A true analysis shows, the sociologist claims, that when all conditions for action are present, the effect results necessarily from the causes operating so that the agent could not have acted otherwise. In those cases where "freedom" seems to be in evidence, it is only apparently so, because the sub-conscious mind stores many ideals that influence our behavior. "Human society is only gradually becoming intelligence and rational processes are only gradually freeing themselves sufficiently to control efficiently group behavior and social life." [1]

A gradual initiative process into the "mysteries" of nature, makes control of society possible. The degree of control exercised by socialized man is an index therefore of his conscious incorporation into the socialization process which has benignly

[1] C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 317.

"freed" him from man's primitive fears of nature's forces. In the childhood of the human race, says sociology, unscientific animism gave rise to a superstitious notion about spirituality, and misunderstood anthropomorphism created a Deity with all its progeny of dualistic concepts of reality and superstitious beliefs for theology. To mollify this "Capricious Being", wholly a mental figment, and because of man's ignorance of the scientific laws of social continuities, it was fondly imagined that peace-offerings, embodying a show of voluntary worship would render this "God" propitious because man had apparently "preferred" to serve "Him".

However the "truth made man free", so that he now understands the true social realities and daily increasing knowledge enables him better to control nature's forces. Man is indeed freeing himself gradually, not indeed arbitrarily by a "supreme" effort of a blind faculty but by understanding that, "free will, if you call it that, is then simply a power of creative growth, which we all have in some degree, and starts from our actual situation. No one is free to do anything he has not worked up to." [2] Previously, Cooley had described the human will as being precluded from every vestige of freedom in its true meaning. In the following quotation, he explains very well why "free choice" cannot enter into the scheme of things for sociology, because such actions are necessitated. [3]

> The human will is no separate faculty, but the whole mind functioning as a guide to action, its power being shown in grasping the material which life offers and moulding it to rational ends. A person with a vigorous will shows an onward growth which is in great measure foreseen and intentional; he forms ideals and strives to realize them.

Spontaneous choice is excluded by this notion of freedom. In fact, choice does not reside in the will, because "it is opportunity for right development, for development in accordance with the progressive ideal of life that we have in conscience." [4]

Essentially the same notion is obtained from E. R. Groves, who has treated this question from a biological point of view.

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[2] C. H. Cooley, "Social Process", p. 171.
[3] ibid. p. 169.
[4] C. H. Cooley, "Human Nature and the Social Order", p. 393.

This quotation is lengthy, somewhat involved, rather indefinite in phraseology, but still worth while to give the sociological notion of "freedom". Behavior and conduct are explicitly mentioned so there can be no doubt as to the writer's views on freedom. Incidentally I might remark that one should not become discouraged over a certain vagueness in these quotations, because this defect is inherent in sociology, owing to its lack of sound criteriological ideas.[5]

> A person's behavior therefore is his effort to accomplish purposes. Good activity is tested by its efficiency. The social test of conduct is the same as that which zoological science has formulated and insisted upon. Are the acts of the person such as to produce favorable adjustment to the present, actual circumstances? If so, the activities are socially efficient. If not, they are socially faulty and unsuccessful. Zoology has taught us to regard the entire personality, or organism, in scientific terminology, including both mind and body, as an adjusting mechanism. It is more complicated than the most remarkable machine. It has also what a machine cannot have—a flexibility that comes from consciousness. Its primary purpose, nevertheless, is the making of favorable adjustments by acting upon the environment. This is as true of the mind as of the body. That the body acts as an adjusting mechanism is generally recognized. Biological science has forced us to see that mind also is an adjusting mechanism. Indeed the body adjustments themselves are essentially nervous in origin and are closely related to the mental life. From biology therefore we get the meaning and the test of conduct. Its meaning is adjustment. Its test is the efficiency of the adjustments made.

Conduct or behavior thus explained does not exemplify theological "free choice", but resolves it into processes of social continuities. All actions of man could be previously forecast, were one able to see at a glance all the influences brought to bear upon such a person. "Every human thought or act is strictly determined by a long process of antecedents",[6] so that to insist upon free will betrays an "unredeemed" mind.

"Transformation of society" L. L. Bernard tells us is not initiated by "uncaused freedom", the choosing to set one causality in operation rather than some other, for "we can understand neither the transformation of society nor the

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[5] "Personality and Social Adjustment", pp. 8-9.
[6] H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", Introd. p. xv.

springs of behavior in the individual until we study also the stimuli which produce individual behavior immediately and social change and adjustment ultimately."[7] Consequently human conscious action is governed by "social patterns of behavior",[8] since the individual simply reflects the social forces present in his consciousness.[9] An intelligent view of conduct dispenses with the traditional notions of motives in the sense that the individual could have chosen to act otherwise than he did act. The practical help to give, counsels B. W. Bacon, is to make it possible for the individual's knowledge to become deeper, so that the control of social forces operating through him may become more intelligent.[10]

The theory of intelligent educators in the field of morals and religion holds that the realm of personal being is as much subject to law as that of chemistry or biology, and that we do not create moral principles by our successive embodiments of experience in the enactments of codes and ethical systems, but progressively discover it. The moral order is not made, but "revealed". The principle is absolute, the successive formulations relative. This consciousness is dimly apparent even in the baffled childhood of the world, whose prehistoric codes are one and all described the finger (or the voice) of God.

"Discovery" as used here, does not mean that moral law objectively exists, and that we come to a knowledge of it by means of "things seen", but it means that moral law results from successive experiences of man. "What we mean by the 'freedom of the will' is not ability to do anything without thinking, but ability to think all the alternatives together and to act on this larger thought. Free action is the fullest expression of thought and of the self which thinks it."[11] There is a sense in which the largest thought results in the greatest

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[7] *J. of S. F.*, "Recent Trends in Social Psychology", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 742.

[8] *A. J. of S.*, P. E. Martin, Review of "The Concept 'Social': A Critical Note", by L. A. White, Vol. XXXI, Mar. 1926, No. 5, p. 712.

[9] *A. J. of S.*, E. B. Reuter, "The Relation of Biology and Sociology", Vol. XXXI, Mar. 1927, No. 5, p. 709; *S. F.*, F. N. House, "Development in the Theory of the Social Personality", Vol. VI, Mar. 1928, No. 3, pp. 356-67; F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 181.

[10] *Yale Review*, "Decline of Moral Authority", Jan. 1928, pp. 313-18.

[11] J. M. Baldwin, "The Story of the Mind", p. 20.

freedom, but this in scholasticism presupposes that the intellect visualizes the many possibilities and presents the one most thought about to the will, but it also presupposes an existing will which controls that intellect. This control over the intellect may keep it thinking on one particular line of activity, even though the intellect realizes there are others and even more efficacious means at hand. In short thinking good is not willing good.

The notion of freedom that obtains in sociology is in reality a confusion of the two faculties of intellect and will into a single activity. Sociologists seem to be prepossessed by the fear that somehow or other "uncaused" freedom, as they contemptuously term the arbitrary choice of the will, would interrupt social continuity.

Of course, it is not difficult to understand their prejudices when it is remembered that no causality is acknowledged by them save that which can be experimentally tested; consequently all activity, even human activity, must have a naturalistic explanation. Were the doctrine of the "Freedom of the Will" as taught in moral theology to be admitted in sociology, modification would have to be made in their philosophy. Hence the alternative is to fit the explanation for all phenomena into a system that does not impinge upon man's autonomy. God, therefore is no longer regarded to be a Reality, for His manifestations and revelations are but evidences of mistaken anthropomorphic tendencies: moral law and theology but the fantastic imagery of an over-wrought imagination and superstiously fed intellect.

There is no such phenomenon in nature as a genuine case of arbitrary choice, because were such to really happen, the whole sociological philosophy would be discredited; whereas, a "proper" notion of freedom only brings out man's true nature and reveals a keen sociological analysis of social life with its processes. The sociological notion of freedom is an intelligent one, because it also reveals a unity of nature that is as beautiful in its simplicity as it is effective in operation.[12]

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[12] C. H. Cooley, "Social Process", p. 170.

Our freedom is not a power to escape from our history and environment, but something that works along with these, enabling us to do things *original* but not discontinuous. While I believe that the human spirit is part of a creative onward whole, building up life to unknown issues, I believe also that the growth of this whole is gradual and connected.

The unity of nature thus predicated, is brought out in greater detail, as the "freedom" becomes stronger, for "ability" to respond adaptively to more elements in the environments gives a larger dominion, that is all.[13]

A wonderful transformation would be effected in society, were man to become intelligently social. Ignorance, on the other hand is the greatest anti-social force that can impede social progress. A civilization, therefore, that is founded upon the antiquated idea of moral excellence residing in the will is doomed to inanition. Social relations and man's reactions to them cannot be controlled by the "false hypothesis" of personal choice and consequent responsibility, much less by a "coercive" sanction and surely not by thundering anathemas of an outworn and all but discarded theological system. F. H. Hankins voices these opinions in his criticism of J. M. Cooper's "Birth Control", a thoughtful and strong exposition of this social evil, that challenges the modern social endorsement of contraceptives so prevalent today.

The quotation bears strongly upon "freedom" because by implication, F. H. Hankins states, that the more an intelligent and less dogmatic view is held in regard to the use of contraceptives, the more will society profit. The social benefits accruing from a thorough understanding of contraceptives and their uses, would do much to eliminate the harmful "God-forbidden" and "intrinsically-evil" ideas that are intended to cow the social consciousness into submission and fancied security. These anti-social patterns thus enforced are harmful to true freedom, individual comfort, and social progress; hence society is under a compulsion to protect itself from their pernicious influence.[14]

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[13] Park and Burgess, "Introduction to the Science of Sociology", p. 509.
[14] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. II, May 1924, No. 4, p. 594.

It is a strange ethic that views as unselfish the father who in the exercise of his sex functions brings into the world more children than he can raise to a modest standard of self-realization. The holy prophets of the ancient virtues and the immutable verities have usually foretold that inevitably disaster would follow every effort of man to follow the light of knowledge, but man heroically and bravely struggles up toward the light. It is the truth only, the truth of scientific knowledge only, that shall make him free. He may not as yet, doubtless does not as yet, perceive the whole truth as regards contraceptives, but he is certain to use what he has and to strive for more. And it is through the acquisition and spreading of still more knowledge of the biological psychological and social aspects of the matter that he will at last learn how to save himself, his womenfolk, his children, and civilization as well.

The particular vice of the traditional notion of freedom, the power to exercise arbitrary choice, is its anti-social influence. The following denunciation of freedom occurs under the heading, "Degeneration and Will".[15]

I hold, for many reasons, that it is a bad thing to teach absolute freedom of the will, as bad as to teach fatalism. It leads to discouraging of judgments on conduct, both our own and that of others and to a neglect of the training process by which everything good must be prepared. The logical outcome of the doctrine of unlimited freedom would seem to be that one should make a great effort to achieve at once what he wants, without regard to his preparation.

Whereas the correct sociological view "is that one sets about moulding his whole life into a process from which success will naturally flow. No thoughtful observer will doubt which is the better method."[16] Neither scholastic philosophy nor revealed religion sponsors the grotesque presentation here attributed to them, yet such misrepresentations are of common occurrence in sociology.[17]

A striking feature of the sociological explanation of "freedom", as just outlined, is the concern of sociologists to preserve social continuities unbroken. All nature is continuous,

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[15] C. H. Cooley, "Social Progress", p. 171.
[16] ibid.
[17] *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 222; G. D. H. Cole, "Social Theory", p. 184; V. D. Scudder, in Ross and McCaull, "Readings in Civic Sociology", p. 228.

and the supposedly "uncaused" act of the will violates this principle. "Everything is limited by every other thing . . . to understand the human will it must be considered as it is, a natural energy." [18] In one sense the contention is perfectly true, for "nature abhors a vacuum". This is an accepted principle in physics and its corresponding axiom is a principle in metaphysics, "everything finite requires a cause". What then is lacking in the sociological position? Only this, that they fail to distinguish between the human will, as acting in some definite manner, as capable of setting even a contrary chain of secondary causalities into operation, and as abstaining from acting altogether.

For the first two divisions, undoubtedly, the energy of natural forces, social or non-social, are certainly utilized; for the third possibility, namely, not to will, no energy is started in action at all, so even the sociologists would be forced to admit that nothing "eventuated". We may therefore confine our considerations to the first two possibilities, namely, to will or to will not.

The exercise of the free will in man involves the use of energy. In fact, a positive act of the will involves two distinct sources of energy; namely, one in the will itself, and one in the secondary causality started into action.

We dispose of the second one first, because it is evident that in an act of incendiarism, the fire resulted from causes calculated to start it and certainly continues to burn by causes natural to that phenomenon, irrespective of the will of the agent. However, the initiation of the chain of causality that made possible the first flame was due to the decision of some freewill that those necessary conditions be placed.

Now to return to the first source of energy referred to above, namely "decision" itself as an act of the will. Certainly to exercise freedom is to use the energy of the will, and this energy, although set in motion by a spiritual faculty, nevertheless has a counterpart that is truly material and can be subjected to all the tests that modern psychology can devise.

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[18] C. K. Franklin, "The Socialization of Humanity", p. 349.

However, the sociological view of "freedom" is precisely bound up with this notion of energy as just mentioned. Furthermore, we, as well as they, insist that exercise is natural to the will but we explain it differently. To the notion of free, volitional activity, sociologists oppose an emotional urge; for a spontaneous act of the will, they substitute the theory of creative growth. However, the same activities are reported on by both sociology and moral theology; so it is not surprising that the resulting explanation shows some parallelism. Elsewhere I have said: [19]

> Of course, whatever energy required for the will to function is a material agency to that will or any will, but this natural energy does not predetermine how the will is to function, i. e., how it is going to decide. The existence of such agency for action of the will is a primary postulate of the doctrine of the freedom of the will. This will is a spiritual faculty using a material organism for its operations. Now all the operations of this natural organism are natural energies, and, as such are necessitated and must follow the laws of their nature. But from this statement, it does not follow that the mechanism of an act of the will, that is, a description of the manner in which the will uses its material apparatus, therefore controls the decisions and predetermines the decisions of the will. The case is quite the reverse; the will must use this apparatus for its decisions when it acts, but it is free to render any kind of decision it chooses.

The implication is that sociology returns an incorrect analysis though showing some similarity to the correct explanation. The difference, however, is more manifest, and necessarily so, because, spiritual realities and consequently spiritual principles do not enter into a sociological scheme of things.

Another interesting sidelight on sociological "freedom" is the accompanying coercion for "wrong" conduct, i. e., for antisocial activity. An explanation of the existence of such "perversity" already has been given, namely, "a less socialized consciousness". But society must protect itself even against itself "and must always have a club ready to use on the small percentage who refuse to play the game according to the rule." [20]

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[19] T. M. Hemelt, "Ethical Teachings, Principles and Influences of Sociological Text-books as Used in non-Catholic Universities", p. 62.
[20] R. L. Finney, "General Social Science", p. 204.

The real cause of anti-social action on the part of the individual is not in the will, but in the intellect. Consequently while no "fault" attaches to delinquencies, be what they may even to the extent of "feeling a compulsion to strangle a child", yet such unsocialized individuals must be "socialized" or be removed from active participation in social activites. R. L. Finney who advocates the use of a "club" now explains his meaning more fully. His present study is into the nature of morality; so the question of freedom is intimately involved.[21]

But even after it is clear that health, safety, happiness, and prosperity are co-operative enterprises, there always remain a few who will not obey the rules. Either they lack intelligence to understand the use of the rules, or they are tempted to get something for nothing. At any rate they must be compelled to obey. Obedience through fear is the only goodness such people have. It is better than none, to be sure; but there is little joy in it.

Of course even unsocialized man responds to "animal training", hence society is never at a loss for a method to compel social co-operation. However, such a method of socialization is really foreign to true sociology, and is resorted to only as a final measure. "Our moral consciousness belongs to our mental constitution [says E. Westermarck] which we cannot change as we please".[22] But given sufficiently sympathetic surroundings our aptitudes will change, and so too will our conduct.[23] Hence the need for proper social environments.

Freedom, or rather the sociological substitute for it, plays a big role in accounting for behavior. While its character is radically different from the freewill demanded by moral theology, it has much in common with it by its explanation of the creative growth theory. Creative growth, therefore, is to sociology, what free will is to ethics and moral theology.

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[21] "General Social Science", p. 209.

[22] "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas", p. 19.

[23] *J. of S. F.*, F. H. Giddings, "The Measurement of Social Forces", Vol. I, Nov. 1922, No. 1, p. 3; H. Carter, "The Social Theories of L. T. Hobhouse," pp. 131; 132; pp.92-3; C. C. A. Bouglé, "The Evolution of Values", English Translation by H. S. Sellars.

CHAPTER XVI

RESPONSIBILITY: THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF CONDUCT

(Consciousness of Social Integrity)

The effects following from conscious and freely willed acts of man are not a matter of indifference to him. At the first intellectual perception of a proposed act, whether of commission or omission, certain definite results are visualized. These eventualities are recognized as belonging to the act, not by intrinsic nature of the act itself, but as consequences from it, and are regarded as belonging properly to the contemplated act, forming with it one complete entity.

The act thus considered does not stand in isolation but is seen in its relationship by its conformity or difformity to an objective norm of morality, known either through reason alone as in ethics, or through revelation and reason as in moral theology. This norm, indeed, is not endowed with a finality from itself, but is further recognized as the express command of a Legitimate Authority. The relationship between the act as contemplated and the objective norm as conceived and present in the conscience of the individual, is not a mere comparison of the act with the norm, but establishes, moreover, an obligation that binds upon his will and is recognized as such. This recognition by the intellect of the bond on the will is called "oughtness", and constitutes the morality that is intrinsic to the specific act under consideration.

The will may decide to accept or to reject an act at any stage of the rationalizing process. Of course, a minimum of intellectual perception is required to fulfill the essential conditions required for a human act. However, it should not be concluded that a complete and exhaustive analysis has to precede every decision of the will in order to have a bona-fide act of morality. It is conceivable, indeed, that the intellect may

not examine the act in its entirety though sufficiently well to make that act truly human. But owing to lack of attention, prejudice, impatience, or simply because the will withholds the intellect from giving further consideration, the will may exercise its prerogative and make immediate selection. But what is more probable is that the will chooses some definite good because it wants it, although sufficient reasons are presented by the intellect to justify the choice of a higher good. Consequently among finite objects, the will is free, since its whole aptitude for good is not completely energized by any one of the objects presented to it. Were the INFINITE GOOD presented to it for acceptance the will would be compelled freely to accept it.

According to the morality perceived in the act by the intellect, before that act is presented to and accepted by the will, does the act itself show forth a moral character. The goodness or badness thus predicated of the act performed, goes even beyond this limit and affects the agent himself, who has taken the quality of the act performed into his personality; or avoided contamination by rejecting it. Hence it is by the decision of the will that morality affects man, because the will, by accepting or rejecting the proposed act, complies with or disregards the obligation known and admitted to be binding. The morality of the act becomes personal, therefore, because the intellect perceived that it would become so, and the will accepted or rejected it with all its accompanying features of morality, because of its appeal as a good. This choice of accepting or rejecting, as well as the power to choose some good differing even radically from a present one, is called arbitrary freedom. Sociology also speaks of a freedom but means by it something else, as was seen above.

In either case, whether in that of conformity to or difformity from the known norm of morality, there arises a new relation between the individual agent performing that act and the Legitimate Authority obliging that agent to the performance or avoidance of it, and this relation is called responsibility. This element belongs in the analysis of an act of conduct, for whether the act be a good one or a bad one, it neces-

sarily affects the relationship that must also exist, because of the dependence between the two persons involved; between the one imposing the obligation and the one obligated; between the Independent Infinite One and the dependent finite one; between The Creator and the creature; between God and man.

Were this element of responsibility to be dropped out of a moral act; were it possible to disestablish the relationship that exists between the subject obligated and the superior obligating, morality itself would be something else than the science of responsibility, because obligation could no longer exist. The element of responsibility is demanded by intrinsic necessity or because of the necessary relations resulting from Divine delegation of authority to legitimated representatives, for to admit that obligation is a relative thing and still speak of conduct would be a contradiction. Since man's nature is what it is, since that nature contains a spiritual principle as well as a material principle, since it possesses the greatest of natural prerogatives, rationality consisting of intellect and will, we do not argue responsibility because man is conscious of his obligation to God, but we insist that responsibility is demanded by the very nature of man as he is and as he is known from a "true" scientific study, as he is studied and "experienced" in his every day life. Furthermore, God cannot relieve man of his responsibility as long as man remains what he is, namely, an intelligent creature possessed of a free will; man cannot repudiate his responsibility to God, after he has attained to the use of rationality. However, should an individual man be hindered from his birth, from the use of reason; or, should a man be incapacitated in the exercise of his rational powers in subsequent life, such a person is automatically removed from the sphere of moral action altogether. Morality has no meaning to such an unfortunate person, because he has not the use of his faculties and does not have the necessary requisites to place a moral act. Furthermore, not only are these statements true for "natural" morality, but equally valid for supernatural morality, because an act of supernatural morality presupposes and requires as a foundation an act of natural morality.

Sociology in its treatment of behavior cannot dispense

with the idea of responsibility altogether. Moreover, sociology has to account for the phenomena of self-vindication, which demands the notion of responsibility. While the term "responsibility" is not often met with in sociological writings, absence by name does not warrant the conclusion that the thing itself is not there. This is especially true because the individual is regarded as participating in the social whole. Moreover his very actions are the resultant of social or anti-social forces rather than due to his own personal and spontaneous desire and consequential activities; so whatever happens through man's immediate agency, is, in final analysis, imputable to social energies. Responsibility rests rather upon society as a whole to raise the level of socialization so that no untoward or anti-social activities remain as possibilities.

There is nevertheless some slender thread of responsibility left to the individual, but it does not arise from voluntary actions in a theological use of the term voluntary, because such a contingency is not contemplated by the philosophy of sociology. The responsibility, if one may call it that, is rather the inability to acquire "saving" social knowledge, either because of unpropitious environments or due to undeveloped mental powers by reason of imperfectly evolved social patterns. In the last analysis, therefore, no real culpability can be laid upon the individual person, who is rather an object for pity than deserving of censure. Such examples of poor socializations are blights upon the social escutcheon of any group because they show rather a lack of community co-operation.[1]

> In a truly organic society the struggles and suffering of a poor class would arouse the same affectionate and helping solicitude as is felt when one member of a family falls ill. In contrast to this, the indifference or somewhat contemptuous pity usually felt toward poverty indicates a low state of community sentiment, a deficient we-feeling.

The sociological view of responsibility is unique, but upon inspection is found to be consistent with that science's interpretation of behavior. Man's status in society is determined by the level of socialization found in him; consequently when

[1] C. H. Cooley, "Social Organization", p. 298.

the term "responsibility" is used, the highest authority capable of binding him can only be society itself. "It [responsibility] implies, in the first place, answerability to society for the performance of certain duties which are demanded or expected of us as social members." [2] But this writer is fully consistent with sociological principles, for he also makes man responsible to himself because of his incorporation in the social whole, so that man becomes morally autonomous. Surely never did metaphysics fall into such blunders even in its wildest speculations. "It [responsibility] implies also answerability of the self to its true owner—which is not society; we may call it answerability to the Good, if we wish, or answerability to the true individual whose instrument the self is." [3] It is not surprising that the "individual" should receive attention, since his very individuality is a social phenomenon as is also his associations. However a just predominance is given to the social group, particularly since the individual realizes his full stature in that social whole and not independently of it.

The following quotation of F. W. Blackmar, although somewhat extensive covers many notions connected with responsibility. First, he accepts social consciousness as a fact and ascribes superiority to it over the individual mind that "frequently coerces it into a certain line of action". In this manner the individual is made, as described by Blackmar, to be conscious of "social" not "moral" obligation, for he is made to "feel" that obligation by coercion. The individual's action then shows social morality because his actions reproduce social patterns. Finally, the writer's insistance that "there is no transcendental ego over and above the action of individual minds" makes social morality in his mind autonomous. [4]

> Society has grown out of the fact of association, as it was the coming together of the people that made it possible for the institution called society to exist. One of the primary results of this association was the thinking, feeling, and willing together of the entire group of individuals thus associated. This has been called the social mind. There is no tran-

[2] E. J. Urwick, "A Philosophy of Social Progress", p. 256.
[3] ibid. p. 258.
[4] "The Elements of Sociology", p. 245.

scendental ego over and above the action of individual minds. Nevertheless, there is a mental force obtained by the unity of thought, sentiment, or feeling of the individual minds which come in contact in a community. The popular expression for this social mind is moral sense of the community, public will, or public opinion. While there is no independent entity in the social mind there is a power over and above each separate individual which moves it and frequently coerces it into a certain line of action. The mind arises because of concerted action and once having developed, it adds to its present volitions the fund of experimental knowledge. This fund of "capitalized experience" makes steadiness and constancy of the mind, which gives it a resemblance to the individual mind.

The consciousness of incorporation into the social whole seems to give the idea of responsibility that obtains in sociology. When full realization is attained the individual enjoys a complete social sense of what society is achieving, is conscious of his participation in the movement and feels the urge to further the socialization process. He may then be said to be acting to the full limit of his responsibility to society, because he is well aware of his co-operation and furthermore completely enjoys his social personality thus expressing itself to its full ability. Thus our civilization has developed, for[5]

all our science, our fine arts, our industries, our governments, our morality, our religion—everything—are accumulated inventions, which have been slowly built up like the coral as the long centuries have passed. And we shall go right on improving our civilization for thousands of years to come, each generation helps a little. What sublime teamwork is human life upon this planet!

The "teamwork" metaphor is not to imply spontaneous personal activities on the part of the individuals, but means that the progress of human life demonstrates the responsibility felt by an integrated social consciousness. Social consciousness therefore expressing itself through the individual's actions gives rise to a sense of social responsibility.[6]

The social urge for improvement seen in society arises from its own internal striving. This is variously accounted for, and may perhaps be represented as the urge on the part

[5] R. L. Finney, "General Social Science", p. 83.
[6] E. A. Ross, "The Principles of Sociology", p. 631; "Roads to Social Peace", p. 4.

of society for continuance in existence. This force or power working for improvement, has conferred many benefits upon society, although a contrary course might have predominated in societal evolution had the social mind ceased functioning. Thus F. A. Bushee attributes the "fortunate" turn in the evolutionary process taken by the social movement to an idealism present to men's minds. This statement, indeed, detracts in no way from social responsibility as just set forth, but is rather a confirmation of it, because as the author himself admits "satisfaction or happiness" experienced by the individual consequent upon "the adjustment of inner to outer forces", is the urge that compels a progressive evolution.[7]

> The lower or physical side of man's development is brought about through material or blind forces of evolution, without any consciousness of the process on the part of the individual; but the higher or mental side, is accomplished through the initiative of individuals who realize that certain courses of action will lead to a higher plane of life. Therefore they consciously adapt themselves to those forces which are working towards higher levels; and they receive that satisfaction or happiness which comes from the adjustment of inner to outer forces.

Conscious adaptation does not imply "voluntary" action on the part of the individual; it is but the employment of the social sense, evolved in man through participation by him in the social whole. Consequently, its manifestation is an expression of "answerability" of social forces working in and through the individual, by conformity to "certain courses of action" that "will lead to a higher plane of life."

The stimulus that provokes social forces to function in man receives attention from L. L. Bernard, who reports that "authorities themselves are undecided where to locate it: whether to attribute it to the individual, or to make it a group action." However, the existence of the urge itself is affirmed. A point of immediate interest in, "Recent Trends in Social Psychology" is his statement regarding the "two outstanding fields of interest in . . . essays," wherein the two viewpoints are discussed.[8]

> One is the problem of the place of instinct in individual character

[7] "Principles of Sociology", p. 61.
[8] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 738.

development and social control, and the other refers to the basic character of social psychology itself. Is its proper field that of the behavior of individuals reacting to social stimuli, as Allport contends, or should we extend it to include a sort of collective psychology of the group?

The difference of opinion as to the prime mover of social energy finds expression among many writers.[9] Perhaps the subject receives fullest attention from E. C. Hayes in his article: "Some Social Relations Restated" where he lists six writers besides himself, and reports each writer as assigning several probable causes for the "urge" present in and responsible for the activities of social forces.[10]

The place of "urges" is most important in sociology because it completes the notion of causality for social development. That some sort of explanation must be forthcoming is demanded by the logic of the social analysis, and substantiated by many references found in sociological writers.

The account as found in sociological treatises is of particular interest in relation to the substitute offered for responsibility because consciousness of this responsibility is a "social" phenomenon and cannot be disregarded. Owing to the naturalistic postulates of sociological philosophy, some explanation has to be found that will dispense with the recognition by man of a moral obligation imposed upon him by God. Man's nature has been subjected to the closest scrutiny, in fact "scientifically" investigated and certain tendencies have been seized upon and made to serve as a basis for a philosophy of life. Conduct can be thus accounted for without invoking spiritual principles. So also is it with responsibility. Man is no longer held responsible to God, as His Existence and certainly His connection with human affairs have not been demonstrated by experimental tests. Consequently, man's ten-

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[9] *A. J. of S.*, F. N. House, "The Concept of Social Forces", Vol. XXXI, Nov. 1925, No. 3, p. 364; C. A. Ellwood, in E. C. Hayes, "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences", p. 6; C. A. Ellwood, in Ross and McCaull, "Readings in Civic Sociology", p. 312. E. A. Ross, "Roads to Social Peace", p. 6; "The Principles of Sociology", p. 674; H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Political Theory," p. 199.

[10] *A. J. of S.*, Vol. XXXI, Nov. 1925, No. 3, pp. 333-46.

dency to justify his actions must find some other basis than the moral law of God as known through Divine Revelation.

Society can be responsible only to itself under the sociological interpretation. Hence a system of autonomous morality alone is possible. In such a system the individual's dignity will rise or fall as emphasis is thrown on the society concept or prominence given to the importance of the individual. In either case, man's true dignity is not really safeguarded. By exalting society, the individual suffers and is reduced to an intergral part of a vast social mechanism. By striving to maintain the intrinsic worth of the individual's personality, a man may apparently exercise causality but the independence attributed is specious rather than real, because man is thought to derive his whole social being from society, as similarly he obtained his physical being through an evolutionary process.[11] Further, sociology holds that these processes are still affecting him. If physical evolution is not so palpably affecting him now, the social forces are effecting a fuller socialization in him. Consequently man is but a vicarious agent at best for natural forces, whether those forces be physical or social.

The operation of social forces upon man's conscious activities indirectly parallels the guidance that a true morality furnishes for the direction of conduct and through it social life itself. While the points of view of sociology and moral theology are different, yet their aims are the same, namely, guidance for man in his conscious activities. Sociology, therefore, by the very necessity of its subject-matter, establishes a morality, or to use a term more in harmony with sociological language, a socializing process for human society. Adopting, therefore, "socialization" instead of "morality", the idea of responsibility cannot be entirely dispensed with.

Concern for the behavior of men may be rightly regarded as an evidence of this responsibility. And although the following statement of W. I. Thomas may refer to the individual's activity, it is equally applicable to social actions as a whole. Furthermore, it must be noted that the "social control" spoken of means "Moral Control". Hence socialization is equivalent

[11] F. A. Bushee, "Principles of Sociology", pp. 465-84.

to morality. "Moral control—the modification of the natural disposition and behavior of men in view of the fact that they are members of a society—may be regarded as the great problem of early times." [12] If in early times, so also today is society concerned that proper "motivation, behavior patterns and consequences" [13] be available for the control of man's social activities.

The selective process accounts for the upward curve in socialization according to A. Sutherland. Although the progressive quality of evolution is sometimes not admitted as a characteristic of real sociology, its repeated mention is sufficient evidence to consider it as a social force. In fact, Sutherland names this urge "moral instinct", a significant title indeed, but not implying the deliberative choice implied in moral theology. Of course "moral instinct" is incorrectly used to denote intelligent action and is said to be "in social animals, the result of that selective process among the emotions which tends to encourage those that are mutually helpful, and to weaken those that are mutually harmful." [14] This "urge" for social perfection then depends upon an emotion in man, that is actively functioning through his whole social being. Hence the frequency of its manifestation betokens determination and strong will, so that that activity becomes a moral one and is referred to the will of man. "The genuinely moral person is one then, in whom the habit of regarding all capacities and habits of self from the social standpoint is formed and active." [15] Or, as viewed by the result obtained, the emotional meaning of moral is even more apparent, for, "the moral and spiritual individuality of the person comes to function only in a favorable community life. Self-respect, self-culture, self-determining freedom—all the moral qualities that go to make up individuality—grow only in a social medium." [16] Social morality is a closed whole and simply manifests itself in the

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[12] "Source Book for Social Origins", p. 856.
[13] *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "History and Social Intelligence", Vol. II, Jan. 1924, No. 2, p. 152.
[14] "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct", p. 304.
[15] Dewey and Tufts, in J. Ford, "Social Problems and Social Policy", p. 35.
[16] J. A. Leighton, "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 31.

individual's behavior, as that individual has experienced the "urge" for a better expression of social relations.[17] When a full awareness of conscious integration is possessed by the individual, socialization is approximating the maximum attainable under its present evolutionary development. Then, too, social consciousness in man has become correspondingly delicate, making for the greatest social progress. Thus functions man's sense of social responsibility, and shows forth his complete participation in the social whole.

[17] J. M. Baldwin, "The Story of the Mind," p. 91; F. W. Blackmar, "the Elements of Society", pp. 271-2.

CHAPTER XVII

SANCTION: FIFTH ELEMENT OF CONDUCT

(Social Fatalism)

The conscious activities of man under the direction of his intellect and the control of his will, therefore, are a matter for concern to the individual. And when judged by sociological standards these conscious actions of man must be accounted for, since social energy is expended by them, which energy necessitates those actions to some definite result. Responsibility, as used in either sociology or moral theology, means that man's behavior or conduct has specific consequences because that activity of man conforms to or is contrary to a standard or norm called social consciousness or moral law respectively.

Man feels this responsibility because his actions bring about definite changes in his personal life, and investigation reveals to him that some force or power is the ultimate reason for things being as they are. Sanction is thus felt to be a real element in conduct, because even the very manner in which conscious human activities function, is directed by this final and compelling force. In moral theology, the ultimate sanction is God; in sociology it is a social fatalism manifesting certain benevolent characteristics.

Normally a single act of conduct does not imply a whole series of such acts. Although in moral theology the individual act of conduct enjoys an exclusive morality all its own, because it is a human act, in sociology "morality" depends rather upon a whole series of social acts.[1]

If he is to behave in the way which will be most satisfying at once to himself and to other people who make up his social setting, [he] must treat himself and all the relevant physical and social facts that go to make up his situation as one controllable whole, his total situation. This

[1] *J. of S. F.*, A. E. Sheffield, "Three Interviews and the Changing Situation", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 692.

implies that the outer setting of the individual is a constituent part of his behavior process.

A comparison of these two viewpoints show that the idea of sanction has equally great, if not greater, application in sociology because man is simply a factor in conduct, not the originator of it.

In moral theology a complete act necessarily involves "sanction" as a constitutive part of it. This exigency follows even a single act because God's Supreme Authority is involved by the choices made, so that the "obedience" or "disobedience" by the creature is not an insignificant matter. Consequently even a single and independent act might entail all the consequences that can be shown to follow properly from a course of conduct, consistently performed and extending over a whole lifetime.

There is an important distinction that should be kept in mind in this connection, namely, the separation of the causality set in motion by an act and the purely subjective aspect of the act. It is the objective view of conduct contrasted with the human aspect. In other words, subjective morality does not always parallel, point by point, objective morality. Theoretically indeed, they are one, and in the nature of things, there cannot be any difference between them, and were all the moral acts of man to be perfectly done, i. e., were the individual actually to perform what he intends the two aspects of morality would coincide thoroughly. Not infrequently, the individual really intends one thing, but owing to error in judgment not change of will, he actually does something else. Hence there is a morality that arises from intention as there is an objective causality set in motion by the act that produces results irrespective of the intention of the agent.

It may be said that the subjective aspect of morality is the one that really concerns man. Of course, this bold statement is not true, but it nevertheless brings out a notion about morality that is apt to be misunderstood. From the intention informing a man's resolve, arises the individual's participation in the morality forseen by him. Consequently, it is his will that is brought into contact with the will of God, that affects his

status with the Supreme Being. Even in acts that are intrinsically evil, i. e., by their very nature are immoral at all times, it is conceivable that their true morality would not be "known" so that an erroneous conscience might even conceive that act as morally good. However, these considerations of subjective morality do not enter in a discussion of final moral values in sociology, and are given only by way of clarification.

In our consideration of conduct, it is viewed objectively, i. e., as though the subjective and objective aspects always coincided. Yet it must not be overlooked that an act of conduct, even in its objective aspect must contain thought and volitional processes. In this supposition the mental elements of conduct are to be taken moreover as ideal, i. e., they are the processes of a person who fulfills perfectly all the subjective requirements for an objective act of morality.

Sanction, as used here and as necessary for an act of conduct, means that which results from that act, because of the ordination of a competent authority prescribing that result. In examples of delegated authority, i. e., of finite lawgivers, the sanction and the competent authority are necessarily separated. In the case of fundamental morality, God Himself is also the Supreme Sanction, because the final outcome of conduct is possession of or loss of God by the use of man's faculties.

In moral theology, our relations are raised to a higher order, i. e., to the supernatural, which means that we are brought into more intimate contact with God and we are endowed with His very Nature. This participation is not pantheistic, since our individualities are not lost, and we still remain finite creatures. It does mean, however, that because of this elevation we have a new set of obligations, arising from the will of God, Who has ordained this new and higher order of things, and has deigned to bestow "supernatural life" upon man. The will of God, indeed, is not arbitrary in the sense that even these ordinations could be contrary to the existence and exigencies of man's fundamental nature, because logical division of being separates the created from the Uncreated, and because all created things, whether in the material or in the supernatural

order, have their proto-type in the mind of God, i. e., are immutable in essence. Consequently God's will must conform in its ordinations to His Divine Essence, i. e., Existence-from-Self. However, what God wills to exist, or to bind upon His creatures whether rational or irrational, cannot be contrary to His own Essence. Hence the Final Sanction for man's moral conduct can be nothing else than God Himself, for the natural order of morality as well as for the supernatural. These truths need but be mentioned to be realized, for they are elemental and basic to the very concept of morality.

Probably it is well to note that the mental processes just referred to regard God and the whole supernatural order as really existing and independent of the individual mind conceiving them. This remark may seem superfluous, but not when the sociological viewpoint is remembered. Because of their erroneous ideological assumption, based on a physical criterion for truth, only a subjective order is possible to them. The term "objective" continues to appear, but does not necessarily mean real, independent, separate existence of the object outside the mind. "Objective" is opposed to mental, distinguishing realities that occur within the mind and those that occur without it.

Whatever sanctions appear in sociology are closely related to the physical order, for, bound by a naturalistic interpretation of phenomena, sociology is unable to rise out of that order. God cannot have existence, or if He actually might exist, we could not definitely know it.

Whatever is seen to result from conduct, or behavior as the sociologist calls conduct, is the only sanction that conduct can have, and whatever may seem to argue another source for conduct, receives an accommodated explanation, e. g., reference to conscience as "small still voice of the herd." Sanction, therefore, is largely a matter for experience. It does not require a basis in reason. "A sanction is any ground or reason which is adequate to initiate action, whether the actor be conscious or not that this is the ground or reason of the resulting action." [2] But even when conscious, there is no guarantee

[2] J. M. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development", p. 370.

that a fully rational sanction is meant, for, "the more refined phases of ethical emotion, together with their influence on social conduct, are considered under the headings of 'sentiment' and 'sanction'." [3]

The meaning of sanction as used in sociology receives further explanation from E. A. Ross. His reference to compulsion upon the will in "doing or abstaining" involves a sanction in the stricter sense, although he apparently admits secondary sanctions operating through "social pressure". [4]

> Besides the planes formed by voluntary imitation there are planes laid through society by social pressure. The doing or abstaining from something is believed to involve human welfare, so the group makes it binding upon all. The pattern of conduct society thus puts its influence behind may be called standard.

The real efficacy is derived from the group; so logically he would make that body the supreme sanction for conduct instead of God as does moral theology. However, Ross' view is not unique, for C. H. Cooley likewise "deifies" the group. "Life in the primary groups gives rise to social ideals, which, as they spring from similar experience have much in common throughout the human race. And these naturally become the motive and test of social progress." [5]

The notions that have found expression thus far have justified my previous criticism [6] that all sociological explanations must have a naturalistic sense. This is true even when their attention is directed formally to the notion of God as the Supreme Sanction for morality. Their descriptions must be inaccurate, more often grotesque, because sociological thought cannot comprehend spiritual realities and unable to perceive transcendantal qualities. [7]

> If society were ruled by divine will there could be no direct science of society. If the divine will were limited by law, which theologians would hardly concede, there might be a science of the divine will, and

[3] ibid. p. 16.
[4] "The Principles of Sociology", p. 564.
[5] C. H. Cooley, "Social Organization", p. 32.
[6] cf. Part II, Chap. V.
[7] A. M. Lewis, "An Introduction to Sociology", p. 10.

this might serve indirectly as a sort of social science in the second remove.

Divine will as used by A. M. Lewis has the meaning of the supreme final sanction for conduct and his statement goes to the very pith of the question. It will be noted indeed that he acknowledges several important facts about sanction: First, the idea is not unknown to sociology; secondly, by implication at least, social consequences are sanctions, as also noted above in Baldwin, Ross, and Cooley; and finally, behavior requires sanction to complete its meaning. This last is a very important admission for sanction in the theological sense, and shows that sociologists do intend their interpretation of life to be a guide for conduct. Consequently sanction is necessarily connected with conduct, so that sociology could not well disregard it. Social laws are made to operate with a sureness that may be described as fatalistic. "The demonstration of the regularity of the recurring social phenomena is no less important, for without this no definite conclusions can be reached." [8] However, "regularity of the recurring social phenomena" really makes a "free will" interpretation of behavior impossible. [9]

Social Science as understood by these men can determine what sanctions society places upon its laws by observation of past behavior. "When human beings began to come together in social relations there developed among them customs, or methods of actions sanctioned by usage." [10] All that can be known, therefore, about consequences of conduct, must be gotten from the study of social conditions of man. Consequently, no higher sanction can be found than that originating in society itself. In the following quotation, C. A. Ellwood speaks of "ethics", which for our purposes is the sociological equivalent to moral theology, because it will be remembered that ethics is simply an attempted description of the conscious activities of man. In fact, both "morality" and "ethics" are used in the same meaning. [11]

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[8] F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 41.
[9] *S. F.*, R. L. Finney, "The Problem of Social Evaluation", Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 202.
[10] J. Q. Dealey, "Sociology, Its Simpler Teachings and Applications", p. 146.
[11] "Sociology and Modern Social Problems", p. 21.

This view of morality, which for the most part is endorsed by modern thought makes ethics dependent upon sociology for its criteria of rightness or wrongness. Indeed, we cannot argue any moral question nowadays unless we argue it in social terms. This is not denying, of course, that there are religious and metaphysical aspects to morality, but it is saying that modern ethical theory is coming more and more to base itself upon the study of the remote social consequences of conduct and that we cannot judge what is right or wrong in our complex society unless we know something of the social consequences.

Acknowledgments made to religion and metaphysics are really damning, because the writer makes "social consequences" the only sure guide for conduct. If only these provide a sanction by determining "rightness" and "wrongness", certainly social morality can never rise higher than an idealized utilitarianism at best. Furthermore, only a subjective content is left to metaphysics, and an emotional meaning for religion. By these tokens of the sociological viewpoint our own notions of sanction as ultimately deriving its efficacy from God; our science of metaphysics as representative of true realities, both spiritual and temporal; and, finally our belief in God's own Revealed Word, are, all radically and fundamentally false. Our very position, it is argued, is illogical, since our premises for investigation are not "scientific" but traditional and assumed; our morality is deduced from theological principles and made subservient to an imaginary divine law.

Man is now the arbiter of his own destiny, for society contains within itself all potentialities of improvement. In fact, this alone is the way that man must go, if he would live a rational life.[12] Yet the same society is not the gentlest of teachers, as man is indeed under social compulsion. He is totally unable to hurry or prevent, to hasten or retard, to approve or condemn, the consequences following upon his conscious actions, called "behavior" in sociology and "conduct" in moral theology. He is properly represented as a pawn in the hands of inexorable fate: man's one prayer, if that privilege is still left him, is, may the environments, conscious and unconscious, be propitious to me, a poor social product; may I gradually grow in social consciousness, so as to be among the social-

[12] E. S. Bogardus, "A History of Social Thought", pp. 279-80.

elect. Thus may be paraphrased the following had the writer attempted dramatization.[13]

> Change in the social life is quite largely unobserved and uncontrolled by the knowledge and planning of society. The traditional order is a great though unconscious director of the activities of men through guiding their desires and controlling the opportunities for their expressions. Social changes have to do with the redirecting of human behavior through changing desires and the opportunities for their expression.

Truly should man realize his helplessness, and woe is he who is present in life without his "social garment", for he shall be excluded from the social estate, where alone man can enjoy his powers. He is doomed because the social laws of society operate with inexorable fatality, for "the general will is like the giant forces of nature. It is diffused and intangible, elusive and hidden, it lets men play with it, and seemingly defy it; but when they have defied it too far, it kills like lightning and wrecks like the tempest. (The Independent, Vol. 74, p. 124, editorial.)"[14]

Society, however, is fully capable of self-improvement, so that its future is in its own hands. By social compulsion that has become benevolent, society can assure itself of continuity and the individual of social happiness and the means thereto by "the development and functioning of the spiritual powers immanent in human nature." Thus fortified man can face the future, because he believes that[15]

> the improvement of the human lot, the realization by man of a deeper, richer, more satisfying and better integrated life depends on the development, by the dynamic of good will and the light of intelligence, of the capacities resident in human nature. In the light of history and science we must put our faith, not in any intervention from supramundane sources, but in the development and functioning of the spiritual powers in human nature.

All the elements of conduct have a sociological counterpart,

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[13] W. G. Heath, "An Introduction to Sociology and Social Problems", p. 114.
[14] F. R. Clow, "Principles of Sociology with Educational Applications", p. 146.
[15] J. A. Leighton, "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 225.

but it is especially in "sanction" that the full force of the parallelism is felt. A benevolent but inexorable social fatalism gives validity to behavior, whereby man gains or loses socialization, according as his surroundings have been favorable or unfavorable. His very "success" is a testimony of social compulsion as also his unsocialized state illustrates an inexorable law.

PART V

CHAPTER XVIII

THEREFORE SOCIAL MORALITY IS ALONE POSSIBLE

Conscious activities of man are very much in evidence in social relations, for the reason that it is principally in these activities that sociology sees the operation of social laws. Man has been observed to act with great uniformity of action, so that his future acts have been conceived as consequences of former ones. The general name of behavior has been applied to this phenomenon.

The science of sociology holds that man's conscious actions, called behavior, are directed by definite social forces, which, if controlled, will make for social improvement. Emphasis, therefore, is not upon the individual and his isolated conscious act as in moral theology, because sociology does not consider man's actions as "free" in the meaning that man has the power of choice arbitrarily to determine himself to a definitely willed action.

Conscious activities in man are conceived as wider in extension than correspondingly human acts are in moral theology. This difference in regard to man's activities is noteworthy since it is indicative of contrary fundamental premises for each science.

The term behavior is more generally used in sociology than conduct to denote the conscious actions of man, and this term has in consequence, a definite meaning. From the foregoing, Part IV, it was seen that preference for the term "behavior" is a conscious one, in that the connotation of conduct is too easily associated with the notion of "uncaused freedom" reprobated by sociology. Furthermore, the use of the term "behavior" easily predominates in sociological writings, although

the term "conduct" does appear, but should however be understood in the sense of behavior.

The analysis given for an act of conduct comprises the elements that rise naturally out of a human act. These elements were referred to by me as "wellsprings" of morality for the reason that an act of conduct considered objectively, is the result of all these principles. Were one of them not to function, the result would not be conduct, but something else than what is meant by a completed moral act.

Of course, the term "wellsprings" is not found, but the designation is mine to indicate that where such influences are at work the result will be "conduct". That conduct really results, cannot I think be doubted, for the five wellsprings treated above comprehend fully, though mutually exclusive one of the other, all the elements that an analysis of an act of conduct involves. Each one of these elements has received attention in previous chapters, and the present is intended as a recapitulation of the ideas basic to those chapters. The five are—telesis, oughtness, freedom, responsibility, sanction.

A sociological act of behavior has the same outline as an act of conduct. Surprising as the likeness may seem at first sight, its absence would be really harder to explain for the following reasons. Both sociology and moral theology profess to deal with "conscious activities in man" or "human acts", as these actions are respectively called in sociology and moral theology. Futhermore, both sciences address themselves to definite tasks, which tasks are, when due allowance is made for their respective points of view, identical. For sociology, it is formulating laws for control of social forces to benefit the social whole, the individual included as a consequence; for moral theology, it is determining norms of morality, i. e. moral principles to help man in the proper guidance of conduct for the benefit of himself primarily and secondarily, though necessarily, for society. And while a divergence appears here as to the immediate beneficiary, the similarity persists in that well-being is looked upon as the proper result for properly directed conduct.

Finally the two interperations of life are alike especially

in attributing values to the action performed. These values arise from the appeals intended to arouse interest in and conformity to the prescriptions made by either science of life. Here, indeed, there is a notable difference: it is solely the temporal appeal that is opposed to man's true interests which are chiefly supernatural. Hence values follow upon the pronouncements of both sociology and moral theology, but they are mundane values giving meaning to acts of behavior in sociology, as contrasted with spiritual values in moral theology.

The character of the "morality" found in sociological writings will be comparatively an easy task to portray, especially since their philosophic conceptions have been given in the foregoing. For the most part the writers themselves make the application of sociological principles to conscious activities in men and declare the values placed by them upon the acts described. Moreover, the very applications follow but logically from an analysis of behavior, so that it is not difficult to know how sociology estimates its pronouncements upon behavior.

Morality as taught by sociology is set forth in these pages as a social morality, for the reason that an analysis of the conscious activity of man shows that man and not God gives final validity to the notion of conduct as sponsored by sociology. The following statement of R. C. Givler, summarizes the position that sociology takes in this matter, and at the same time serves to recall the conclusions reached in the preceeding parts. It will be noted that the writer is paricularly anxious that we exalt man by the doubful means of makiing his mental activities like unto his purely physical ones.[1]

> Behaviorism is the theory that mind is not one kind of thing and body another, but that if we must make a line of cleavage, we had better say that mental phenomena are one and all generated by the human organism through its contacts with the environment. Sometimes this is expressed by saying that mind is a function of the body, or that when body reaches a certain complexity, mind then emerges. This theory is monistic rather than dualistic, and it is one of the most significantly ethical theories that

[1] in H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 511.

has ever been announced, since it furnishes the only sound basis we have ever known for the unification of the personality. Theories which have made mind the superior entity have uniformly resulted in introversion and asceticism, despising the body and taking refuge in an inner consciousness; Behaviorism, on the contrary, realizes that the organism is not only body, but the body and everything it is capable of doing, one of which things is called mental activity.

Only values that have their basis in the natural order can arise from these considerations, for "science, by the subtle method of supplying innumerable conveniences and safeguards of life, has finally convinced man that the universe is run according to natural law, rather than by fiat or caprice."[2] Of course natural law as used here, has a special meaning: it reflects the positivistic concepts of reality.

J. A. Leighton considers that the attitude of mind that characterised and brought about the modern improvement is, " . . . rationalistic in the sense that no authority is recognized as superior to the inquiring probing mind operating upon the data of experience."[3] A material standard determines value in life, because after all "the mind is a function of the body". This mind can know no values except those that are in harmony with the world about it, and whence it itself was drawn. The medium in which the individual ordinarily exists, i. e., the group will furnish the standards.[4]

In many cases of what we judge to be bad conduct the man belongs to a group whose standards are not the same as those of our own group by which we judge him. If his own group is with him his conscience and self-respect will not suffer, nor will he, so far as this group is con cerned, undergo any blame or moral isolation.

Theoretically the morality of one group may differ from that of another,[5] for "the moral . . . is nothing but the social raised to an ideal plane."[6] Hence if morality differs from group to group so too may values in their particular applica-

[2] ibid. p. 502.
[3] "The Individual and the Social Order", pp. 100-101.
[4] C. H. Cooley, "Social Process", p. 105.
[5] ibid. p. 101.
[6] C. A. Ellwood, "Sociology and Modern Social Problems", p. 398.

tions, but not the fundamental wellsprings that gave rise to those values.

On the question of values, it is well to understand that sociology expresses the highest values in life that are possible for man to know, since social relations are all-comprehensive and it is sociology, as is claimed, that alone can interpret them. Sometimes religion is the name for a definite set of values, but this is, as D. B. Leary tells us, only a phase of sociology, because to be able to contribute so much to life makes religious activity truly social activity.[7]

> Religion when sobered by broad social knowledge and tempered by concrete social aims, may become more and more an institution in the dynamic, progressive, and behavioristic sense of the word, and become less of a curative, solacing device. Religion must do not dream, impel not comfort, express not sublimate, be positive not metaphysical. But such a religion would also be a sociology.

In explanation, it must be stated that religion is not for the sociologist, a rationalized systematic way of life whereby man is able to discharge his duties of homage and worship to his Creator, God, in accordance with revelation. In sociology, religion does not have this super-eminence, but is regarded as a social force, though an important one, by means of which, man's emotional nature may be controlled. The rational element, so prominent in our view, does not obtain, and for this reason, religion is made to take a subordinate place in the affairs of life. Hence its "value" must be judged accordingly.[8]

> We have, also, to find a way of diffusing among men right aspirations and right desires—right emotional attitudes—before we can be sure that they will use knowledge rightly. Now religion stands for this element of aspiration and emotional value in human life. It is in this way intensely concerned with social values. At its best, religion is a setting of the affections upon the highest personal and social values and ideals which we know, that is, upon that we may call divine things. It is the cultivation of faith, hope, and love in human life. The religious spirit is the spirit of devotion to ideal social and personal ends and of the consecration of individual life to these ends.

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[7] In Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "The Social Sciences and their Interrelations", p. 376.
[8] C. A. Ellwood, "Christianity and Social Science", p. 10.

Most assuredly the social order is greatly dependent upon the religious, for religion furnishes ideals, motives, and commandments for right living, particularly in the case of revealed religion, for it endows society with and protects it in the enjoyment of intergrity, indepedence in its own sphere, and dignity in keeping with its purpose, that could not be gotten from any other source. These qualities are justly due to society, because it is an ordination of God, destined to regulate the conduct of man in his social relations according to the will of God as known through Revelation and by the exercise of reason. However, revealed religion, as found expressed in the Church, does not regard society as having equal dignity with itself, for the reason that although society deals with temporalities under God's law, the Church's province is the spiritual interest of man. Nevertheless, the Church insists that society is perfect within its own sphere and therefore fully entitled to and deserving of all the dignity pertaining thereto.[9]

The viewpoint of sociology is quite the reverse. Not recognizing a divinely instituted Church it most naturally sees in such an organization but another evidence of social activities. The social man is by consequence the religious man for sociology, so that whatever morality the Church as representative of religious influence can show, it is but a social morality. Religious values, i. e., the worth placed upon certain social actions of man for society's or his own benefit, must take their meaning and value from the force originating them. Owing to its denial of the spiritual, all the so-called religious values in sociology are derived from the nature of man himself. These values are made to spring from man's emotional nature, because the whole sphere of religious activities is regarded as belonging to his emotional part.[10]

Religion, therefore, or the Church as it is often referred to in sociological writings, is made wholly subservient to society, because the Church as an independent and superior institution is not acknowledged. Although God is associated

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[9] Ryan and Millar, "The State and the Church".
[10] *J. of S. F.*, T. F. Opie, "The Place of the Church among Social Forces", Vol. I, Sept. 1923, No. 5, p. 581.

with religion in some sociological treatises, religion does not therefore assume priority in man's attention, because the existence of God in not conceived as a necessity for society.

Nothing beyond man's immediate experience can be of scientific interest, so that all realities must be conformed to autonomous nature in their explanations. When these fundamental postulates of sociology are understood, identical values for man's acts cannot be logically expected for sociology and moral theology, because contrary philosophies are basic to each system. When the realities themselves are unlike, it is not surprising that these realities operating as principles should produce different, and even contrary, values in explanation of the selfsame facts of social life. Morality as understood by moral theology must be opposed to the sociological counterpart-notion for the reason that God's control of social man is an incompatible notion for sociology, while in moral theology all morality is dependent upon God, Who is the Infinite and Supreme First Cause of all reality.

Because sociology subscribes to naturalistic philosophy, even God and religion must be given a similar interpretation. Whatever social force sociological writers can show these "factors" to have in society, it has no more intrinsic worth than society itself. Man is a social animal with emotions that must be controlled, so that his whole activity becomes social.[11]

> What concerns the sociologist most is the influence of religion in the development of social organization. In the first place we shall find that religion has always been connected with social order. The control of families, tribes, groups and even nations, has been brought about through religious influence.

In the quotation just made, little scope is left to man in his social relation. The contention that man is socially controlled is a postulate of sociological philosophy; so consequently the sacredness of the individual is not contemplated by it. On the contrary, only a social identity is allowed the individual man by sociology, so that whatever worth or value is in man or his actions is due to social process. Consequently social norms

[11] F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 201.

constitute the morality whereby man's actions must be judged.

The individual does not receive the personal worth that he enjoys in moral theology. Great effort, however, is made to invest the social individuality with as much dignity as possibly can be conferred upon socialized man. H. E. Barnes in treating "Individualism versus Social Absolutism" identifies the individual with society. All of man's worth is by consequence a social thing; for the principle of life is not really personal to him, but a manifestation of social forces. Hence man has no individualizing principle that makes him a man before he engages in social activity. An individual and spiritual soul, making for independent personal worth and dignity could not exist under such conditions. [12]

The more general sociological position on this problem is, however, an eclectic and synthetic one. A number of thoughtful writers, approaching the subject from a sociological point of view, have challenged the discussion by insisting that to view the problem as one of the individual versus society is to mistake the question at issue and to misinterpret the problem. Society and the individual are indispensible complements each to the other; neither could exist without the other, and it is even difficult, if not impossible to differentiate individual from social factors.

A mutual influence is thus set up, which, as also described by C. H. Cooley, certainly leaves no place for an independent spiritual soul in man.

Perhaps even these statements could be interpreted without denial of a human soul, but judging from the previous pages, such an interpretation would do violence to the present text and would not represent the sociological viewpoint. In fact, the natural meaning of the words themselves certainly preclude the individual from being considered as a spontaneous source of moral activity. [13]

The Individual is always cause as well as effect of the institution; he receives the impress of the state whose traditions have enveloped him from childhood, but at the same time impresses his own character, formed by other forces as well as this, upon the state, which thus in him and others like him undergoes change.

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[12] "Sociology and Political Theory", p. 197.
[13] C. H. Cooley, "Social Organization", p. 314.

As stated above, sociology in appreciating man's actions, lays emphasis not upon the individual as individual, but rather upon the social entity. The world does not exist, for man's benefit: his interest and purpose in life no longer furnishes the criterion whereby the intrinsic worth of acts and objects in relation to this purpose are to be determined. The purpose of socialized man, the sociological ideal of life, is drawn from the things at hand, namely, a "mundane urbanity which alone can produce true culture and civilization". [14]

Social vision has broadened man, argues J. F. Markey, so that he no longer considers "himself the center of the universe", and no longer does he "think himself unique—a thing apart—a special creation". So reasons this writer in "A Redefinition of Social Phenomena", and he finally ascribes the cause for the erroneous view formerly held to the fact that "in the past we have been almost hopelessly anthropocentric." [15]

The social orientation has made it impossible for man any longer to occupy the center of the stage. He is assigned to his proper place and his appointed station is given unto him. In consequence, man becomes of relative importance instead of predominating as formerly. [16]

All his activities in consequence are to be interpreted in a new light, since traditional views do not coincide with this newer social view of things. His activities cannot be construed into an argument for a spiritual soul as their principle or cause, because "scientific" investigation disproved the one and has located the other in social forces. Were one to interpret social phenomena under the spell of traditional philosophy influenced and intimidated by a superstitiously accepted revela-

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[14] *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 228.

[15] *A. J. of S.*, Vol. XXXI, May, 1926, No. 6, p. 736.

[16] *A. J. of S.*, C. W. Margold, "The Need of a Sociological Approach to Problems of Sex Conduct", Vol. XXXI, Jan. 1926, No. 4, p. 462 ff; *A. J. of S.*, E. C. Hayes, "Some Social Relations Restated", Vol. XXXI, Nov. 1925 No. 3, pp. 343-4; *J. of S. F.*, A. W. Calhoun, "Essays in the Economic Interpretation of History: Societal Evolution", Vol. III, Mar. 1925, No. 3, p. 432; A. J. Todd, "Theories of Social Progress" pp. 10-15; C. H. Cooley, "Human Nature and the Social Order", p. 357.

tion, little more than fanciful speculations would result. In this connection, F. H. Hankins, in his review of W. B. Selbie's "The Psychology of Religion", strongly denounces belief in the "immortality" of the soul.[17] "In a word he [Selbie] admits that science furnishes scant basis for the belief in immortality and therefore he thinks it wise to take refuge in metaphysics where each may indulge his own fancies without fear of embarrassment by facts."

Whatever kind of soul is left to man is not the spiritual soul known in theology. Consequently all spiritual predications of man's activities is denied by sociology. This materializing process extends to all of man's activities, even his mental ones. Hence ideas are not spiritual, but only excitations of nervous energy, of action and reaction. No spiritual representative value remains under this notion, for each idea is particular and applicable to one object only. Universality of ideas is no longer possible under this explanation, so that values given expression by words cannot have the general application of universal ideas that are possible to spiritual representations of similarly like material things.

The idea of soul retained in sociological writings is important if a notion of moral values is to be had. This connection is immediate because as the soul is appraised, so likewise will its actions be valued. As complete man "behaves" himself so too will his "morality" be judged, for the accustomed way of action makes known the social pattern laid down in that man's nature. Thus reasons F. E. Lumley when he speaks of two natures, an original nature and a social nature, meaning thereby that one is physical and gotten by being born, and the other is a social acquisition for, "man is not born human, but has to grow into his humanity." [18] By inference from this principle, all cultural attainments are due to "becoming human", a social effect. And although the term spiritual might even be used to express the higher ideal of life, i. e., the cultural, that term really takes its meaning from our acquired nature, and not from an objective order supposedly independent and superior.

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[17] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. III, May 1925, No. 4, p. 751.
[18] "Principles of Sociology", p. 107.

"Original Nature" assumes that man is possessed of all powers necessary for his development, but this term must not be confused with "original" nature as spoken of by theologians in connection with the Fall of Man. Previous to this Original Sin of man, he possessed a perfect nature unblemished by sin, but this use of original has no connection whatever with the sociological use of that term. Original nature in sociology means the powers and energies man has before he became possessed of reason, before cultural influences began to socialize him. Nevertheless man is able to perfect himself because human nature is sound;[19] so that all of man's activities are also possessed of the same quality. Progressive advancement, however, is not demanded by social activities, for F. Oppenheimer, in a footnote explaining "progress", says that "changes of the social process" may be retrogressive, and "such a cultural loss may . . . be a part of progress."[20]

Considering morality therefore as progress and "a social process" the term must include all social activity precisely because it is society's way of conducting itself.[21] The struggle just referred to is probably a common social phenomenon because moral concepts, as E. Westermarck calls judgments about social actions, "are essentially generalizations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth either indignation or approval."[22] Therefore man's social actions are his moral actions and must be understood as the preceding writers have interpreted them. The following quotation speaks of moral influences and refers to them especially as principles or causes. Consequently evaluations of social facts by writers in sociolo-

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[19] W. G. Sumner, "Folkways"; F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 187; *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes and W. C. Waterman, Book Reviews, entitled, "A Scientific View of Sex Problems", Vol. III, Nov. 1924, No. 1, p. 153; *J. of S. F.*, H. E. Barnes, Book Review of "Personality and Conduct" by E. R. Groves, Vol. II, Jan. 1924, No. 2, p. 297; *J. of S. F.*, F. E. Lumley, "The Preacher's Right to Marry", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 702; E. Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas" p. 185.

[20] In Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "The Social Sciences and their Interrelation", p. 223.

[21] R. L. Finney, "General Social Science", p. 35.

[22] "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas", p. 738.

gy show their own appreciations of the values they place upon life and its purposes.[23]

A final criticism of the views set forth in the first part of this paper is their [i. e., above authors] failure to recognize the degree to which group behavior is controlled by the values and standards existing in the group. It is the recognition and adherence to such standards and values which creates that organization and unity necessary for group action. The values of "divine revelation" and "authority" leave no room for those of "science" and "common sense".

[23] *S. F.*, C. T. Pihlblad, "Mental Tests and Social Problems", Vol. V, Sept. 1926, No. 2, p. 242.

CHAPTER XIX

SOCIOLOGICAL EQUIVALENTS OF MORAL VALUES

SECTION I—*Man Completely Derationalized: True Moral Values Impossible.*

Morality involving the spirituality of the soul cannot be found in sociological writings, and what is found under the title of morality, or what is equivalently spoken of as morality, is, at best, but a substitute. Consequently, sociology does function as a treatise in moral theology in that it undertakes the substitution of the "social" for the human element in morality. Also its moral character results from the values it instills into human mind by infiltration of the principles of autonomy of reason. As a result, sociology has devitalized man's mental faculties, causing them to represent as moral values what are in reality but poor counterfeits.

It may sound bold to state that the human element is disregarded altogether by sociology in its analysis of an act of conduct. Subscribing to naturalism, sociology, indeed, by its experimental criterion for truth, devitalizes a moral act and makes it but a resultant of social forces. Moral values are present in sociology rather by their absence than by a true effectiveness. Therefore sociological conduct cannot be integrally complete, and the very absence of necessary "human" elements fixes its "moral" character. As a consequence sociological pronouncements do have values that substitute for real moral values in the guidance of conduct.

Values are used in sociology to influence behavior; so their function as social determinants is well established. In view of the character of these values, as will be further shown by quotations, there remains little doubt but that sociology should be ranked with moral theology as far as control of conduct is concerned. R. L. Finney clearly acknowledges that values are factors in society, and urges greater zeal for their discovery.[1]

[1] *S. F.*, "The Problem of Evaluation", Vol. VI, Dec. 1927, No. 2, p. 204.

In view of the need for objective appraisal of social trends and processes in such a time as ours it would appear that we require a fresh attack upon the problem of social evaluation. The task of this paper may be promoted, therefore, if we proceed first, to re-examine the concepts involved; second, to establish a criterion for such evaluation; and third, to suggest a technique for the investigation.

The values thus sought after have a definite character that excludes all spiritual content. Man's activities are thus capable of other explanations than the traditional ones, hence terms evaluating the new findings must only have a naturalistic meaning. In these acts so considered, the human element does not have a "moral" character about it, because man simply acts in accordance with the laws of his being. Hence this very absence of a necessary element affects the character of values that sociology ascribes to acts of conduct.

Speaking of the man-nature as a basis for morality, J. A. Leighton makes values follow the character of the force producing them. He uses "ethical" instead of morality, but the meaning in sociology is identical. "Ethical theory and ethical practice must be based on man's actual nature." [2] But this writer's concept for actual nature differs radically from that of a moral theologian. [3]

The ethicist must clear his mind entirely of the dualistic notion that certain impulses are, in themselves, good or bad. He must get rid of the idea that that action only is morally good that is performed from a conscious and deliberate choice of certain ends and all other action is bad.

Conduct therefore does not result from purely human activities; so sociology must leave out the one important element that makes conduct moral because that element makes it characteristically human. This writer entertains no illusions about such an ephemeral thing as "human" qualities in man, for he still insists upon derationalizing man in order to make him social. [4]

He must recognize that human conduct is almost entirely the result of: *first*, the *unconscious impulses* which constitute the organism's life-

[2] "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 253.
[3] ibid.
[4] idem.

urge its dynamic being; and *second*, of *habits* formed, *interests* and *ideals* developed, by the interaction of impulse and environmental stimuli, He must recognize that the struggle between good and evil, right or wrong, is the expression of the conflicts which arise between the innate impulses, which are the self at the outset of its career, and the social patterns of conduct.

Environmental stimuli do not permit a spiritual content for ideation and volition. Consequently, man cannot be differentiated from the brute except by degree, and this is precisely how C. W. Margold evaluates human activity even for the control of sex conduct. Whatever conduct results because of these purely natural values should not be imputable to man, because the resultant morality simply manifests the preponderant stimuli. Individualistic notions of morality representing an intelligent understanding of rightness and wrongness, together with choice of a will must give way to the sociological interpretation,[5]

Contemporary Sociology, in fact, abandons the traditional individualistic approach and accepts the group, that is, social life as much a datum, inherent in the nature of things, as is individual life. It demonstrates that group life is as genuinely fundamental and no less all-inclusive of things, interests, or concerns human, no more derived, secondary, or belonging to any special "sphere" or province than is individual life.

Purely human qualities of thought and volition as spoken of in moral theology are denied, either by explicit denunciation as seen above or implicitly by erroneously describing these processes;[6] for example, in the case of conscious mental activities in man. Sociology under the influence of an experimental test for knowledge, cannot bring to the analysis of consciousness the power of abstract thought. Man's consciousness in sociology does not differ in kind from mere animal conscious-

[5] *A. J. of S.*, "The Need of a Sociological Approach to Problems of Sex Conduct", Vol. XXXI, Jan. 1926, No. 4, p. 463.

[6] F. E. Lumley, "Principles of Sociology", Chap. I, pp. 1-21; C. A. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society", p. 313; C. H. Cooley, "Social Process", p. 170; C. H. Cooley, "Human Nature and the Social Order", pp. 328-9; A. M. Tozzer, "Social Origins and Social Continuities", pp. 230-1; K. Young, in H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 199.

ness, and in reality could not, since the one determining cause for real intelligence and moral conduct is denied, namely a spiritual soul. Sociologists are consistent however, and for that reason conduct is not made by them to depend upon abstract reasoning which in turn guides the choices of the will, but follows, according to their statements, mechanically from efforts at "co-ordination".[7]

> Our impulses which start and direct behavior constitute the most ancient function of our nervous system. The impetus to act is older and deeper than thinking. Thinking came when the nervous mechanism had become very complex and the various forms of the instinctive drive required co-ordination. Thinking therefore originated as a means of making behavior more successful in its efforts at adjustment, and it is this fact which has led biology to regard thinking as a mode of behavior.

The value arising from a "controlled nervous mechanism" would not rank, conceptually at least, with the value that flows from a spiritual soul operating in man. For an individual act of morality, therefore, the evaluation of activities depends upon the values previously assigned to the powers producing those activities. When therefore these individual acts are represented as derationalized the faculties producing them must be also dehumanized, with the result that full and genuine acts of morality such as treated in moral theology are not forthcoming. However, what does actually come forth from the sociological origins as conduct, must be compared to real morality, since it parallels real morality.

This notion of behavior destroys all rationality in the individual. The action is rather that of play of forces, so that man would be better represented as a power at the mercy of inexorable and often unknown forces. Control is social rather than personal; hence a greater effort should be made to improve human nature and less concern be had for the abstract mental sciences. "Human nature is plastic, improvable, and shown how to act more intelligently, which is to say more morally."[8]

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[7] E. R. Groves, "Personality and Social Adjustment", p. 21.
[8] *S. F.*, G. B. Logan, "Guides to Periodical Reading", Vol. IV, Mar. 1926, No. 3, p. 541.

Were man to secure the harmonious functioning of his human nature, he would then undoubtedly also be moral. With this happy eventuality, his reason likewise would have developed, so H. E. Barnes tells us, into codes of ethics or morality, with the result that "abstract-group" concepts would furnish all values for the control of conduct. These abstractions do not imply a spiritualizing faculty in man, because Barnes subscribes to an evolution of reason, thereby denying spirituality. These concepts are to represent simply the advance made over an imaginary god-control idea and is a further realization by man that social laws are a scientific development, not an ordination from a supermundane Being. Values for control of conduct arise out of social conditions, but when only imperfectly understood may be regarded as referring to an objective order. [9]

The behavior theory as understood by sociology does not include, nor is it intended to include, a spiritual content in the faculties of man. [10] A more scientific explanation has been found in which man is no longer the head of creation, possessing a spiritual soul and one destined for eternal union with God. Sociology has dissipated those "myths" and has succeeded, where its standards are accepted, in completely derationalizing man. The following succinctly sums up what has been said thus far, and makes evident that the sociological substitute for morality is a counterfeit. [11]

> Under the old order of thought creation was stereotyped and rigid, everything made distinct, to order and pattern. An absolute code of eternal right was posited, based on the immutable nature and character of God. There was conceived to be only one fit and ideal form for family, church, and state, and all variants were regarded as aberrant and pathological.

True morality, according to sociological principles, is to

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[9] *J. of S. F.*, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theology of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 2, p. 212.

[10] *J. of S. F.*, F. H. Giddings, "The Scientific Scrutiny of Societal Facts", Vol. I, Sept. 1923, No. 5, p. 511; *S. F.*, L. A. White, "The Concept 'Social': A Critical Note." Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1, pp. 72-3.

[11] *S. F.*, A. W. Calhoun, "Social Development", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925, No. 1. p. 44.

rise out of human nature. This formula might be subscribed to by moral theology, but with the understanding that human nature is to be interpreted by a spiritually-conceived philosophy. In theology, God's Sovereignty is not denied, precisely because a true analysis of man demands the existence of a Real, Objective, Self-existing, Supreme, First Cause reasonably to account for the existence of the finite objects investigated. Furthermore, God does have concern for the works of His Hands, so that Providence is also a rational belief. Finally, the intelligent creation is ordained to serve its Maker voluntarily, thus constituting the moral order.

The morality that is so intimately connected with God in moral theology does not require such a basis in sociology, according to R. M. Binder, who makes belief in a supermundane morality an indication of arrested mental development, stopping "in the mythological stage of thinking".[12] In fact, no other basis than human nature, except as interpreted and understood in the light of experimentally tested truth, need be supplied for the laws of conduct, for "these moral rules are our rules. They are by no means forced upon us by the whim of some strong person."[13] It is true that the moral rules are not made by us, as Finney rightly points out in the course of his book, but neither are they an expression of social compulsion growing out of social needs, as he claims they are. Neither do these "moral" rules argue an "automatic reaction", in the individual or society as E. F. Reed seems to imply they do in "Psychic Mechanisms and Social Radicalism."[14]

The phrase "discovery of the moral order" is nevertheless good theology, but certainly not in the sense advocated by sociology. Personal and arbitrary freedom is presupposed in theology, for discovery implies an intelligent choice of means; furthermore, discovery means that the moral order is actually found because it previously existed, so that its perception is a real discovery not an "investigation" of it. In sociology, discovery means quite the reverse, and does not require the anterior existence of the moral order. It means that the cus-

[12] "Major Social Problems" p. 303.
[13] R. L. Finney, "General Social Science", p. 208.
[14] *J. of S. F.*, Vol. II, Nov. 1923, No. 1, pp. 36-40.

tomary modes of social behavior have been scientifically investigated, tabulated, and formulated in a law of social morality; so all the objectivity that morality can claim is in society itself, not outside of it.

The freedom necessary for "discovering the moral order" does not exist in sociology, according to G. D. H. Cole, who speaks of a freedom, but explains its true nature away by making it a "creative growth", an idea very popular with sociologists. And although he makes freedom a condition for morality it is not an approval of the scholastic notion, because this writer makes the individual's liberty contingent upon social liberty, and "regarded as complementary to it".[15]

A real and objective order cannot be meant by the sociological use of "discovery of the moral order", as is seen from the use of the word "mores". Morality results from the mores, says W. G. Sumner, "for everyone of the mores gives the notion of what ought to be".[16] But what ought to be does not imply that it has uniformity of existence and independently of the mind conceiving it, for "the mores can make things seem right and good to one group or one age which to another seem antagonistic to every instinct of human nature."[17]

This notion of morality lacks a very important quality for morality, namely, stability, so that "discovering" it means in final analysis "inventing" it, since the one test for morality, according to Sumner, is bringing "to pass in the order of life, what ought to be",[18] and this need not be uniform for all peoples and times. Each group or each age will in turn "discover" its own morality, thus precluding the very possibility of a uniformity in moral principles, which says E. Westermarck, "owing to their very nature, . . . can never be true".[19]

There is a subtle connection supposed here between morality and truth, which in all justice, I do not think is intended. Although, the two notions can be separated in reality, for truth and goodness are of the fundamental properties of being,

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[15] "Social Theory", p. 182.
[16] "Folkways", p. 231.
[17] ibid.
[18] idem.
[19] "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas", p. 18.

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both aspects must be in evidence when a self-same object is considered "true" by the intellect and appeals as good to the will. Hence to speak of morality being relative to a people or an age, indicates that basic philosophic concepts are awry, even though there is a covert reference to transcendental properties of being.

Of course, were one, as does the sociologist and which alone he consistently can do, only to examine into the subjective appreciations of morality, it is understandable how relativity must appear. But to admit this is equivalent to a condemnation of himself, for it is tantamount to admitting an objective order as well, which he certainly does not intend to acknowledge. "All notions, of propriety, decency, chastity, politeness, order, duty, right, rights, discipline, respect, reverence, co-operation, and fellowship, especially all things in regard to which good and ill depend entirely on the point at which the line is drawn, are in the mores." [20] If drawn from the mores there is no objectively real moral order, for although the mores might give a certain objectivity, in the sociological use of that word, to the morality that is drawn from them, it surely would not be a uniform kind, nor one that is conceived to exist because it bespeaks an independent, intelligent First Cause, i. e., God, Who gave origin to that morality.

Moral values that reflect stability are consequently impossible to sociology. Whatever prescriptions sociology does advance for the proper direction of society will be founded upon some standard that is necessarily at variance with God's order and purpose in the universe, since no such reality as God has vindicated its existence. Ideals for social control got from an examination of the mores, even under a most favorable interpretation, could not lead to God, because morality is earth-born. Because of this premise the moral values set upon man's action must be in harmony with a naturalistic view of life as the following quotation actually illustrates. And if sociology does have moral values they are not in harmony with God's will as known through revelation and by reason. It is interesting to note, however, that a complete program for conduct

[20] W. G. Sumner, "Folkways", p. 231.

is contained in this statement, and this will serve to summarize all that has been thus far said about sociological morality.[21]

> Natural selection which has through countless ages eliminated the worst and conserved the best-fitted and thus has led on the whole to the survival of the fit is so far as possible nullified by civilized man; the worst are preserved along with the best and all are given the same chance of reproduction. The mistake has been not in nullifying natural selection by preserving the weak and incompetent, for civilized man could not well do otherwise, but in failing to substitute intelligent artificial selection for natural selection in the propagation of the race. Instead of this there has been perpetuation of the worst lines through sentimental regard for personal rights, even when opposed to the welfare of society; and both church and state have cheerfully given consent and blessing to the marriage and propagation of idots and of diseased, defective, insane, and vicious persons. Finally there has been extinction of the world's most gifted lines by enforced celibacy in many religious orders and societies of scholars; by almost continuous wars which have taken the very best blood that was left outside of the monastic orders; by luxury and voluntary sterility; by vice, disease and consequent infertility.

The objection that values such as these do not represent all sociologists' views is a futile one. If an actual writer here or there does not express these values explicitly, such a writer really subscribes to them in principle, if he is consistently a sociologist at all.

Finality could not be an attribute of sociological truth, neither could immutability be a property of its morality, because sociology does not admit a spiritual content to ideas. Its terminology can never have universality of meaning; hence its statements are an enumeration rather than a statement of a body coordinated scientific truths.[22] Under their philosophy, the sociologist must make his "morality" correspond in character to the nature of his "ideas", namely particular, or, as H. E. Barnes expresses it "relative" to each man moralizing.[23] The very logic of their position makes them

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[21] E. G. Conklin, in J. Ford, "Social Problems and Social Policy", p. 311.
[22] cf. Part II, Chap. VI.
[23] *J. of S. F.*, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 228.

accept "experience" as the determinant of morals just as also they were forced to use "experience" as a means to discovery of truth. In substantiation of this, Park and Burgess may be cited, who particularly denounce fanciful and abstract conceptions of the "good", and argue for the "practical" as a "test" for determining what obligations are to be brought under the "ought" of morality: "We do not know what we ought to do until we know what we can do; and we certainly should consider what men can do before we pass laws prescribing what they must do." [24] Notwithstanding the inherent fallacy of this norm, there is a certain utility about it that can be used to find out the practical applications of duties already known and accepted but made contingent upon expediency rather than upon objective right. But such a norm could hardly serve as a valid test for true morality. Yet sociology virtually has no other standard to offer, since abstract reasoning is discredited and disowned by it, so all that man can really know, is what he has experienced. In his ideals too, as R. M. Binder points out, feeling must become their source. In fact, this feeling through experience is made the very ground work for the whole mental structure. "As soon as feeling has been differentiated into intellect, will, and emotions, the possibilities of an ideal of self-realization are given." [25] As a natural consequence, all values that man acknowledges, under such an analysis, must also depend upon feeling. If man's rational faculties arise by "experienced" feelings, surely the results of those faculties in operation, can have no higher order. Hence, whatever judgments of values are pronounced by these faculties must be rated by the same standard, experience.

Because of this common denominator for all of man's activities, he cannot essentially differ from the brute animal except by a further development of consciousness. Hence his true individuating principle, the spiritual soul, is not acknowledged. In consequence, man becomes derationalized which makes true moral value impossible. [26]

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[24] "Introduction to the Science of Sociology", p. 14.
[25] "Feeling as the Principle of Individuation and Socialization", p. 40.
[26] F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 59; B. B. Lindsey, "The Companionate Marriage", p. 342; *Yale Review*, B. W. Bacon, "Decline of Moral Authority", p. 313.

SECTION II—*Right and Wrong have Subjective Values only*

Mere conformity with human nature is too vague a formula to adopt as a test for true morality. There is involved in such a standard the more ultimate question what does that human nature mean when it is made to serve as a criterion for moral judgments. Unless this observation is kept in mind mere conformity will not be sufficient to determine whether a true morality results or not.

In sociological writings, human nature does not have the meaning assigned to it in philosophy and in moral theology, so that simply to accept "conformity to human nature" as a criterion would not have any meaning unless its sociological content is also known. In sociology nature is regarded as self-sufficient, as containing within itself all the causality necessary for its development. Its origin even, if treated at all, is consistently regarded as involving no extramundane cause. The viewpoint generally held is that nature is accepted as a datum, and scientific inquiry into social relations has no immediate concern with this question. Nevertheless, the evolutionary hypothesis is accepted in fact, so that its principles of autonomy regulate all cosmological references. In its moral applications the autonomy of nature precludes any relation of a specific act to an independent order of reality. By this assumption, all reference to a concomitant obligation, imposed by a Supreme Authority rightfully binding the individual to obedience, is denied.

Contrast this "living by nature" with the moral theological interpretation of that expression. An individual can and must live a moral life if he follows nature, provided he follows that nature in its entirety. This means that he recognizes his duty of obeying the exigencies of his spiritual nature as well as fulfilling the needs of this material nature, as explained by moral theology. The individual will realize then that he is under moral compulsion to conform his conduct absolutely with the prescriptions demanded by a supernatural destiny with all exactness; and he will further realize that it is his duty to obey absolutely all commandments in matters of strict obligation covering his spiritual and temporal relations.

With the same promptitude, he will understand the fitness of following at least the major counsels of perfection, although they do not bind upon him by strict obligation.

Informed by such a philosophy of life, the individual recognizes his unqualified dependence upon God, his Last End, from Whom every act receives its validity. Consequently, when an act aids the individual to live according to his nature, in its fullest meaning, that act is said to be "good" and is designated as "right". When the reverse obtains, the act is correspondingly called "bad" and is pronounced "wrong". In either case the morality of the act is extrinsic to the individual, since it, as well as the individual himself, are but creatures of a Supreme Cause, the Infinite and Omnipotent God.

The character of rightness or wrongness is not a mere subjective appreciation, and although the individual must apprehend the oughtness of morality, he recognizes it in virtue of his spiritual faculities, as it is in reality, existing independently of his mind. The objectivity of God as Author of the moral order gives value in turn to the individual's apperception of morality, which value is also recognized as existing independently of his perceiving mind. Hence rightness and wrongness have objective values that belong to an act, irrespective of the mind considering its performance or non-performance.

Were nature accepted as autonomous, as is done in sociology, a final standard is inconceivable because knowledge gained by experimentation only cannot beget obligation. Moreover, the individual only partially, and generally inadequately, masters the accummulated knowledge of the past, so that appreciation of morality must differ in men, one from another. Hence, what is right or wrong for me is what experience, personal or vicarious, has taught me to be so. Consequently, my judgments of rightness and wrongness are only subjective appreciations and cannot be anything else.

The particular reason adduced by sociology for dispensing with an absolute standard is its belief that nature, demanded by such a standard, would suffer stagnation. All true progress results from evolution, and morals are no exception to this scientifically established law. Hence, E, A, Ross insists that

"right" and "wrong" must also adapt themselves to changing conditions. [27]

> Basing right and wrong on human nature and the nature of society keeps moral ideas plastic. Instead of being fixed for all time by the texts of an ancient book ethical discriminations develop with changing conditions of social life and keep step with the progress of psychology and sociology. Rigid ecclesiastical dogmas as to interest, alms-giving, marriage and propagation simply cannot survive the light of social science. Again, the dissociation of the state from religion gives it a freedom of development unknown to the theocratic state. The latter has certain merits, but adaptability is not one of them.

Judgments in regard to conduct cannot be more than relative under such a declaration. "Now every sociologist would probably admit that what is moral is relative, being determined by time and place." [28] A definite time and place for a particular act of sociological morality would probably exclude contradiction within that definite act itself, since so evident an inconsistency would make all discussion impossible. Hence the relativity must refer to changed times and places as E. A. Ross definitely stated in the preceding quotation.

The individual's apperception of values in regard to right and wrong is represented as depending upon his emotions and not upon a rational basis. "Hence a moral judgment is true or false according as its subject has or has not that tendency which the predicate attributes to it. If I say that it is wrong to resist evil, and yet resistance to evil has no tendency whatever to call forth in me an emotion of moral disapproval, then my judgment is false." [29] It will have been noted in this quotation that a rational appreciation is really lacking, since the basis for pronouncing upon morality is not reason but a tendency experienced. Here is an important point of divergence in sociological morality and one that explains why its values for right and wrong cannot be anything else but subjective.

Restricting values to an emotional basis, sociological moral-

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[27] "The Principles of Sociology", p. 508.

[28] *J. of S. F.*, F. H. Hankins, Book Review of "What I Believe", by B. Russell, Vol. III, May, 1925, No. 4, p. 747.

[29] E. Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas", p. 17.

ity becomes subject to all the vicissitudes that human feelings can experience. C. H. Cooley says, "the right never remains precisely the same two days in succession", [30] and furthermore it depends upon the "organization of the impulses with which that mind finds itself compelled to deal". [31] As a consequence, education, therefore, but more properly training these impulses, will effect socially good values for right conduct. In his book, "Influencing Human Behavior", H. A. Overstreet advances the argument that any course of conduct, when thoroughly accepted by an individual may receive approval as right by him just as previously a contrary one was condemned for the same reason. [32]

The only stability feasible for the individual's appreciation of what is right as of what is wrong is his own emotions at the time. Conformity to an absolute norm of morality does not regulate conduct in sociology, for the individual makes his self-expression the criterion of his morality. In practice, this means that so long as the prospect is agreeable, no matter for what reason, sociology pronounces that conduct right. And why not? Should I not make convenience my guide in determining right and wrong, since sociology assures me that all morality is relative? And if only subjective values do result from such a premise, are they not sanctioned by sociology? Consequently, Judge Lindsey correctly enlists sociology in his support when he justifies companionate marriage by a subjective appreciation of its benefits. [33]

Companionate Marriage as I conceive it, as it has been explained time and time again by sociologists and as it has been discussed for years in the pages of the Journal of Social Hygiene, one of our outstanding sociological publications, is a state of lawful wedlock entered into for love, companionship and co-operation by persons who, for reasons of health, finances, temperament, etc., are not prepared at the time of their marriage to undertake the care of a family.

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[30] "Human Nature and the Social Order", p. 335.
[31] ibid. p. 329.
[32] p. 222.
[33] "The Companionate Marriage", p. 175.

Section III—*Necessitated Acts Deny Moral Values*

Final appreciation of the morality of a proposed act in sociology rests ultimately with the individual. Individual feelings or emotions have become rationalized, so that man no longer acts upon blind instincts, but consciously directs his conduct in accordance with these rationalized impulses, although they do not differ in kind from those previously experienced.[34] When, moreover, harmonious control has resulted from an integration of impulses in one individual self, so that all activities are consistent throughout, complete freedom from opposite impulses has been achieved. When only the useful impulses have had opportunity to develop, namely, those that are social rather than anti-social, the determined conduct is right or socially good. Furthermore, when these impulses have developed from instincts, natural or acquired, and have crystallized in the mores of a group, the conduct is also "moral".

Acting in conformity with his nature, man is free; and when nature has been socialized, his freedom produces morally good conduct, because he has been humanized by the process. Gradually he has been taught to think and to reflect on his own acts, and now realizes their lack of social character when compared with current social standards. Social ideals have struggled with egotistic impulses, and the stronger has predominated in his consciousness. Fortunate is the individual whose social environments abound because then social ideals and patterns laid down in his consciousness have the advantage. In such circumstances, the individual realizes moral freedom, because his character becomes well formed. "Realized moral freedom is simply the development of a character rich in sympathetic imagination and generous passion for others guided by reflective judgment as to ends and means."[35] Consciousness of incorporation in the social whole brings out all the latent qualities in man. Under the benign influence thus instituted, a complete integration occurs, so that the whole self participates in the active enjoyment of social righteousness. Such a person cannot conceivably do a moral

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[34] L. T. Hobhouse, "The Rational Good".
[35] J. A. Leighton, "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 290.

wrong, at least, as long as no anti-social pattern gains the ascendancy in his mind. Social evolution has effected the redemption from primitive savagery, as E. C. Hayes explains man's gradual evolution of freedom. "Social evolution, likewise, from paleolithic time has been compounding out of human experience the moral sentiments, the counsels of prudence, the arts of life, the languages and creeds that issue in the words and deeds of men." [36]

There is undeniably a sense of satisfaction in realizing that our actions are in harmony with the social ideal. This harmony indicates a more intimate consciousness of integrated social relations, by which our social sense is being perfected. An individual who has reached this development is conscious of his own intrinsic worth as a member of the social whole. He knows that in him has been realized the social ideal of his group, so that the personal type created in him is an expression of values by society. These are moral values moreover, since they represent the best that is conceivable in society at at its present stage of evolution.

Consciousness by an individual of his worth is regarded without doubt as exerting a real influence upon his life. These values present in his consciousness are recognized as the expressions of his very self and regarded by him as the means of continuance in that high social estate. They are considered necessary for social progress, too, by giving worth to society in general, and dignity and purpose to the individual in particular. V. D. Scudder, in her treatment of "Social Ideals" makes much of the motivation aroused in individuals by high moral values. It is just this idealism that gives vitality to society, thus assuring the individual of a medium for a continued happy existence. [37]

Deeper than all theories, apart from all discussion, the mighty instinct for social justice shapes the hearts that are ready to receive it. The personal types thus created are the harbingers of the victory of the cause of freedom. The heralds of freedom, they are also its martyrs. The delicate vibrations of their consciousness thrill through the larger

[36] "Sociology and Ethics", p. 65.
[37] In Ross and McCaull, "Readings in Civic Sociology", p. 228.

social self which more stolid people still ignore, and the pain of the world is their own. Not for one instant can they know an undimmed joy in art, in thought, in nature, while part of their very life throbs in the hunger of the dispossessed. All this by no virtue, no choice, of their own. So were they born; the children of the new age, whom the new intuition governs. In every country, out of every class, they gather; men and women vowed to simplicity of life and to social service; possessed by a force mightier than themselves, over which they have no control; aware of the lack of social harmony in our civilization; restless with pain, perplexity, distress, yet filled with deep inward peace as they obey the imperative claim of a widened consciousness. By active ministry, and yet more by prayer and fast and vigil, they seek to prepare the way for the spiritual democracy on which their souls are set.

Freedom is truly glorified in this eulogy, with the result that fuller freedom really means greater determinism. This statement can be explained quite logically, as will be found in J. A. Leighton's chapter on "The Ethical Meaning of Freedom".[38] The rejection of "mechanism" is well done by this writer, for he correctly points out that "it carries into a sphere in which they [i. e., concepts] are not relevant."[39] His final reason for condemning mechanism is thoroughly sound, and were it not impregnated with an anti-spiritual bias, as the following pages of the chapter demonstrate it is, this reasoning could just as well represent the Catholic position. The following quotation fully exemplifies how a particular statement may be correct, but really false when interpreted in its larger context.[40]

It is an a *priori* dogma which ignores the good empirical facts that human beings do recognize themselves to be responsible beings capable of initiative and choice, do approve and disapprove their own and others' acts and motives, do feel and sometimes obey their sense of obligation, do form or embrace ideals or plans of action and live by them and reproach themselves when they fail.

Nevertheless it is surprising that these statements could be so explained as to deny real, arbitrary, free choice in the will. This freedom, called "uncaused" by the sociologists,

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[38] "The Individual and the Social Order", pp. 279-293.
[39] ibid. p. 281.
[40] ibid. p. 282.

gives at once their viewpoint, namely, that no breaks can occur in nature, and that only determinism is possible under a scientific explanation of reality.

Volition, indeed, plays a very active part in Leighton's theory of freedom. However, freedom in his book does not mean that the "individual is always free at the instant of choice to choose either the course he does choose or some other." [41] Were this writer to have completed his first statement condemning mechanism he should have added also that the will has the power to abstain from choosing altogether, if it so elects. However, such a notion is not Leighton's, for the meaning intended for volition is clearly given, "whatever line of conduct the individual may elect to follow, he could not have done otherwise." [42]

Pure mechanism, justly condemned by Leighton, should not in turn be imputed to him, because the individual is acting with full consciousness and even by choice as Leighton explains and understands those terms. And although his definition is determinism, it is a "rational" kind of determinism if the writer's idea can be grasped. For he argues that self-development includes in itself rational qualities in their highest expression, so that possession of these attributes insures freedom not of an "uncaused" kind but of a scientific kind. "Freedom as the goal of self-development [explains this writer] is present in all sorts of degrees, from that lack of integration which constitutes dementia to fullest integration which is the highest sanity." [43] Consequently the fully free individual is he who has most social consciousness.

But this social consciousness is not all sufficient, a personal choice is needed. A proper notion of freedom is presupposed in correct moral values, since morality in its true meaning implies a spontaneous choice of good by the individual. Consciousness of having chosen the good when the possibility of a contrary choice was present, brings a satisfaction to the individual in that he has acted according to his conscience and so obeyed the law of God publicly, he has vindicated objective

[41] ibid. p. 285.
[42] idem.
[43] ibid. 283.

right and faithfully fulfilled his personal obligation. He has given homage to God through the submission of his will to God's will. His action has a value therefore, in fact a moral value, because his actions are concerned with conduct.

There is a conflict here, as at all other points, between moral theology and sociology. Values are derived in the former from a source extrinsic to nature; in the latter all values are from within.[44] The difference is not merely casual, because it is the clashing of two antagonistic interpretations of life. Although agreement may appear on the surface, the meanings are mutually opposite. More especially is this true, concerning values, for these serve, as summaries that show intrinsic worth in a definite way. Take, for instance, the question of freedom: the values placed upon individuals must necessarily differ under these two views of life as their fundamental viewpoints, are opposed one to the other. In theology, morality is God-given: in sociology it is man-given. Instead of a study of man leading to God, it has, under sociology deified man and dispensed with God.[45]

Values of any kind must have a secure philosophic basis, but the values in sociology are inadequate because the basis upon which they rest only partially represents man. "A similar development of a mechanistic or non-personality explanation of mental and social behavior is now in process and will unquestionably be achieved as rapidly as we devise methods of measuring individual and social adjustments of environmental pressures."[46] The field of morals no longer belongs to the speculative sciences, but now is on a par with the physical sciences. H. E. Barnes certainly subscribes to such an idea when he likens the solution of moral problems to an engineers' consultation. "The sympathetic and wholehearted co-operation of a large number of scientific experts would be essential to arrive at any reliable verdict as to an ethical problem."[47]

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[44] C. H. Cooley, "Social Process", p. 170; and p. 395.
[45] *J. of S. F.*, H. M. Parshley, "A Physiological Basis for Ethics," Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, pp. 786-9.
[46] *S. F.*, L. L. Bernard, "The Concept of Progress", Vol. IV, Sept. 1925 No. 1, p. 37.
[47] *J. of S. F.*, "Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 219.

Certitude in moral matters depends upon the skill one has in evaluating social causes. Cause and effect contain all social values, so that a knowledge of either term, is sufficient to determine the moral activity that resulted from the social cause, or was realized in the social effect. This activity may also be evaluated by the importance that society attaches to that cause or effect, since social values represent the concern that society has for its own activities. Since activties presuppose persons, social values are moral ones also, or more properly only their equivalents. The following establishes the connection between social activities and persons, and also states that "causal relations" really constitutes sociology. "In explaining these [social] activities which constitute the social process, the chief concern of sociology is with the causal relations between them." [48]

However, a person acts for a reason and because of a motive, or as the sociologist would say, in conformity to some social pattern laid down in man's social consciousness. According to J. A. Leighton, the impulse to action is only emotional, so that the motivation cannot be accorded the dignity of a rational conviction in the spiritual meaning of rational. The quality of the moving force indicated fixes the character of that force itself, as "self-realization is expressed always in the measure of integration of the self's original dynamic tendencies." [49] According to sociology, man's original self furthermore is not rational, but only becomes so, for "the self acts from impulses or appetites. In the course of its interaction with the environments the self becomes self-conscious." [50] Therefore, the appreciation possessed by an individual in sociology of his conscious activities is not precisely that predicated of him in moral theology, when that individual makes use of a similar exercise of rational consciousness. Furthermore, when it is realized that the "human self . . . responds to stimuli coming from the physical and social envi-

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[48] *A. J. of S.*, E. C. Hayes, "Some Social Relations Restated", Vol. XXXI, Mar. 1925, No. 3, p. 344.
[49] "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 282.
[50] idem., p. 283.

ronments in certain more or less specific ways",[51] the resulting activities are necessitated, not free as demanded by revealed religion. Hence the value of such emotionally motivated and stimuli-provoked actions in man can only have a like dignity. They cannot comprehend the spiritual qualities of man's rationlity. For this reason necessitated acts of conduct as explained in sociology as performed by a conscious human being do not have real moral value.

Section IV—*Denial of Responsibility Precludes Personal Moral Values*

Man understands that his activities are attributable to him in some way or other, so that the recognition of responsibility logically becomes an element in his conduct. It does make a difference what particular course of conduct is chosen, and the very foreknowledge of those anticipated results affects the individual's mental consciousness beforehand in a pronounced way. Very definite conviction about responsibility does exert a real influence upon the choices to be made.

In an interpretation of life where man recognizes a Supreme Lawgiver, and where that Lawgiver's Sovereignty is involved by the very acts of obedience or disobedience, responsibility has a very definite content. Under such a concept the value of this connection is necessarily a moral one, for man understands that his will is obligated and consequently, his action is conformed or not to God's Law. Man's very decisions redound to God's Glory, because concurrently man understands that all his faculties, as well as his being itself, are creations of this same God. Should he conform his will to God's will, he unifies himself by moral incorporation with the Divine Purpose expressed in the Universe and reflected in his own nature; should an opposite course have been elected, his conscience tells him of this lack of harmony, called Sin in its widest acceptation. Consequently, the very appreciation by the individual of this responsibility produces a set of moral values, the character of which determines the estimate of his own dignity as a person.

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[51] ibid. p. 283.

In sociology a secure basis for personal worth cannot be found. The sociologists' notion of responsibility does indeed have a value connected with it, but that value can only reflect the philosophic conceptions underlying the order of reality admitted by them. In their writings man, indeed, is made autonomous but his personal dignity is not enhanced thereby, for the simple reason that no First Reality can be found that is really worthy of man's homage. Finite potentialities such as are found in man argue dependence, and unless this elected First Cause is one worthy of man's known dignity, his appreciation of his personal dignity suffers necessarily. The value, therefore, that man attaches to the conscious recognition of responsibility cannot rise higher than the worth ascribed to the Prime Cause of all reality, That has caused the present order to exist. Various answers have been returned purporting to explain this First Cause and they range from a Personal, Intelligent and Infinite God to a "scientifically" induced "law of nature" evolved out of mere material forces of matter. Surely no real value could be based upon other than a Personal Being, for the individual realizes that he is a person himself, and that it is by his very intelligence as a person that any validity can be thought even to exist in a theory of conduct, whether socially conceived or otherwise. The Catholic notion takes full cognizance of man's finiteness. In other words, it means the recognition by man of his limitations, and really becomes an incentive for his reason to investigate the order of the universe in which he happens to find himself. Should man locate the cause of his being in any source other than an Infinite Being, the fault lies in the original analysis of his own finiteness.

In sociology, the values ascribed to man's responsibility reflect a false synthesis of life, which is due to an erroneous conception of reality. Because of the bearing of fundamental philosophic premises upon the formation of values in general, but more especially moral values, it is useful briefly to review these notions. Man's sense of responsibility must vary as his idea of prime causality in the universe changes.

In sociology, man's very knowledge about his conscious activ-

ities and their forseen results compels him to place a value upon those activities, because they are first of all his activities, and also because they are effective means of bringing about results influencing his life. Accepting the deterministic postulate, E. C. Hayes solves the problem from a viewpoint of naturalism, and readily enough admits values. In fact, he gives positive testimony for values because he insists that knowledge of necessitated causality alone can effect an intelligent responsibility in man. Explaining the results of determined choices as producing values he really makes them equivalent to moral values. "The moral effect of determinism is not only to reinforce motive but to intensify the sense of responsibility, that is, the sense of being a link in the causal chain, and of functioning beneficially or distinctively."[52] Responsibility therefore under determinism really prevents real moral values from appearing in man's actions. The great fear of sociologist is that man will free himself from his past by an act of "uncaused freedom," and thus "disrupt" the order of nature. To avoid such a catastrophe, the notion of responsibility must be adapted to determinism, for "it is meaningless to think of acts occurring without motives or to suppose that volition is the result of a mysterious caprice or sheer contingency." [53] Clearly responsibility felt by man is but another manifestation of the pervasive social sense of society.[54]

On the contrary, a man is a social outcome rather than a social unit. He is always, in his greatest part, also some one else. Social acts of his —that is, acts which may not prove anti-social—are his because they are society's first; otherwise he would not have learned them nor have had any tendency to do them.

Whatever values man may subscribe to are not those of his own individual appreciation, because in the order of things social life alone vitalizes him. "Self grows into richness, harmony and stability of content only through the identification of itself with other selves and with more universal inter-

[52] "Sociology and Ethics", p. 94.
[53] J. A. Leighton, "The Individual and The Social Order", p. 286.
[54] J. M. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development", p. 196.

ests."[55] Responsibility is really social not personal, and this denial by sociology of personal responsibility makes impossible a true notion of personal moral values, whereby a rational individual, could freely choose to honor God by thorough submission to His will.

Values make life worth living; so man's appreciation of things of value makes his own particular life in turn possess value. However, his appreciation depends as much upon himself evaluating as upon the worth of the object itself that is under consideration. Furthermore, when the very faculties in man that do the evaluating, are consciously recognized as gifts from God, the appreciation of values grows apace, because He is honored and glorified thereby. Man by using his faculties, as God intended he should use them, must also grow in appreciation of their worth for determining values in life, and also because the keener these faculties become by exercise and the more developed they are, the greater will be his mental powers. In fact, unless man so uses his intelligence he degrades himself, thereby lessening his power for appreciating values. Hence a scheme of life that frustrates man in the use of the only power, rationality, that can humanize him is harmful to his true interests and prevents appreciation of true value. Now sociology by denying rational control to man in the one department of life that especially marks him off as a man, fails by that much to give real value for the things of life. This is precisely what sociology does by making man's morality only a social product.

In the theological concept of life, the process is quite the reverse. Man's activity is not a mere vicarious one, even though man is not supreme in himself as he is said to be in sociology. Man actually performs the action even though he gratefully acknowledged that his powers, his being, in fact all creation, comes from God. It is precisely because God's power is only a concurrence with his own actions that responsibility is man's not God's. Everything that man has he owes to God through creation, either immediately as the soul, or

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[55] J. A. Leighton, Supra, p. 339.

mediately as his body, so that his moral obligation becomes all the more binding.

There is a certain determinism here, but not the kind that sociology understands. The meaning here is that man acts by using his rational powers whether obedience or disobedience characterizes his conduct, so his conduct is determined by the choice of the causality set in motion. Hence it can be truthfully said that volition does follow a determined course of action, when the will has decided upon a definite course of conduct. However the will could have equally as well elected a contrary course of action had it so decided. While it is true that a real natural energy is required in every act of the will in order that it may act, this exercise of energy should not be forced to serve as a sociological basis for a complete act of the will. In social determinism, as explained by sociology, this energy is made to fulfill a two-fold function, namely the mechanical action involved in the material counterpart of an act of volition, and the purely spiritual element of election which properly constitutes the act of the will.

The urge for autonomous activity in sociology, has awakened the genius of philosophic naturalism to erect an interpretation of man's very nature into a system of values capable of guiding his social conduct. Of course, the energy required for the will to function is a natural agency, but this natural energy does not predetermine how the will is to function, i. e., how it is going to decide. The existence of such energy for such action of the will is a primary postulate of the doctrine of the freedom of the will. The will is a spiritual faculty using a material organism for its operations. Now all the operations of this natural organism are natural energies, and, as such, are necessitated and must follow the laws of their nature. The will must use this apparatus for its decisions when it acts, but it is free to render any kind of decision it chooses. Moreover, the will in the presence of materials presented for choice may abstain from acting altogether. This means that in such cases, the will arbitrarily abstains from acting at all.

On the other hand, when all is materialistically explained,

we see value made to depend upon "emotional life", a basis that certainly does no credit to man's reason. A chapter heading in "The Companionate Marriage" entitled "The Chemistry of Love" has more than a metaphorical meaning when this truth regarding bases for moral values is understood.[56] Such a conclusion follows logically since even the perception of the finer values in life does not depend upon the spiritual part of man but upon his material nature only. It is not denied that love in man can be spiritual, but as explained in sociology both as to its origin and function, none of its real spiritual nature can remain. The following quotation states definitely that "tender sentiments and sweet influences of the human life" are the results initially of "a physical passion." If indeed these "sacred" values are initially physical, they must progressively remain so because no higher principle receives acknowledgment in sociology.[57]

> Not less fundamental than the satisfaction of hunger and the avoidance of pain of cold, is the satisfaction of the sexual appetite. This is a true animal instinct, universal in all, and powerful in its influence in the development of social order. Primarily, though merely an animal instinct, it gives rise to all of the love sentiments and the refined sexual relationships which lie at the foundation of the home. Only a physical passion in its primary consideration, it becomes a generalized sentiment absorbing the emotional life of man and giving rise to all of the tender sentiments and sweet influences of the home life.

Responsibility can only be vitalized by a material energy, since every vestige of spiritual powers in man has to be scrupulously expunged.

Section V—*Inadequate Sanction Destroys Moral Values*

The concept of social continuity is a vital one in sociology, for it contains in brief the whole content of that science. This statement refers to the unbroken chain that exists between social causes and their effects and holds good for all activities "discovered" in society. Man's conscious activities are

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[56] B. B. Lindsey, pp. 154 ff.
[57] F. W. Blackmar, "The Elements of Sociology", p. 201.

likewise included in this general formula, allowing no exception for volitional activity.

Of course much misconception attends, says the sociologist, upon the formula for "social continuities", so that the explanations offered by the protagonists of free will frequently violate this fundamental principle. What particularly is objectionable to the sociologists is the insistence by revealed religion upon the sanctity of personal freedom as a sine-qua-non of human morality. Their animosity is particularly aroused by the implications of such a doctrine, for its realization would disrupt the order of nature and make social science in its true sociological meaning an impossibility. Furthermore, a real antipathy manifests itself in their writings against this *calm* assumption of freedom as a fact by moral theology.

Because of these convictions, an unmistakable hostility against everything spiritual is greatly in evidence. Spiritual does not mean in this connection, simply a finely idealized order that epitomizes all that is great and noble in social relations. Spiritual refers to a definite order of reality that is existing and in an independent manner. And what is specially objectionable to sociology, is the assumed superiority in kind for this order as though it actually could exercise a real causality in purely human affairs. These latter activities are conceived in sociology as autonomous by their own right, and consequently fully able to furnish a naturalistic explanation for all phenomena, purely physical as well as truly social.

Considerations such as these are inseparably bound up with the theory of the freedom of the will. Sociology full well realizes that moral theology must insist upon this doctrine, for upon its substantiation depends all subsequent deductions in matters moral. Attributing a spiritual faculty in man, one that is capable of self-determination without regard to extraneous influences, invalidates a science of social relations, as conceived by sociology. Furthermore, such a spiritual force argues sociology, could not actually be known, for it could not be brought under control of scientific investigation, since it is admittedly superior to its criteria. Likewise, a spiritual reality such as demanded by the theological view, is not feas-

ible, since the actual findings in social relations do not justify an invention of such an hypothetical causality as arbitrary freedom. Its very predication, as a philosophic concept, is counter to all generally accepted and scientifically tested bases for philosophic inquiry. Finally, the doctrine of free will leads logically to an ultimate finality for all reality, even for the "so-called" spiritual reality itself, unless refuge is had in endless series of interrelated "superior" orders, a manifestly illogical subterfuge. Consequently, sociology must denounce all such mental "aberrations" ruthlessly, and set itself to the dissemination of saving social knowledge.

No illusions are entertained by either sociology or moral theology of a compromise, for the reason that fundamental differences in principles are involved. Propositions in the two sciences are mutually exclusive.

Unless these fundamental biases of sociology are continually kept in mind, the examination of a particular feature of its doctrine cannot be thoroughly made. If this charge of hostility to spiritual superiority is true for sociology in general, it is particularly so in the matter of sanction. In both interpretations of life, conduct is conceived to terminate in definite results which constitute real moral values.

To determine accurately therefore the values that necessarily result from the outcome of man's conscious activities, definite notions of the fundamentals involved must be obtained. And it is especially in the explanation of freedom, because of its essential connection with sanction, that these fundamentals appear in their true meaning.

Indeed, were they not present in all their stark reality, such statements involving values as the following might be misinterpreted. J. A. Leighton, as already seen in his defense of social determinism, does not subscribe to a spiritually-conceived philosophy so his use of "spiritual individuality" cannot mean spiritual values in the Catholic sense. "The highest sanction of the good life is reverence and love for the attainment and enjoyment of the fullest possible moral and spiritual individuality in others and in oneself." [58] Commenting

[58] "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 347.

further upon "the supernatural sanctions for good", he formally condemns supernatural sanctions. "An appeal of the above sort undermines the very nature of goodness as being the inherently worthful character of moral and spiritual selves."[59] Of course, the dependence of the "supernatural" upon the "spiritual" presupposed by me would not be admitted by sociologists. However these two concepts do really designate the same reality as far as resulting and inherent values in man's conduct are concerned. Yet sociology can have no part with supernaturalism. "Obligation is simply the resultant of conditions, not a fiat from above; and ethics like any other science should be devoted to the description of the conditions under which phenomena occur."[60]

Natural causation is deemed sufficient to account for obligation; so too is it capable of explaining whatever worth may be found in conduct. For J. A. Leighton, the very motivation for conduct is a natural product and lodged in the individual. It is regarded as "the reactions of their [i. e., men's] original impulsive natures to the social conditions of their nurture, to the effective social-moral and legal patterns of conduct." [61]

Human motives are consistently derationalized in sociology, so that whatever values, perhaps "social patterns", are present in consciousness cannot be genuine moral values. The following illustrates this point, and testifies to the necessary connection of sanction with free will.[62]

> Human motives are the product of stimuli and impulses derived from the chemical properties and processes in the human body, the biological past and the personal experiences of the individual; and conduct is, in a psychological sense, strictly determined, there being no place in modern psychology for the old metaphysical doctrine of free-will.

The reasoning faculty in man should not be thought to enjoy any special prerogatives over his other faculties. There is no warrant, says the sociologist, to consider it a thing set

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[59] ibid. p. 348.
[60] *J. of S. F.*, H. M. Parshley, "A Physiological Basis for Ethics", Vol. II, Sept. 1924, No. 5, p. 788.
[61] "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 345.
[62] H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 34.

apart and entitled to pre-eminence similar to that claimed by traditionalists for the will. Sociology is most insistent upon uniformity in man's faculties, for to make exception in favor of reason or volition would be a complete reversal of its fundamental naturalism. An explanation of mental phenomena that presupposes the very existence of the spiritual, involves a power higher than that known to be in nature through experimental knowledge, but this would be dualism. Such a hypothesis argues sociology, simply indicates a theory of knowledge that is not vindicated by scientific investigation.[63]

The modern spirit holds that all genuine knowledge arises from careful observation and analysis of the data of common human experience, and that all general principles or laws must be verifiable as statements of the ways in which physical bodies, living organisms and minds actually behave.

Man's mental powers therefore do not differ substantially from his purely physical powers. It needs hardly to be stated that sociology does not recognize "physical" in this usage, for an opposition is thereby set up, involving another and higher order of reality.

Values, cannot have the same meaning for sociology that they have in moral theology, where man is recognized to possess a spiritual and a material nature united into one individual unit, from which results his personality. Man's acts in consequence take their worth from the complete unit-man, in whom the predominant factor is his spiritual soul. Values under this synthesis are likewise spiritual, because they are mental apperceptions by man of an objectively real order, made up of separate and independently existing objects. This value could not be known unless the individual subscribes to a spiritual philosophy of life. So too will his appreciation of sanction for moral conduct be greatly inferior and inadequate unless the spiritual vitalizes his knowledge. Leaving the eternal realities out of consideration gives rise to a morality that has no justifying reason for its existence.

The rational, as understood by sociology, cannot exert

[63] J. A. Leighton, "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 101.

a real influence upon man's evaluation of his own conscious activities. And even though an incorrect appreciation of mental powers distorts sociological evaluations for morality, occasionally indications are discernible that seem to give a transcendent dignity to the purely human factors in morality. It is not unusual indeed to find eulogies of man's intellectual ability in these writings, just as though his rational faculties did possess inherent worth. F. H. Giddings, for example speaks of reason as a real factor in conduct, but certainly does not base his "values" upon the exigencies of an immutable moral law. [64]

> When we do things to or for our fellow beings not instinctively, or impulsively, or to gratify a desire to meddle, but rationally, we are trying to realize visualized ends. The original or primary ends in view when this undertaking begins are simple and egotistic. They are, first, to make those with whom we have contact and dealings, harmless; that is to say innocuous; second to make them unobjectionable, at least not obnoxious; and third, to make them not burdensome.

For the most part in these references, the strictly rational is not accentuated, although it does receive some recognition. Generally speaking, the emotional qualities are emphasized. [65]

Man's intellectual activities do not require the spiritual soul: full explanation of mental activities is now forthcoming without the "invention" of a spiritual principle. This is the testimony of psychology, according to R. C. Givler, who explains its present day popularity as precisely due to the reducing of "behavior to an intricacy of nervous discharges and mechanical motions. For all this the interest in psychology—psychology with the Psyche left out—is greater today than ever before." [66] The true criterion for mental powers then is not man's intellect, for whatever was formerly thought to require a spiritual cause for intellectual activity, is now properly explained by naturalism. [67] This same tendency to

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[64] *J. of S. F.*, "Social Work and Societal Engineering", Vol. III, Nov. 1924, No. 1, p. 9.

[65] F. A. Bushee, "Principles of Sociology", pp. 562-3; F. W. Blackmar, "The Element of Sociology", p. 184.

[66] In H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 518.

[67] C. H. Cooley, "Social Process", p. 170.

rule the spiritual and necessarily the supernatural "out of court" has been stated many times before. It is well, however, to show by actual statement that whatever moral values sociology belives to be attached to sanctions for conduct cannot come from an "unscientific" view of life as offered by revealed religion. Needless to say, the following writer's characterization of the supernatural is a travesty on God's dealings with man, but it does show that the true nature of conversions can be misrepresented to vindicate an autonomous morality. [68]

> If a man can do everything merely by willing it, there is of course no need to improve social conditions and make life more decent; indeed, his victory will be the greater, the more handicaps he has to overcome. Hence the parading of drunkards and criminals in certain churches until recent times as examples of what a man could accomplish by the "grace of God." The triumphs were usually shortlived, and the backslider followed closely in the wake of the revivalist.

Sociology, because of its naturalistic principles, cannot supply true values for sanctions in moral conduct.

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[68] R. M. Binder, "Major Social Problems", p. 304.

CHAPTER XX

SOCIOLOGY A NATURALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF LIFE

The present work makes no pretense of being a treatise in sociology: it is only a study about sociology. The materials investigated are the findings and recommendations of the "science of society" considered in relation to their ultimate values. Therefore, the present work is a study about sociology from the theological point of view undertaken for the purpose of appreciating in the light of man's eternal interests the final values in sociology.

There is an assumption of theological superiority in this statement, which is directly intended and is now explicitly stated. Does this "bias" prevent an impartial treatment of sociological statements, may be justly asked? I think not. Theological principles, while accepted as data, were not employed didactically, that is to say, their introduction into this work was governed by the specific sociological point under discussion. Hence a detailed exposition of theological doctrine was not made. The investigation was conducted in accordance with accepted primary truths of moral theology, and in this sense all theological investigation is "partial". The same criticism may be raised against sociologists, because they pre-judge "spirituality" when they limit reality by experimental criteria, thereby subscribing to a monistic theory of knowledge.

Because sociology concerns itself with conduct it was adjudged moral. Sociology is a moral treatise, not formally but none the less effectively. Because of these considerations, the treatment was not unfair, neither in the quotations made nor in the use of them. Man's conscious activities when analysed yield certain charateristic notes that are to be found in every act of conduct. Sociology itself recognizes these factors and regards them as social forces; so the elements referred to as of moral theology and the forces recognized by sociology sub-

stantially coincide. This similarity, almost identity, need not surprise us for both sciences undertake the investigation of the self-same material, but examine it from their own specific points of view. Their values differed radically, since mutually exclusive principles characterize sociology and moral theology. The theological point of view admittedly is the criterion whereby sociological values were measured.

These theological principles were assumed rather than established. Very frequently explicit statement of the theological position was not made but inferred, because the particular one meant is easily known by the subject discussed. No references were made to definite theological works because any standard and recognized edition of theological works professedly sets forth Catholic teaching. Fundamental notions, connected with theology and involved in this study, have received sufficient refinement to make them adaptable for the purposes of this study.

Values in sociology have been found to rest upon a naturalistic view of life, rather than a supernatural one. Because of this antagonism, sociology must return an answer to life that is at variance with moral theology to the extent that temporal interests oppose eternal ones. Perhaps definite summaries taken from the sociologists themselves will best show this difference.

Before proceeding, it is well to remark that sociology considers that morals result from relationships. "Modern ethics in the main is naturalistic" says J. A. Leighton who further makes clear his meaning by explaining humanism, which he eventually identifies with naturalism.[1]

> This is the meaning of humanism as a name for the general tendency of modern thought. The good life consists in the development and enjoyment of human powers in this world; in contrast with the view that the supreme good is wholly otherworldly or transcendent, the attainment of the Beatific Vision of communion with God, to be enjoyed through some mysterious and miraculous occurrence. Hence, humanism means the same thing as naturalism.

From this it is seen that morality, or the way of life, advocated

[1] "The Individual and the Social Order", p. 103.

by sociological treatises definitely repudiate the supernatural concept, so that opposition must characterize the comparison of them.

This "new morality" is not to be license, however. People will not be "lege soluti", but will be truly free, able to live under a rational concept of life. In this manner D. Drake describes progress in " The New Morality".[2]

> But with the spread of scientific and historical knowledge the supernatural conception of morality is bound to lose more and more ground, and morality is sure to be looked upon increasingly as sub-rational, as mere stereotyped habit and superstition. The only hope lies in teaching people generally that morality is rational, neither mystery nor a convention, but simply an observance of the laws of provident being.

A view such as this makes morality a most natural affair. It is neither a "mystery" nor a "convention" and so it is secured from traditionally received and authoritatively revealed precepts. Under the socialized notion of morality "right" has a sanctity about it that could not be derived from mere agreement between God and men or simply by men among themselves.

The "laws of provident being", as the socialized species is called, are to result from a scientific study of social relations, wherein are contained the secrets of right living. In fact, the word morality, when thus used by sociology, requires explanation. "Social action", or some such term, would probably express the idea better because morality in its traditional meaning lends itself to misunderstanding.

When the viewpoint of sociology is kept in mind, its great preoccupation about the implication of its terms is easily understood. Held by a theory of experimental knowledge, and encouraged by the successes in science, the study of man's conscious activities is regarded as a purely scientific study with no allowance for his spiritual faculties. Consequently morals are withdrawn from the domain of philosophy and revealed religion, to be introduced into the laboratory of the social scientist and engineer. These savants are unrestricted

[2] p. 21.

by "dogmatic" propositions that are to regulate their discoveries in advance for it appears as an absurdity scientifically to "plot" a way for conduct, when some benevolent, but more often capricious, being can simply reveal an "absolute" morality.

The foundation for the new morality cannot be metaphysics either, for that finely-spun theorizing revels in the realm of speculation rather than that of practical life; neither can a spiritualized psychology furnish a sounder basis, because it rests upon a mistaken concept of reality. Hence L. L. Bernard with "righteous" indignation scores the poetical, if you will, but really "impious" beliefs originating from a God-controlled concept of society.[3]

These people who can hear or see only what fits their dogmas and gives them the satisfaction of the day-dream, still have much of the spirit of the theologian and the metaphysician, persistently believing either that providence will not permit a hair of the heads of the faithful to be injured.

Sociology truly anxious for man's welfare, has greater concern that ethics be scientifically established than for its own vindication as a science. Hence, whether ethics is a derivative or not, or whether it takes precedence over other social sciences, does not really change the basic assumptions of naturalism. Considerations of the relative importance of ethics or sociology are not so important after all; the menace of a "superstitiously" conceived morality or a "fabled" supernaturalism says sociology must be combatted with consistent vigor and resolute determination. Attuned perfectly to man's actual social life, ethics as thus described, is able to develop into a scientific interpretation of life, because of its very naturalism,[4]

Ethics, in thus being supported by either a naturalistic metaphysics or by an empirical psychology, is thus a derivative science. Were this not the case, it could have no claim to be preferred to the fugitive aphor-

[3] *J. of S. F.*, "The Concept of Progress", Vol. III, May 1925, No. 4, pp. 621-2.
[4] R. C. Givler, in H. E. Barnes, "The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences", p. 482.

isms of morality or the speculative fairy tales of supernaturalism. Ethics is better than either of these because it is based upon related coherent knowledge that comes from a wide variety of sources, and is consequently subject to more checks upon its errors. It is indeed this give-and-take of ethics, and not either its rigidity or its infatuation for an absolute truth, which has made it, of all human pursuits, the most worthy of incessant consideration.

Man must work out his own salvation with assurance and scientific precision and not depend upon some "deus ex machina" to supply him with a ready-made morality. This dependence upon self in opposition to some extraneous source of moral law holds equally for unerring revelation or for illuminating glimpses seen by reason of an ideal moral order supposed to reveal in their own way the Divine Prototype. Society must seek its ideals in its own "vitals" and by means of its own resources, for no other way is open whereby men may be socialized says W. G. Sumner, because "morals can never be revealed or intuitive. They are historical, institutional [i. e., of society] and empirical." [5]

The "empirical" requirement for morality is made much of by J. M. Baldwin in his "Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental Developments", and his insistance upon it illustrates the complete divorce of sociology from supernaturalism. [6] The full force of its naturalism may be seen in the following statement of H. E. Barnes. This writer summarizes all that has been thus far said, and leaves no doubt as to sociology's position in the discussion of a final sanction for morals. [7]

Sociology attempts to catalogue and analyze the various geographical, biological, psychological and economic forces which produce and determine the place and mode of group or social life. It likewise aims to describe and interpret the results of this group life in social behavior patterns, folkways, and mores, and the more permanent institutional controls and guides. Embracing, as it does, both the causes and results of group life, it is the basic social science and the only one which can hope to give a generalized view of the social process and social causation as a whole.

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[5] "Folkways", p. 29.
[6] pp. 303-4.
[7] In E. C. Hayes, "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences", p. 405.

Sociologists are rightfully concerned about the basis for morality. These writers clearly see, and in this they agree with the Catholic theologian, that as a man thinks so he acts; that knowledge precedes action; that values forseen regulate and give worth to conduct. W. P. Montague, states these truths succintly, but denounces "authority" as a basis for morality, because human nature must not lean upon any reality other than that which has been experimentally examined, tested and verified. Correct morality must depend upon men not God, for the former is known to exist while the latter has never been "scientifically" demonstrated.[8]

> The consequences of authoritarianism are even more serious for ethics than for religion. For suppose that a youth has been taught that the primary reason for preferring the good life to the life of evil and ugliness is that the former life is commanded by God. If later on that youth comes to doubt the existence of God or the authenticity of his alleged revelation, he will automatically lose the primary reason for preferring good to evil. To the extent that his morals have been founded on his religion, the loss of the latter will result in the loss of the former.

This statement brings out a marked characteristic of sociology, namely, its autonomy in morals. Commmenting upon this feature, R. L. Finney states that "the real authority back of the moral law is the age-long experience of the race. A good parent is the mouthpiece of the wise old centuries."[9] Judging by this statement, authority does have a real place and function in sociology, but it is something radically different from the notion of God as the supreme and final sanction of the moral law. The sociological notion rather converts the "functioning" of the social whole into an "authority" and repudiates all reference to a fancied and extraneous being from whom moral obligations are supposed to derive their binding force.[10] In this analysis, authority becomes "rational" instead of being superimposed upon man from without. What is more complimentary to man's ability is the fact, as J. P. Lichtenberger insists, that the "saving" social knowledge

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[8] In Ogburn and Goldenweiser, "The Social Sciences and their Interrelations", p. 480.
[9] "General Social Science", p. 132.
[10] E. A. Ross, "The Outlines of Sociology", p. 474 ff.

furnishing the real sanction to social laws is the sociological notion and that it was inductively built up. Its formulation is a reliable reflex of actual conditions, because this social authority has been experimentally discovered and rests upon scientific data. Hence a true social philosophy is possible to man so that he can correctly appreciate the social values resulting from his conduct.[11] Sociology therefore can solve all problems since it alone deals with human life as we can know it and as it exists.[12]

Under this definition of morality a complete and systematic code has not as yet been worked out in all details. H. E. Barnes does not seem so sanguine of results, although his remarks seem calculated to stimulate real scientific study of society. It will be noted that great effort is made by this writer to keep sociology "pure" at its source. Commendable as this example of devotedness may be, it is not due altogether to an altruistic motive. In reality it is part of the struggle for social survival, since man's very existence depends upon the control of social processes. The general outlook indeed, is none too satisfying:[13]

> Two thousand years of religion, philosophy and metaphysics have left us no reliable and definitive body of rules for conduct, either personal or social. A hundred years of sociology have done little better. Very few sociologists have presented views on conduct which have been other than their childish theologically derived prejudices, obscure nomenclature and expression. Some have generalized vaguely with a false air of scientific objectivity, but when they have become specific their views have not diverged markedly from the codes of conduct issued by the Catholic, Methodist and Baptist churches.

Despite the lack of co-ordination in sociological principles necessary for the guidance of conduct, writers like B. B. Lindsey have not hesitated to make practical applications of these principles to everyday life. In a sense, their action is defensible, since even the little definite knowledge gained should

[11] J. P. Lichtenberger, "Development of Social Theory".
[12] C. A. Ellwood, in E. C. Hayes, "Recent Developments in the Social Sciences", pp. 1-49.
[13] *J. of S. F.*, Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct", Vol. III, Jan. 1925, No. 3, p. 218.

at once be turned to practical advantage. In his "Revolt of Modern Youth" his representations would have more merit, had his accounts of the "discarded" and "out-worn" morality been better understood by him. However, here as well as elsewhere in sociological writings, is only reflected a defect far too common in works that profess to be scientific productions. Even a more striking example of misrepresentation is seen in "Companionate Marriage", where a false notion of "chastity" has been made to serve as the foundation of an argument for the new morality and a condemnation of morality as taught by revealed religion.[14]

> For a real chastity is a state of mind, a way, not of foregoing love, but of evaluating it. Such chastity is not easily had. It is a product of culture and freedom; and it is not necessarily in agreement with our prevailing sex traditions. As judged by those traditions it may even appear unchaste. For mere conformity to a prescribed code, a real chastity substitutes moral responsibility, common sense, good judgment, and a sincere desire to respect other people's rights. It would base sex conduct on ethics, not on a compulsory morality which has never heard of ethics and which cares nothing for what is genuine in conduct.

Two prominent features of sociological morality are naturalism and the autonomous notion of sanction. These two aspects underlie all the pronouncements of sociology upon the meaning of social relations in their origin and future existence. Neither can these qualities be considered merely accidental, for by philosophic postulate for the theory of social knowledge, no other explanation is possible. Furthermore, their influence upon man's ideals of conduct is necessary, since man's very knowledge is represented to him as naturalistic and autonomous. When, indeed, it is realized that naturalism pervades all knowledge and enters into the explanation of the very "why" of things, this feature of sociology is really anterior to all consideration of moral values.

Whatever traits will finally characterize social morality, must take their quality from these primary considerations. As man believes that he is or is not dependent upon a Supreme Being, in that same manner will his morality be formed. In

[14] p. 304.

the scheme of life, when God's place is not denied him by a false philosophy, morality finds its ultimate sanction in God, not only for its obligatory force but principally for its content. Should morality be man-made as is the case in sociology, final moral values produced under such are truly inadequate, for they comprehend only a part of man's nature and the lesser part at that. That man should be so prone to break down the barrier that separates him from the brute creation is a surprising fact, but the attempt is certainly the one distinguishing mark of sociology, as that science is expounded by non-Catholic writers.

In his masterly article dealing with these phases of sociology, P. H. Furfey fully appreciates the need for and efficacy of fundamental conceptions for a proper view of life. His article, "Some Trends in Modern Social Theory", supports the contentions of these pages that sound morality must rest upon an objectively real order, which indeed depends upon an Uncaused First Cause. Furthermore, his insistence upon the place of "moral values" in sociology, sets forth in clear and concise language the conclusion of my investigation, namely that an abstract social concept cannot furnish a sound basis for morality. Therefore the incorporation of his conclusions will serve to end my modest efforts to determine "Final Moral Values in Sociology".[15]

For in the eyes of the Church moral values are supreme. She is committed to a very particular system of moral principles because Divine Revelation has given her an insight and a point of view in relation to human conduct which the non-Catholic sociologist lacks. While these divinely revealed truths are data for the theologian rather than the philosopher, they guide the latter and teach him the supreme importance of moral principles.

The Catholic thinker sees everything in relation to eternity. For him, applied sociology is not an end in itself but a means to a higher end—the salvation of human souls. For this reason the philosophical approach, taking account as it does of moral values, will always be exceedingly important in the eyes of the Catholic.

The Catholic social scientist of the future must recognize the coordinate importance of the experimental and the philosophical approach.

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[15] The American Catholic Philosophical Association. Fourth Annual Meeting, p. 69.

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